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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF CONTEXTUAL RESTRICTION IN
REFERENCE-TRACKING
MAY 2012
ANDREW ROBERT MCKENZIE
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Seth A. Cable and Professor Angelika H.E.S. Kratzer
This dissertation explores the semantics and syntax of switch-reference (SR).
It makes novel generalizations about the phenomenon based on two empirical
sources: A broad, cross-linguistic survey of descriptive reports, and semantic field-
work that narrowly targets the Kiowa language of Oklahoma. It shows that previ-
ous attempts at formalizing switch-reference cannot work, and offers a new theory
of switch-reference that derives the facts through effects that emerge from the in-
teraction between the syntax and the semantics.
The empirical investigation results in four major findings: First, SR is intro-
duced by its own head, instead of being parasitic to T◦ or C◦. Second, switch-
reference can track Austinian topic situations. Third, it must track topic situations
when it is found with coordination, and it cannot do so with intensional embedded
clauses. Finally, generalizations or theories based solely on the syntax are not able
to account for these facts.
vi
These findings are explained by analyzing switch-reference as a pronominal
head in the extended verbal projection of the embedded clause. This head intro-
duces a relation of identity or non-identity between two arguments. One of these
is in the dominant clause, the other is the highest indexed constituent in the sister
of the SR head. The arguments are selected indirectly, through binding structures
that are interpreted as λ-abstraction. The clausemate argument is bound by the SR
head; the properties of feature valuation derive the height constraint. The pronoun
introduced by the SR head is bound by the connective. Binding by the connective
results in the interpretation of the SR-marked clause as a property. This property
is then ascribed to an argument in the dominant clause. This theory accounts for
the generalizations, and makes fruitful predictions about other aspects of switch-
reference, notably when it tracks non-referential subjects.
This dissertation improves our understanding of switch-reference, of situation
semantics, and of reference-tracking in general. It ties reference-tracking to con-
textual restriction by use of topic situations, which are anaphoric pronouns used
to restrict sentential interpretation. It provides the first solid evidence of mor-
phology sensitive to situations. In addition, the theory of switch-reference pro-
posed here relies on independently-motivated mechanisms in the grammar. This
reliance links switch-reference to other mechanisms of co-reference from inside an
embedded clause, and finds a solid place for switch-reference in linguistic theory.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Switch-reference is a morpheme occurring at the juncture of two clauses that
typically indicates whether the subjects of those clauses co-refer. This dissertation
will explore cases that are not so typical— many languages have been reported
to use switch-reference in unexpected ways. These unexpected uses, found across
the world, are observed to exhibit the same behavior. They indicate a maintenance
or shift in the ‘scene’ from one sentence to the next. The shared purpose indicates
that instead of radically changing our view of how switch-reference works, we
should incorporate these scenes into our theory.
1.1.1 The proposal in brief
This dissertation begins by showing that switch-reference is introduced by its
own head in the extended verbal projection, rather than being dependent on an-
other head. It also shows that relying on morphosyntactic facts does not suffice to
understand the phenomenon; a semantic investigation is necessary.
The dissertation then makes two empirical claims, and offers a new theory of
switch-reference to account for them. The first claim is that switch-reference can
track the topic situations of the joined clauses, rather than the subjects. A topic
situation is a semantic object, a silent pronoun that refers to the part of the world
that the sentence is about, and on which its truth depends. This claim accounts
for the ‘scene-tracking’ effects, and allows us to maintain the basic use of switch-
reference as a reference-tracking device.
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The second claim is that switch-reference always tracks topic situations when
it is found with coordinating conjunctions, whose clauses contain a topic situation
pronoun. When switch-reference occurs with intensional subordinating connec-
tives, whose clauses lack a topic situation pronoun, it tracks the subject. This
derives the observation that the unexpected uses of switch-reference never occur
with intensional connectives.
I then propose a theory of switch-reference that will derive these claims with a
combination of syntactic and semantic structures. The switch-reference head is a
complex pronominal head. It merges above the inflectional layer of its clause, and
selects the highest argument below it. It also introduces a variable that is related
to the selected argument by a relation of identity or non-identity. This variable
is then bound by the connective, creating a property that adjoins to the dominant
clause.
1.1.2 Results
The main empirical result of this dissertation is a broader understanding of
switch-reference. It makes new generalizations about switch-reference that can be
tested in many other languages. The theory of switch-reference it offers is the first
to take into account the effects that emerge from the interaction of independently
motivated structures in the syntax and the semantics.
These empirical results have theoretical import as well. It creates a link be-
tween switch-reference and other types of cross-clausal reference. More narrowly,
it provides the first clear demonstration of morphology being sensitive to situa-
tions. Situations have proven extremely useful in understanding semantic phe-
nomena, but had never been ‘seen’, either as overt pronouns or through its inter-
actions with the morphology.
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By adding to our understanding of switch-reference, this account opens new
avenues of research. It establishes the first well-supported link between switch-
reference and the context, which is found in hundreds of languages around the
world. Many of these languages are underdocumented and endangered, and this
result can aid other researchers and teachers in filling those gaps in our conscious
understanding of these languages.
The methodological result is support for the use of semantic fieldwork in lin-
guistic research, especially on underdocumented languages. This study has relied
on elicitation oriented at felicity judgments rather than grammaticality judgments,
so the dissertation discusses methods and tasks used to conduct the investigation.
1.1.3 Outline of the dissertation
Chapter One discusses the research methodology and introduces the reader
to the Kiowa language, which is the empirical focus of the study. Chapter Two
introduces the reader to switch-reference, and employs a comprehensive look at
its use around the world to argue against any theory reliant on morphosyntactic
facts alone. It also argues that switch-reference is introduced by its own head, and
critiques Finer’s (1984) theory of the phenomenon. Chapter Three introduces non-
canonical switch-reference. It argues against Stirling’s (1993) account of switch-
reference, and proposes two hypotheses: That switch-reference is tracking topic
situations, and that it always and only does so with coordination. It then dis-
cusses semantic fieldwork that successfully tested these hypotheses. Chapter Four
provides a structure of switch-reference capable of handling its various uses and
configurations, and provides the first thorough compositional semantics of the
phenomenon. Chapter Five discusses a few open questions and summarizes the
dissertation.
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1.1.4 Note to the reader
Before we begin, let me mention that the exposition in this dissertation will
contain thorough background explanation of the key concepts. Some of these ex-
planations might seem naïvely superfluous to you. However, it is necessary not
only for the demonstrative purposes of subject mastery required in a doctoral dis-
sertation, but also to instruct readers who will have come from a wide variety of
linguistic backgrounds. The central argument brings together several disparate
concepts from different linguistic subfields. While these are all crucial in the de-
velopment and understanding of the argument, they are little understood outside
their subfields. I learned this from the questions I’ve fielded from helpful audi-
ences at the various talks I’ve given on material herein contained. Therefore, I
cannot assume that any particular reader is already familiar with every pillar of
the argument.
For instance, while switch-reference is well-known to descriptivists and ex-
perts in indigenous languages (e.g., Americanists), it is not well-known to theo-
retical linguists or experts of the most widely studied languages. Situation se-
mantics is not familiar to all semanticists, much less linguists whose specializia-
tions lie elsewhere. Even the formal, compositional, truth-conditional semantic
framework I will use is not familiar to every linguist. Finally, there’s the Kiowa
language, which is spoken by few. It is relatively well-known in scholarly circles,
compared to the five thousand or more languages that get no attention at all, but
little is widely known about it. I hope that this book fills these gaps to some ex-
tent, demonstrating the value of each part, and bringing together researchers from
different areas of linguistics.
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1.2 Methodology
This section discusses the methodology used for this study, which can be sum-
marized as semantic fieldwork using a mix of data sources. Linguistic study of a
language requires working with people who speak that language fluently and na-
tively. Sometimes, the researcher or some of their colleagues are native speakers,
and they can serve as their own sources. I am not a native speaker of the Kiowa
language, nor have I achieved native-like fluency. Therefore, fieldwork with native
speaker consultants has been crucial.
1.2.1 Linguistic fieldwork
This study is based on data collected through a fieldwork methodology reliant
on a mix of techniques. Some of the data was directly elicited, some was collected
from spontaneous speech, and some from texts recorded and transcribed by earlier
speakers and scholars.
Fieldwork is one of two basic ways that linguists collect data from native speak-
ers. The other is through experiments. A linguistic experiment involves hav-
ing a large number of people perform a narrow range of tasks designed to in-
form us about a single phenomenon that has been strictly controlled for. Partic-
ipants, called ‘subjects’, only participate for a short time, and their contribution
is strictly anonymous. The value of experiments comes from the elimination of
single-speaker effects, as well as the provision of results that can be analyzed for
statistical significance.
The research presented in this dissertation contains no linguistic experiments,
for two principal reasons. The first is that it was more desirable to build longer-
term relationships with the participants. The second is that there remain so few
speakers of Kiowa, spread out over such vast distances, that any experiment would
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be extremely difficult to conduct, and any statistically significant result would be
unlikely. Instead, this study relies on fieldwork.
Linguistic fieldwork involves having a small number of people (sometimes just
one person) perform a broad range of tasks designed to inform us about numerous
phenomena. Participants, called ‘consultants’, usually participate for long peri-
ods of time, sometimes decades, and usually take great pride in being credited
explicitly for their contribution. Some will even co-author articles and books. The
value of fieldwork comes from the ability to quickly investigate a wide variety of
subjects, the chance of encountering interesting data through the speakers’ spon-
taneous speech, and the personal connection to the people and the community
where the fieldwork takes place.
1.2.2 Data collection logistics
In this section, I will discuss the logistics of this study. Early stages were self-
funded, but the bulk of the fieldwork, and all of the equipment, was funded by a
Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant from the National Science Foundation
([#BCS-084390]). One of my thesis committee chairs, Dr. Seth Cable, is listed
as Primary Investigator for administrative purposes, but I conducted all of the
fieldwork.
1.2.2.1 Consultants and locations
This study is built on fieldwork that I conducted in several stages from Decem-
ber 2006 to September 2009, with follow-up in the summer of 2010. Most of it was
conducted on site in Oklahoma, either at the Kiowa Tribal Complex in Carnegie,
or at the homes of the speakers, in Carnegie and Mountain View. Some of the data
was collected in sessions conducted on the telephone, using landlines to maximize
sound clarity.
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My main consultants were Christina Simmons, George and Marjorie Tahbone,
and to a lesser extent Carole Willis and Melva Wermy. I also benefitted from great
discussions with Dr Gus Palmer, Jr., and Alecia Gonzalez.
1.2.2.2 Recording and storage
Early sessions (before the grant) were not recorded except by field notes. Nearly
all the sessions after the awarding of the grant were recorded and stored. The
recordings were conducted with equipment designed for easy set up and porta-
bility. The sound quality turned out to be less than pristine, especially with back-
ground noise (air conditioners, children running around). I accepted that loss in
sound quality as a cost for portability, especially since the study was not phonetic
or phonological in nature. I used an audio-technica AT-8004 multidirectional mi-
crophone, mounted on a table stand. Since it was multidirectional, it permitted
sessions with multiple speakers at the same time. The microphone was plugged
directly into a Sony ICD-UX70 recorder, which was able to store dozens of hours of
recordings. I backed up the recordings each night in multiple locations, to ensure
their preservation.
1.2.2.3 Analytical tools
I cleaned up and pieced apart the recordings with the Audacity program, and
when it was helpful, I used Praat to verify tone markings, etc. Since there was no
phonetic analysis required, there was little work done in this regard.
1.3 Data collection methods
This section discusses speaker tasks and data collection methods. I took care
to employ different tasks and methods precisely to profit the most from each one’s
advantages, while minimizing each’s disadvantages. First, I will discuss the major
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speaker tasks, and some major practical issues concerning them that I encoun-
tered. Then, I will discuss different collection methods, which, despite their parti-
sans’ claims, are all useful.
1.3.1 Speaker tasks
I had speakers perform the two basic types of task used for linguistic investi-
gations: Judgment tasks, where speakers determine the grammaticality of an ex-
pression submitted to them; and production tasks, where speakers speak, sign, or
write expressions. I consider the task of translation to be a type of production task,
although it does involve some judgment.
Typical fieldwork sessions began with simple translation tasks. These would
often just be word translations (“How do you say ’turkey’?”). They take some time
to get through, but they are very useful because they warm the speaker up, and
are often the source of interesting lexical items that can be used when constructing
data later on. I often used words elicited at the beginning of a session throughout
the session. Doing so provided a sense of continuity, demonstrated to the speaker
the relevance of the opening task, and was often a lot of fun, like one session where
we kept building phrases with s´¯o
¯
gà ([s´˜o:wgjæ]), the Kiowa word for ‘flirt’.
Translations were also useful in later stages, as well. Because English has no
switch-reference, simply having people translate ’X and Y’ would give a useful
example. Care must be taken, however, because of the difference in structures used
across languages to get similar meanings across. For instance, many languages
don’t have an adjective “heavy”, but instead use a verb which could be translated
as “be heavy,” but which cannot be used without some verbal marking. This is
often the case in Kiowa.
Sometimes, an English expression can be translated in multiple ways. For in-
stance, a Kiowa speaker would translate ‘my car’ as n´¯au-k`¯au, literally ‘me-car’.
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However, if you made a sentence containing the English expression, the corre-
sponding Kiowa phrase might differ. We might expect the translation of the as-
sertion ‘This is my car’ to be ´¯E
¯
dè n´¯au-k`¯au d´¯au. (‘this me-car is’). However, it is
generally translated as ´¯E
¯
dè k´¯au é
¯
d´¯au, literally ‘this car is to me’.
This difference is also apparent when dealing with the translation of func-
tional items. One difference I often encountered was in English clauses with when.
These are usually translated into Kiowa with the postposition `¯e
¯
. But sometimes,
in episodic contexts, an English when-clause was translated as a simple conjoined
clause. Instead of saying ‘When X, Y’, the consultant would say ‘X and Y’.
(1) a. Elicitandum: When John came in, Bill sat down.
b. John
J.
J.
∅−
[3s]
h´¯eb`¯a
he´:jb-a`
enter-pf
nàu
nO˜
and-DS
Bill
B.
B.
èm
e˜m−
[3s:rfl]
s´¯au.
sO´:
sit down.pf
‘John came in and Bill sat down’ (f.n.)
This wasn’t altogether uncommon, and even in English this type of ‘substitution’
occurs, because the use of and signals a strong link between the events that could
include the meaning of when or if.
When encountering unexpected translations like this, it is not unheard of for
linguists to become flustered or even frustrated with the speaker. This is especially
the case when our expectations are heightened by submitting examples culled
from previously published research. However, we must remind ourselves that
translation often varies depending on the context. If we, who design the research,
fail to provide enough context to control for unexpected translations, we can only
blame ourselves for their appearance.
Judgment tasks rely on the speakers to determine whether an expression sub-
mitted to them is acceptable. The judgment is typically a grammaticality judg-
ment: Is the expression allowed by the language’s grammar? To perform this
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task, a speaker must subconsciously access the grammar that they acquired as a
child. This accessing is called an ‘intuition’. Linguistic intuitions are a very reli-
able indicator of grammaticality, and thus a reliable indicator of the grammatical
knowledge of the speaker. However, there are biases that risk preventing a judg-
ment from reflecting that knowledge accurately— satiation effects (Goodall 2011),
single-speaker effects (dialect, idiolect), and prescriptive effects.
The two basic tasks, judgment and production, are used by linguists both for
experiments and for fieldwork. Besides the differences in task, the linguistic per-
formance environment where the tasks are performed matters as well. Different
environments require different data collection methods. Linguists have debated
the relative usefulness of particular environments: uncontrolled or ‘real-world’
environments are more natural, while artificial or laboratory environments are
better controlled. The debates mirror to some respect the larger methodological
battles between generative and anthropological approaches. However, I employ
each of these in those instances where they are the most useful.
1.3.2 Collection methods
1.3.2.1 Introspection
Introspection is the easiest method of linguistic data collection: The linguist
performs judgment or production tasks in their mind. The method is easy for
three reasons. First, since everyone speaks some language, practically anybody can
do judgment or production tasks (albeit with some training). Second, it requires
no logistical efforts, so it can be set up quickly. Third, any task can be quickly
replicated by anyone capable of reading the results. This ease has led it to being the
most commonly used method of data collection in linguistic theory. Its usefulness
in that regard is unquestionable. However, it requires that the linguist be fluent
enough in the target language to judge and produce data with the quality and
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naturalness of a native speaker. My command of Kiowa does not permit me this,
so I had to eschew introspection for elicitation.
1.3.2.2 Elicitation
Elicitation is a methodology that is derived from the introspective approach.
Essentially, it involves having other people perform introspection, and reporting
the results. It requires some logistical effort to enlist speakers as consultants,
whether for the study itself or any replications of it. It is also difficult to run
speakers through the countless iterations of data required for thoroughness, espe-
cially if they do not share the linguists’ scientific curiosity about the more obscure
facets of the language. Despite being more difficult than introspection, elicitation
does lead to the same type of results, and often with better quality.
It is also useful because it balances the ’wildness’ of collecting natural speech
and the unnatural strictness of a linguistic experiment. Like experiments, elici-
tations are controlled (usually), they provide negative evidence, and they can be
focused on one phenomenon. However, they do lack the statistical rigor and ef-
ficiency of experiments. Like natural collection, elicitation involves one-on-one
interaction with consultants, which develop into long-lasting working relation-
ships. The personal nature of elicitations can open a door for the researcher into
the community, building trust that the research is helpful and beneficial. However,
they do lack the free flow and nearly-complete naturalness of recorded speech.
1.3.2.3 Semantic elicitation techniques
This section describes in detail the techniques used to elicit data. The speci-
ficity is necessary because of the semantically-oriented research, which requires a
slightly different technique than is typically used.
As I mentioned earlier, elicitation is typically employed to draw out facts con-
cerning grammaticality. The judgment and production tasks tell us about the core
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’grammar’ of a language: the syntax, phonology, and morphology. However, the
type of fieldwork involved in this dissertation is semantic. The major difference
between semantic fieldwork and other types of fieldwork is that it involves felicity
rather than grammaticality.
Felicity describes whether an expression is appropriate for the context in which
it is uttered. When an expression is appropriate, it is considered felicitous; when
inappropriate, it it is infelicitous. Infelicitous expressions are marked with a #
rather than a *. This appropriateness can be semantic or pragmatic. That is, an
expression is felicitous for a particular context if it is true given that context, and
pragmatically appropriate for it.
There are many reasons why a particular expression might be infelicitous. For
example, imagine this context:
Context:
You are holding a green book with no jacket, and you ask me what color
it is. I have no problems seeing colors.
Given this context, the sentence The book is green would be grammatical and
felicitous. But the sentence The book is red would be infelicitous given the same
context, even though it is grammatical, because it is false. Likewise, the sentence
My parents met in Iran would be infelicitous, because although it is true, it is prag-
matically inappropriate (it violates the Gricean Maxim of Relevance (Grice 1989)).
The sentence The jacket looks old is infelicitous because it contains a presupposi-
tion failure. Crucially, all of these sentences are grammatical— as Chomsky (1957)
famously pointed out, semantic and grammatical appropriateness do not always
match.1 This is the case even if we use words we do not understand, such as a
1The point had been made earlier, by Bertrand Russell (Quadruplicity drinks procrastination),
Lucien Tesnière (Le silence vertébral indispose la voile licite), or any number of language games (e.g.,
cadavre exquis). But Chomsky developed the point to highlight the modularity of the grammar and
the independence of syntactic structure and grammaticality from semantic meaning (and felicity).
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sentence like A seneschal durst not mulct his liege. It sounds grammatical, even if it
sounds non-sensical to a modern speaker of English.2
Since felicity depends on a context, any felicity-oriented elicitations require a
context as well. As Matthewson (2004) points out, grammaticality-oriented elicita-
tion typically avoids context, so it cannot suffice for semantic fieldwork. Matthew-
son discusses three major obstacles, which any semantic fieldworker must bear in
mind.
First, simple translation tasks are completely useless for uncovering felicity
conditions. Sentences cannot be asked about in isolation, because of the nature of
semantic content. Semantics is truth-conditional3, so sentences must be evaluated
or produced with respect to what the judge knows or believes about the world.
The only way to control for that knowledge is to put it in the speaker’s mind with
a context.
Secondly, most semantic objects have ineffable meanings— they cannot be eas-
ily put into words. As Matthewson points out, there is no point asking a native
speaker of English what the means. Doing so is essentially forcing the consultant
to make an analysis on the spot. This not only stands a minuscule chance of pro-
viding a useful result, but runs the risk of humiliating a consultant unable to pro-
vide a cogent impromptu analysis. Ineffability is even more clear when it comes
to semantic objects in the grammar, like evidentials or switch-reference. For in-
stance, Kiowa has an marker of evidentiality indicating direct speech as the source
of knowledge. This marker is often translated in English as "I heard" or "Someone
told me", because English lacks evidentials. If you ask your consultant to translate
2This sentence would not be non-sensical to past speakers, though. It uses archaic words to
make an archaic point: "A lord wouldn’t dare tax his superior."
3Not uncontroversially so, but even in dynamic semantics, where truth is based on the effect
on the discourse (e.g. Heim (1982)’s context change potential), sentences cannot be asked about in
isolation.
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"someone told me it didn’t snow", expecting "it didn’t snow-evidential" (2a), you’d
be in for a surprise, as the speaker will translate your whole sentence (2b).
(2) a. Háun
h ´˜On
not
∅−
[3s]
thólsépd`¯aumâuhèl
tĳo´l+se´p+dO:-mOˆ:-hel
snow+rain-be-neg-evid
‘(I heard) it didn’t snow’ (f.n.)
b. Hájél
ha´te´l
person.indef
é
¯
´˜e−
[3s:3p:1s]
jél
te´l
tell.pf
haun
[h´˜On
not
∅−
[3s]
tholsépyâu
tĳo´l+se´p-yOˆ:]
snow+rain-neg
‘Someone told me it didn’t snow’ (f.n.)
To get an evidential, you have to create a context where the speaker has heard
this from someone else, then ask to produce the sentence. Switch-reference is
even harder to ask directly about, because there is no translated paraphrase at all.
Asking what gàu ‘means’ would simply be a waste of time. Knowledge of truth-
conditions must be arrived indirectly through the construction of contexts.
Third, delivering contexts in a metalanguage runs a risk of confusion. We
might expect that giving a context in English and asking for an answer in Kiowa
might be a crucial lack of control. However, Matthewson finds no adverse affect,
and neither do I. In fact, she argues that using a metalanguage can be more help-
ful than doing everything in the object language. This is especially the case in the
United States, where nearly all native speakers of Native American languages are
bilingual in English, and where almost no linguists are fluent in any indigenous
language. In this investigation I used English to deliver the contexts, and to dis-
cuss examples. I know of no monolingual Kiowa speakers living after 1967, and
all Kiowa speakers are also native speakers of English. Another factor in the use of
English to deliver contexts is the fact that few Kiowas are literate in Kiowa. This
is due to the long-standing lack of any education in the language (recall that most
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speakers were banned from using their native language in schools), as well as to
the lack of a standard official orthography. This fact requires oral transmission on
my part. Though I am proud to be somewhat proficient in Kiowa, I am not fluent.
The risk of misinterpreting my delivery of Kiowa metalanguage vastly outweighs
the risk of mixing truth-conditions from one language to another.
I will add a fourth obstacle to this list: The added cognitive work for the
speaker. Some speakers are better than others at putting themselves in context
and making their judgments based on it. All my speakers got better with practice,
but some did not do well at first. Some speakers have more vivid imaginations
than others. In addition, few speakers are as good at following convoluted sce-
narios as linguists are, for the simple reason that linguists do it professionally. I
took great care to ensure a balance of light and more involved contexts to keep
the speaker interested. A speaker can get confused after being run through a lot
of different contexts, and confusion leads to irritation, or worse. I found it help-
ful to use similar contexts, or a single context that could be re-used for multiple
judgments.
The use of context is onerous and time-consuming, but it is critical for seman-
tic fieldwork. Different kinds of context provide different kinds of results. The
simplest type of context is the lead-out context. The linguist takes an observed
expression and asks the consultant about possible contexts where it might be fe-
licitous. For instance, you could bring up the expression I am going to be the Super
Bowl MVP, and then ask questions like:
1. Could you say that if the Super Bowl was halfway through?
2. What about the morning of the Super Bowl? The day before?
3. Could a little kid say it?
4. Could you say it if the game is over, but the MVP hasn’t been selected yet?
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The lead-out context is great for fleshing out ideas and warming up speakers. It
will often lead to insightful speaker observations, but it cannot be used alone. It is
risky, because it forces speakers to come up with the details of the scenario, which
might make the truth-conditions they are judging about substantially different
from those you expect. Also, the contexts are not exhaustive.
The strongest type of context is the lead-in context.4 The linguist gives the
speaker a context that leads in to a yes/no judgment that depends on the the partic-
ular truth-condition in question. The context should be self-contained. The lead-
in context is extremely useful because it can control for specific truth-conditions,
and it can provide negative evidence. Usually, I used lead-out contexts to develop
a hypothesis, and lead-in contexts to test them.
For instance, imagine I had developed a hypothesis that the quantifier more
presupposes there has already been some. If the hypothesis is correct, positive
evidence supporting it would be a context that introduces such a presupposition,
followed by a speaker judgment that an expression with more is felicitous.5 You
instruct the speaker to listen to a scenario, then to judge the appropriateness of
the following expression, based on that scenario? For example, here is a context
and a sentence for you to judge for yourself.
Context:
This morning at the office, your colleague Bill made a pot of coffee. Just
a minute ago, the boss went to get some, but it was all gone. A new pot
has to be brewed, and you decide to make a good impression. So you tell
Bill:
(3) I’m going to brew some more.
4This is the only context Matthewson discusses.
5This relies on the assumption of compositionality— the meaning of a sentence is composed
from the meanings of its parts, so if a sentence is felicitous, so are all of its parts.
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Accepting the context puts the fact that some coffee had already been brewed
into the common ground, so it is a presupposition of the sentence. If more was
not compatible with this presupposition, the sentence would be infelicitous, but a
typical English speaker will find it quite felicitous.
To confirm the hypothesis, negative evidence is also helpful. For the same hy-
pothesis, we can create a sentence that lacks the presupposition, and have the
speaker judge a sentence with more. Let us repeat the task.
Context:
You and your family go out to dinner at a Mexican restaurant. This
restaurant is famous for the tortilla chips it brings to your table. How-
ever, this time, the waiter forgets to bring any chips, and the kids are
getting restless. You tell your family:
(4) I’m going to ask for some more chips.
Sentence (4) is typically found to be infelicitous, because you can’t have "more
chips" if you haven’t had any yet.
A third type of context that is useful is the follow-up sentence. Here, the lin-
guist uses a target expression in a sentence, then immediately follows it up with a
sentence whose felicity depends on the truth-conditions of the first. For instance,
(5a) is infelicitous because the first sentence does not introduce the presupposition
required for more, while (5b) is felicitous and does introduce the requirement.
(5) a. I didn’t pass out any flyers. . . # and then I passed out two more.
b. I poured out a bowl of milk. . . and then I poured out two more.
Follow-up contexts are helpful because they allow focusing onto a particular
target, and they don’t require onerous context-building, like lead-in contexts do.
However, they’re not always easy to build, since the second sentence has to depend
on the first somehow.
Lead-out, lead-in, and follow-up contexts are the semantic contexts that were
used in this study to help understand the use of switch-reference, without having
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to ask directly about the switch-reference morphemes. However, while elicita-
tions were the most important data collection method that I used, I also used some
recorded and transcribed natural speech, as well as recorded texts.
1.3.2.4 Natural speech
The most naturalistic data comes from extemporaneous speech that is recorded
without interference. Recording speech requires the same logistics as eliciting
speech, except that there is less need for the linguist to prepare items to elicit.
Speakers can be recorded in casual conversations, in formal conversations, or in
narratives. Naturally occurring speech is a reliable way to capture linguistic use
with little to no metalinguistic interference on the part of the speaker. However,
while the language recorded in this manner is often described as natural, rare is
the case where it is purely so, for three reasons that induce prescriptive effects on
the speech recorded: The speaker is aware that the recording is taking place; The
speaker is aware of the prestigious social status of the researcher; The speaker is
often performing a kind of speech that requires attention to language use.
1.3.2.5 Consultation of texts
A very helpful source of data is previously recorded texts. These texts provide
a permanent record of the language. Ideally, these would be stored in an online
corpus, with items tagged for quick analysis. However, no such corpus of Kiowa
data yet exists (though Laurel Watkins is working to put one online in the near
future), so I had to rely on copies of hand-written or typewritten texts collected in
several different places. Many were found in the papers of Parker McKenzie in the
archives of the Oklahoma Historical Society, some were found in anthropological
books about Kiowa stories (like Palmer, Jr. (2003)), while others were given to me
by different Kiowa individuals, including my consultants. Texts are often literal
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transcriptions of natural speech, but oftentimes are not— it is well-known that
many Kiowa texts have been edited after the fact for clarity or style.
I will include under this rubric the consultation of grammars. A broad cross-
linguistic investigation by one researcher cannot rely on fieldwork alone. Field-
work is a long-term process, so it is inefficient for typological work. One must rely,
therefore, on the work of previous researchers on different languages, published
for posterity. In the languages where switch-reference is found, most of this work
is based on the consultation of texts and the recording of natural speech. The dan-
ger of relying on grammars is that they are essentially a collection of hypotheses,
and hypotheses are not always correct, especially given the quick pace of change
in linguistic theory. Sometimes, the data can be interpreted in a different way than
the author of the reference grammar proposes.
1.3.3 Why elicitation is essential
Some of the examples in this study are naturally occurring sentences (NOS),
with the caveat that they might not be so natural. Some were collected from texts,
others through the recording of spontaneous utterances. NOS are very useful in
linguistic investigation because linguists can collect them relatively easily, and can
be certain of their grammaticality. However, the lack of ungrammatical natural
sentences limits the certainty and domain of any study reliant upon them, and the
massive amount of data that results from this kind of collection takes a long time
to prepare for analysis.
NOS are relatively easy to obtain— simply browse a text, or hold a microphone
up to a native speaker. Recording NOS does not even require a linguist to be
present; speakers can record themselves.6 NOS have been argued to be the best
6The BOLD project (Basic Oral Language Documentation) does precisely that: It has distributed
recorders to speakers of 100 languages in Papua New Guinea in order to create a massive corpus
of over 1,000 hours of speech.
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window into linguistic knowledge because they rely on no metalinguistic aware-
ness whatsoever. They also provide independent evidence of all sorts; in recording
speech, we might encounter new phenomena. Also, the sheer volume of data that
can be collected permits corpus-based studies of frequency that inform us about
gradient or stochastic grammaticality in the language. NOS are also very beneficial
from a documentary standpoint.
However, it turns out that the properties that make NOS attractive make them
insufficient for semantic fieldwork. It is simply not feasible to conduct a proper
study of the semantics of a language by relying solely on naturally occurring sen-
tences, for three reasons. First, they do not provide negative evidence. Second,
they are inefficient in that they provide a lot of data to mine, and limit the ex-
planatory power of the study to whatever data happens to be collected. Third,
they are not controlled for context.
One major requirement for a linguistic theory is negative evidence— facts pro-
vided by ungrammatical or infelicitous sentences. It simply does not suffice to
know what is attested; we must know what is possible. Knowing what is possible
entails knowing what is impossible, and only negative evidence tells us what is
impossible. NOS do not provide negative evidence, because they are by and large
grammatical.
Collecting natural speech provides an enormous amount of data that can be
used to build hypotheses. This is great for documentary purposes or corpus-based
studies. However, raw recordings are not helpful for semantic investigation be-
cause they give so much. Recordings must be listened to and transcribed.7 It takes
hours to transcribe even a few minutes of recorded speech, even if you are fluent
in the language. After transcription, the data needs to be tagged. The more data
7Someday, if automatic transcription software is of high enough quality, this task will become
much easier, at least for major languages.
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you collect, the more arduous this task becomes. Natural speech also hampers
investigations because the linguist can only study the constructions the speaker
happened to use while the microphone was on. For the understanding of very
frequent phenomena, this is not a problem. However, much of what we know
about language comes from understanding rare phenomena (rare but perfectly
grammatical). One can only imagine how long you would have to record native
speakers of American English before hearing a single example of negative auxil-
iary inversion (Never in my life have I seen anything like that!), if there were only a
few hundred speakers of the language. After that, we can cringe at the thought of
the time it would take to catch enough examples to form a powerful theory of the
phenomenon.
The third factor against relying solely on NOS is that it does not allow us to
confirm hypotheses of language knowledge. For instance, let’s imagine we did
encounter enough examples of negative auxiliary inversion. It would tell us this
is a permitted phenomenon, but it does not let us predict which contexts allow it
and which ones do not. We can hypothesize about such contexts, but to verify any
hypothesis we must test it by controlling for the context. NOS provide no way
to do this. This problem is all the more acute in semantics, because of felicity’s
dependence on the context. Matthewson (2006) points out that semantic fieldwork
is impossible without some frame of reference for the speaker to make a judgment.
Truth conditions are facts about the world; thus, without some world and facts
about it, the speaker is in the dark, and so is the linguist. This requirement is even
clearer when we consider an Austinian notion of truth (chapter 3. If sentences are
evaluated with respect to some topic situation, then without some sense of which
topic situation the speaker has in mind, there can be no evaluation. For instance,
in English, saying The light is flickering can only be judged true or false if we know
what light we’re talking about. NOS do not occur in a vacuum, of course: they
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will have a context. However, while a broad context is always inferrable, the exact
context of a particular sentence is rarely described overtly, and its inference is not
always obvious. The context must be tested to be assured, but NOS do not provide
that test.
1.3.4 Conclusion
The methodology employed in this study combines different data collection
methods and speaker tasks to provide as complete a picture as possible of switch-
reference and its use in Kiowa. It relies on elicitations oriented towards semantic
notions of felicity, supported by consultation of texts and natural speech. The rest
of this chapter will introduce the reader to the Kiowa people and their language,
by providing an outline of their history and a brief sketch of the language. It will
also introduce the glossing conventions employed in this dissertation.
1.4 The Kiowas and their Language
While this dissertation involves a wide cross-linguistic investigation, its empir-
ical depth focuses on the Kiowa language. Kiowa is an endangered language of the
Kiowa-Tanoan family spoken mainly in Southwestern Oklahoma. The language is
no longer acquired by children, and all fluent speakers are elderly. Monolingual
speakers survived as late as the 1960’s, but none remain today.
1.4.1 A brief ethnological history of the Kiowa
The Kiowa (in the language: Cáuigú, [kO´jgwu´]) are a Plains Indian people. Like
many other Plains tribes, before forced settlement, they were a nomadic people,
whose lives largely depended on hunting bison. Their final migratory range was
centered in what is nowWestern Oklahoma and Kansas, and the Texas Panhandle.
However, they had not been in that range for much more than a hundred years
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when they were finally forced to settle onto a reservation around 1875. Histor-
ical evidence and tribal recollection takes us as far back as circa 1700. At that
time, the Kiowas lived in the Yellowstone area (Mooney 1896). Over the next sev-
eral decades, they found themselves moving eastward, settling in the Black Hills
area of South Dakota by 1775. There, they were overpowered by the Lakota, who
pushed them back out onto the high plains. Further conflict with the Cheyenne
led them southward towards their final range by 1790, at which point they formed
an alliance with the Comanche that lasted into the reservation period.8
By the time White explorers and anthropologists encountered the Kiowa, they
were fully ensconced in the Plains culture. However, linguistic evidence indicates
that they were once a Pueblo culture. Early on, Harrington (1910), citing Mooney’s
data, noted the language’s correspondences to the Tanoan group, notably Tewa.
This link was more firmly established by Harrington (1928) and by Miller (1959),
who sought to include Kiowa in the proposed Aztec-Tanoan family. Definitive
sound correspondences were established by Hale (1962), notably between Kiowa
and Jemez. Based on this work, it is now accepted that Kiowa and the Tanoan
languages descend from a common language.
Therefore, we can safely assume that the Kiowas were once among the Proto-
Tanoan speaking people. Currently, the Tanoan peoples live in Pueblo villages in
the Rio Grande Valley of New Mexico. It is therefore commonly deduced that the
Kiowas once lived there as well. Otherwise, we would have to assume that some-
how, the Kiowas stopped speaking their old language and began speaking a Tanoan
language without extensive contact with Tanoan-speakers. Besides, we would also
have to assume that this language shift took place long enough ago that Kiowa
8As is often the case with American tribe names, the English name for the Kiowas is an ex-
onym. It is based on the Comanche corruption of the Kiowa name Cáuigú. The Kiowa name for the
Comanche, Câigù ([kyaˆjgu]), means ‘enemies’, suggesting that first encounters were not friendly.
23
no longer resembles a dialect of any other Tanoan language. The Kiowa/Tanoan
split certainly happened quite some time ago, though we will probably never pin-
point the date. Jacobsen’s (1983) glottochronological speculation places the split
at several thousand years ago, but this seems highly implausible.9
We may never know when or why the Kiowas left New Mexico for good. How-
ever, we do know that neither Kiowas nor Pueblos remember each other. Mooney
(1896) found no Kiowas claiming parentage with the Pueblos, and nobody has
published accounts of Pueblos asserting a link to the Kiowa. The split proba-
bly happened before the horse arrived (in the late 1500’s), based on the develop-
ment of the Kiowa word for ‘horse’. The word chê
¯
([tsˆ˜e:j]) is used today for ‘horse,’
but before the arrival of the horse, it meant ‘dog’. In Kiowa, the word’s meaning
shifted, and it eventually referred to the beast of burden that dragged tipi poles
and such. After horses replaced dogs, the word was applied to horses, and dogs
have since been called either chê
¯
h`¯ı
¯
([tsˆ˜e:+jh˜ı:]), ‘original beast of burden’, or chégùn
([tse´+gun]), ‘tipi-pole beast of burden’. Speakers of the Tanoan languages never
lived the horse-dependent plains culture, and this change did not occur, as ev-
idenced by the cognates for chê
¯
in modern Tanoan languages, which still mean
‘dog’.
9I am suspicious in general of the application of glottochronology to language families outside
of Europe. The theory is based on the development of Proto-Indo-European into the modern Eu-
ropean languages. Two factors make its application to Kiowa implausible. First, the history of the
various European peoples is relatively well-known, and fairly precise dates allow a correspondent
link to the (reconstructed) language development. This is not the case for Kiowa, or for any Amer-
ican people, beyond a few hundred years at most. Second, the Kiowa people’s migrations surely
disrupt the uniform rate of change that underpins glottochronology. The Kiowas had little contact
with the Pueblo peoples of New Mexico since they left the Rio Grande valley. They were in close
contact with languages of other families for the entire time they’ve been gone. Thus, any rate of
change was likely accelerated by contact, though we can’t know how much. Similar accelerations
have occurred in Europe. For instance, French has changed much more from Latin than Spanish
has, despite the fact that Iberia was cut off from Rome long before Gaul. The ancestors of the
speakers of French (the speakers of the langues d’oïl) were in close contact with speakers of Ger-
manic and Celtic languages, and this had an effect on the rate of change, making it more profound
than changes in Spain, despite having less time to develop. Given cases like this, we must question
the notion of a uniform rate of change, and chronologies built upon it.
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A solitary hand-written notecard in the papers of Parker McKenzie claims that
Kiowas left the upper Rio Grande area around 1525, just after Cortes and his In-
dian allies conquered the Aztecs.10 I do not know what evidence supports this
claim, and no motivation is suggested. This date might be plausible, though. It
would place at least seven generations between leaving the Rio Grande Valley
and turning up at Yellowstone around 1700— the earliest era still recalled in the
tribal histories recorded by Mooney. This, added to the seven or so generations be-
fore Mooney interviewed the Kiowas puts fourteen generations between the early
1500’s and the late 1800’s. Given the significant cultural changes and losses in just
four or five generations since the reservation period, that seems like more than
enough time for the Kiowas to forget the other Tanoan peoples and Pueblo cul-
ture.
1.4.2 The status of the language
As a people, the Kiowas numbered over 12,000 during the most recent U.S.
census (2000), despite a rather high blood quartile (1/4). This number includes
the present author. In that same census, only 865 claimed to be able to speak
Kiowa. This number does not include the present author. The census data are self-
reported, and language-related data do not include any judgment of fluency. Esti-
mates as to the number of fully fluent speakers range from a dated 400 (Watkins
(1984), certainly using Parker McKenzie’s count) to 60 (Linn 2011). All these
speakers are elderly, and no children are known to be acquiring the language.
Most Kiowa speakers live in southwestern Oklahoma, in and around the cities
of Anadarko, the site of the BIA Agency, and Carnegie, where the Tribal Center is
located. There is no longer any reservation. In the 1890s, the tribal land held in
10These papers are publicly available in the archives of the Oklahoma Historical Society in Ok-
lahoma City, Oklahoma.
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common was allotted out to individual tribe members, mainly in the area around
Rainy Mountain (Sépyàldà). Each head of household was allotted from 80 to 320
acres. This plot of land was an incentive for them to behave more White by farm-
ing. More importantly, most of the three-million-acre reservation was not allot-
ted, due to the small tribal population at the time (1,260). All land not allotted
was opened up for White settlement. In the eyes of the government, this must
have looked like a win-win: Whites got land, Indians got civilization. As a result,
Kiowas, along with other Oklahoma tribes that underwent allotment, found them-
selves scattered on farmsteads throughout the region. This scattering hampered
the maintenance of the language.
Another factor in the destruction of the language was the boarding school. Ac-
cording to United States policy, Indian children were sent to schools run by various
missionaries, where they were forced to adopt Christian customs and speak En-
glish. Attendance was compulsory, and enforced by withholding rations from the
students’ families. Students caught speaking their native language were swiftly
and severely punished.11 While students did not forget Kiowa during their years
at school, the stigma placed on the language led to the students refusing to pass
it on to their children, lest they suffer the same indignities. Thus, the chain of
acquisition was broken. In fact, many of the speakers now living spent significant
time as children with their grandparents, who were often monolinguals, and who
spoke Kiowa to them.
Since World War II, the Kiowa tribe has been one of the leaders in the revital-
ization of Plains Indian culture (Meadows 1999). Unfortunately, this revival has
not included a maintenance of the language, in large part because languages are
11Parker McKenzie (ms.) notes laconically that the English-only education "hampered our learn-
ing of English." Indeed, many students, including Mr. McKenzie, only graduated high school after
age 20.
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much more difficult to maintain and pass on. Still, there has long been an interest
in the language. Kiowa stories often play with language, and many Kiowas have
been more than eager over the years to assist linguists. Shamefully, the linguists
were not always as kind in return. Several names stand out over the years among
the Kiowa, but none more so than Parker Paul McKenzie.
McKenzie was born in 1897, a full generation after the Kiowa tribe was forced
onto their reservation. He did not speak English until his schooling began. An
apt student, he went on to study at Oklahoma A& M University and Bacone Col-
lege. He returned home and found employment at the Kiowa, Comanche, and
Apache Agency in Anadarko, Oklahoma, sorting through land allotments and aid-
ing monolingual Kiowas with the bureaucracy.
While still a student, he devised a way to write Kiowa, and through years of
refinement, completed an orthography to rival that of Sequoyah (see Meadows &
McKenzie (2001) for the story in his own words, and Watkins & Harbour (2010)).
Despite any lack of linguistic training, his Kiowa orthography is deftly sensitive to
the phonology of the language. It gained official recognition in 2003, and is used
in this dissertation alongside the IPA. Parker also worked with several linguists
and anthropologists over the years. His long and tumultuous working relation-
ship with John P. Harrington led to their Popular Account of the Kiowa Language
(McKenzie & Harrington 1948). McKenzie’s long and harmonious relationship
with Laurel Watkins led to A Grammar of Kiowa (Watkins 1984), still the best refer-
ence grammar of the language. He never completed a dictionary, but he “collected"
thousands of vocabulary items from elders and recollections and meticulously cat-
alogued their various forms.
In addition to his language work, he was the most well-respected historian and
genealogist of the tribe. Due to his large and varied contributions to the tribe and
to science, he was awarded a doctorate honoris causa from the University of Col-
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orado in 1990. He was extremely proud of this accomplishment, and his diploma
is still the first thing you see when you step through his front door. Dr. McKenzie
was the last Kiowa to have lived in the 19th century, and nearly made it to the 21st,
keeping active until he passed away in 1999.
1.4.3 Reading Kiowa
The Kiowa examples presented in this study are written in two ways: First
they are presented as they would be written in the McKenzie orthography, which
employs Roman letters, and diacritics marking vowel tone, length, and nasality.
Below the orthographic form, examples are presented in parentheses in the Inter-
national Phonetic Alphabet (IPA), with only high and falling tone marked (blank
vowels have low tone).
1.4.3.1 McKenzie orthography
The McKenzie orthography was developed by Parker McKenzie over a long pe-
riod in the 20th century. Its phonetic accuracy and phonological sensitivity are
unparalleled among Kiowa orthographies.12 It was designed to use only Roman
letters and as few digraphs and segmental diacritics as possible. Some of the more
striking features is the use of Roman letters found in the English alphabet corre-
sponding to sounds not found in Kiowa. McKenzie employed these to represent
sounds found in Kiowa but not English, but did so with a clever nod to the phono-
logical features they have in common.
12The McKenzie orthography is not the only one that has been created for Kiowa, or even the
only one created by Kiowas. I employ it here for several reasons: It is the most accurate one for
segments, it is the only one that includes suprasegmentals, it is the most accurate at delineating
word boundaries, and it is to me the most aesthetically pleasing. Unfortunately, no orthography
has been accepted by the entire Kiowa tribe, for a variety of reasons (Neely & Palmer, Jr. 2009).
The lack of a standard has slowed down every attempt at language revitalization, but there is little
hope of concord in sight.
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For instance, Kiowa plosives are distinguished by place, of course, but also by
voicing, aspiration, and ejection. Here are the Kiowa plosives, written in the IPA
on the left, and in the orthography on the right.
labial b b p f ph p pĳ v
alveolar d d t j th t tĳ th
velar g g k c kh k kĳ q
Table 1.1. Kiowa plosives in IPA and McKenzie orthography
Notice how the replacement letters share a place of articulation with the non-
replacement letters— this kind of awareness is sewn throughout the orthography,
and is detailed in Dr McKenzie’s own account of the creation of the orthography
(Meadows & McKenzie 2001), and in Watkins & Harbour’s (2010) article about it.
1.4.3.2 Glossing convention
Linguistic glosses for Kiowa examples follow the standard format. The first line
is written in the McKenzie orthography. If I elicited the example from a speaker, or
had a speaker repeat an example found in a text, there is a second line containing
a broad phonetic transcription in the IPA, separated morpheme-by-morpheme. In
the McKenzie orthography, verbal agreement prefixes are written separately from
their verbs, although they are phonologically attached. Therefore, in the phonetic
gloss, they are followed by a dash that signals the attachment.
(6) Ém
P´˜em−
[2s:3p]
c`¯odód`¯auvàidèj`¯aud`¯e
ko:wdo´+dO:+pĳaj-de-tO:-de:
a lot+sing+fight-pf-mod-hsy
‘(I hear) you will sing a lot’ (f.n.)
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If I collected the example from texts or other written sources, and did not have any
consultants repeat it, I do not add a phonetic transcription. The first line is in the
McKenzie orthography with relevant morpheme breaks added in.
(7) ´¯E
¯
+hàu-dè
this+right here-nom
hê
¯
jègà
story
gà−
[3p]
d´¯a
¯
u
be
. . . q´¯a
¯
hî
¯
man
‘This is the story of . . . a man’ (Falcon Boy, ms.)
To mark morpheme boundaries, I employ the Leipzig conventions (Comrie
et al. 2008), except that when a Kiowa morpheme is translated by a multi-word
English phrase (like k´¯ı
¯
f`¯au, ‘come out’), I separate the English words with a space
instead of a period. The relevant markers of morpheme boundaries are shown in
Table 1.2 (between morphemes A and B). If a bound form is separated orthograph-
ically from its host, the attachment symbol will be on the bound form.
symbol meaning
A.B portmanteau
A−B affixation
A=B cliticization
A+B incorporation
A:B break unclear or irrelevant (e.g. with contractions)
Table 1.2. Morpheme boundary symbols
The glosses are annotated with their source; “f.n.” indicates that the examples
are from my field notes.
Agreement prefixes in Kiowa are quite complex, reflecting up to three argu-
ments.13 I will gloss them in a uniform way, depending on the arguments they
agree with.
13In classes taught at the University of Oklahoma, these prefixes are referred to as ‘pronominals’.
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argument structure convention example gloss
intransitive [ subject ] à ([a`]) [1s]
transitive [ subject : object ] gàt ([gja`t]) [1s:3pn]
intransitive dative [ ∅ : subject : dative ] né ([n´˜e]) [∅:3d:1s]
ditransitive [ agent : object : dative ] bágî ([ba´gˆı:]) [2d:3p:1s]
Table 1.3. Agreement prefix notation
Abbreviations for the glosses indicate person and number in standard fashion.
Number in Kiowa is singular (s), dual (d), plural (p) or inverse (i)14. 1st person
plural is inclusive (1pi) or exclusive (1px). 3rd person plural (3p) can in some
cases be either inanimate (3pn) or animate (3pa). Kiowa agreement forms involve a
daunting amount of syncretism (see section 1.5.4.2). The glosses will only include
the relevant meaning.
A full list of abbreviations used in glosses can be found in the List of Abbrevi-
ations in the frontmatter.
1.4.4 Previous research on Kiowa
Kiowa has attracted interest from linguists in every era of linguistic study, al-
though never very many in number. The earliest known scholarly attempt to un-
derstand features of Kiowa grammar were small contributions by Gatschet (1882),
in his “The Phonetics of the Ka¯yowé Language.” While his word list did provide
some useful information, the regular discrepancies from forms attested not much
later suggest that his phonetician’s ear was not quite developed.15
Ethnographer James Mooney spent a couple of years with the Kiowas, record-
ing oral history published in the seminal Calendar History of the Kiowas (Mooney
14See section 1.5.4.1 for an explanation of inverse number.
15It is of historical interest to note Gatschet’s comparison of the apparent ’openness’ of Kiowa
grammar to their savage roaming around the prairie.
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1896), and learning some Kiowa along the way. His concern in recording the lan-
guage was primarily with a correct understanding of names of people, artefacts,
and institutions, but he provides a lot of interesting information.
The first serious scholar of the Kiowa language was the enigmatic ethnologist
James Peabody Harrington. While the bulk of Harrington’s ‘productive’ career16
dealt with the languages of California, Harrington spent quite some time with the
Kiowas in the 1910’s and ’20’s, working for the United States Bureau of American
Ethnography. He applied his sharp ear and quick wit to recording a vast amount of
information. He first suggested a link to the Tanoan language (Harrington 1910),
and published themonographVocabulary of the Kiowa Language (Harrington 1928).
The Vocabulary offered the first grammatical analysis of the language, and contains
many helpful examples that illuminate the usage of the lexical items. Unfortu-
nately, there are some major concerns with the Vocabulary, notably Harrington’s
mishearing many unaspirated [t]’s as [d]’s.
Harrington returned to working on Kiowa in the 1940’s, focusing on work with
Parker McKenzie. This work led to the publication of A Popular Account of the
Kiowa Language (McKenzie & Harrington 1948), which gave a more up-to-date
view of the grammar, and offered a text of a Kiowa legend. Harrington abruptly
terminated his fruitful collaboration with McKenzie in 1949 (we don’t know why),
and Harrington set his sights elsewhere.
In the 1950’s, a group from the Summer Institute of Linguistics, then based in
Norman, Oklahoma, conducted extensive fieldwork on Kiowa with a number of
speakers. Besides the collection of some texts, their work was published in a series
16The scare quotes refer to the fact that Harrington compiled literally tons of information, but
published very little of it, wishing rather to devote all his time to fieldwork. Often, he published
only under pressure from his employer. He became infamous for the ardor with which he kept his
unpublished research out of the hands of other researchers, lest they steal from his work (Stirling
1963; Laird 1975). Much of his research was discovered after his death, squirreled away in secret
warehouses.
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of articles in the International Journal of American Linguistics. The most notable
research result was the elucidation of Kiowa’s system of morphological number
(section 1.5.4.1). This work carried on into the early 1960’s.
In the early 1960’s, a series of papers definitively established the historical link
between Kiowa and the Tanoan languages, using standard methods of establishing
sound correspondences. Miller (1959) proposed a limited set of correspondences,
prompting Trager & Trager (1959) to riposte with a reminder of Trager (1951)’s
suggestion of such correspondences. Hale (1962) provided extensive evidence for
a series of sound correspondences. He also proposed certain features of the proto-
language they would have shared.
By the mid 1960’s, those who had done research on Kiowa had moved on to
other projects. The linguistic study of Kiowa lay dormant until the 1970’s, when
Laurel Watkins picked it up as a graduate student. Working especially with Parker
McKenzie, Watkins produced several articles published in various journals, no-
tably Watkins (1990) and Watkins (1993). Her most comprehensive work was A
Grammar of Kiowa, written in collaboration with Parker McKenzie (Watkins 1984),
which contains the most detailed phonological andmorphological analysis to date.
Building off her work, Gus Palmer, Jr. has developed Kiowa language courses at
the University of Oklahoma, where students can take Kiowa as a foreign language.
More recently, Daniel Harbour has provided a theoretical approach based on
the generative Minimalist program. His MIT dissertation on Kiowa’s number sys-
tem Harbour (2007) broke new ground in morphological theory, and his papers
on Kiowa syntax Harbour (2003); Adger & Harbour (2007a) have laid the ground-
work for more detailed exploration of the phrase structure and morphosyntax of
the language. Most recently, Dr Harbour has collaborated with David Adger and
Laurel Watkins to write a book that uses Mirror Syntax to derive Kiowa phrase
structure Adger et al. (2009).
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Many non-linguist Kiowas also work on the language, especially as teachers.
Kiowa is taught at several places, including the University of Oklahoma, the Kiowa
Tribal Center, and Anadarko (OK) High School. Despite interest in the language
from tribal members, no popular dictionary or pedagogical grammar has been
published, although some texts have been constructed by Kiowa teachers and stu-
dents. Also, no book-length collection of Kiowa texts has ever been published.
1.5 A grammatical sketch of Kiowa
The Kiowa language is the empirical focus of this study. This section provides
the reader with a primer in the structure of the language, to give the reader a
feel for it, and to make reading the examples throughout the text easier to read.
Important grammatical details will be brought up at the appropriate times. The
information here is a combination of facts presented in previous research on Kiowa
(supra) , and contributions from my own research.
1.5.1 Typology
Kiowa is a polysynthetic language that can be classified informally as aggluti-
native. Inflectional morphology is sparse on nouns, but verbal morphology is often
quite complex. Many expressions involve intricate methods of compounding, the
most notable of which is incorporation.
Pro-drop Kiowa is an argument-drop language. Any argument can be left out
of a sentence; in fact, they frequently are. The only required part of a ‘complete’
Kiowa sentence is the verb and its agreement prefix (8). Watkins (1990) reports
stretches in narrative of over twenty consecutive phrases with no nominal argu-
ments.
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(8) Áu
PO´−
[2s:3i:1s]
´¯a
¯
u
´˜O:
give.pf
‘You gave it to me’ (f.n.)
1.5.2 Syntax
This section will describe the basics of Kiowa syntax to help the reader orient
themselves.
Word order Kiowa is classifiable informally as an SOV language. That is, its basic
surface word order is Subject-Object-Verb. With three arguments, the basic order
is Subject-Indirect Object-Direct Object- Verb.
(9) Yísàum
j´ısO˜m
Y.
át`¯adè
a´-tha-de
his-wife-his
chê
¯
tsˆ˜e:
horse
á
Pa´=
[3s:3s:3s]
káun
kh´˜On
bring.pf
‘Yisaum brought a horse for his wife’
Inside nominal expressions, the order is Quantifier-Demonstrative-Noun. Be-
sides demonstratives, there are no overt determiners.
(10) j´¯e
te´:
all
úigàu
Pu´j-gO
that-inv
chê
¯
gàu
tsˆ˜e:-gO
horse-inv
‘All those horses’
There is no category for adjectives; adjectival modification occurs in two ways:
A verb is compounded to the noun (11), or a relative clause is used (12).
(11) mátàunsyàn
ma´tO˜n+Sa˜n
girl+(be) little
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‘little girl’
(12) mát`¯a
¯
udàu
ma´O˜:-dO
girl-inv
è
Pe−
[3i]
syángàu
S´˜an=gO
(be) little=nom.inv
‘(3 or more) little girls’
Kiowa relative clauses are head-internal; essentially they are sentences with a
nominalizing particle postposed to the verb. This particle agrees in morphological
number with the head noun, as in (12). Thus, in (13), the inverse marking on the
nominalizer -gàu indicates that the head noun is ‘women’, not the boy.17
(13) T`¯al´¯ı
[tha:l´ı:
boy
màyóp
may-o´p
woman-inv
é
e´−
[3s:3i]
b´¯o
¯
gàu
b´˜o:]=gO
see.pf=nom.inv
è
Pe−
[3i]
th´¯agà.
tĳa´:gja
good
‘The women the boy saw are good.’ / *‘The boy who saw the women is
good.’
Adpositions in Kiowa are postpositive, either on nominal expresssions or on
clauses. They are encliticized to the noun phrase, or the rightmost constituent in
the clause.
(14) fáife=bè south=along ‘along the south’
(15) máun=jò hand=with ‘with the hand’
(16) èm k´¯ıf`¯au=dò [2s]− leave.pf=since ‘since (because) you left’
Questions Kiowa uses a yes/no question particle, hàu ([hO]), which is sentence-
initial, except for topics. Wh-words are obligatorily fronted.
17Watkins (1984) shows that some relative clauses head nouns can be extraposed, with the rela-
tive clause itself moved to a postverbal position.
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(17) Hàu
hO
Q
t`¯al´¯ı
[tha:l´ı:
boy
màyóp
may-o´p
woman-inv
é
e´−
[3s:3i]
b´¯o
¯
gàu
b´˜o:w]−gO
see.pf-nom
è
Pe−
[3i]
th´¯agà.
tĳa´:gja
good
‘Are the women the boy saw good?’ (f.n.)
(18) Hâjêl
haˆ:teˆ:jl
who
t`¯al´¯ı
tha:l´ı:
boy
∅−
[3s:3s]
b´¯o
¯
?
b´˜o:w
see.pf
‘Who did the boy see?’ (f.n.)
Discourse configuration Kiowaword order is not strictly tied to argument struc-
ture. It isn’t truly ‘free’, though. Word order can vary for discourse purposes.
Topics, especially contrastive ones, can be left-dislocated, even beyond question
words. Many given constituents are right-dislocated to the post-verbal domain.
(19) Cút,
ku´P
book
John
J.
J.
gà
gjæ−
[3s:3p]
h´¯augà.
hO´:-gjæ
buy-pf
‘The book, John bought.’ (f.n.)
(20) John
J.
J.
gà
gjæ−
[3s:3p]
h´¯augà
hO´:-gjæ
buy-pf
cút.
ku´P
book
‘John bought it, the book’ (f.n.)
1.5.3 Phrase Structure
Adger & Harbour (2007a) note that the postverbal functional morphology di-
rectly mirrors the standard syntactic hierarchy of the projections corresponding
to these morphemes. That is, the innermost (to the verb stem) morpheme is the
lowest, and so on as you head away from the stem. This leads to a phrase structure
like the one in (21):
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(21) CP
EvidP
ModP
(TP)
NegP
AspP
vP
VP
. . .
v◦
Asp◦
Neg◦
T◦
Mod◦
Evid◦
C◦
This tree assumes a right-headed structure. Recent developments in syntac-
tic theory (Kayne 1994) argue that all structures are in fact left-headed; apparent
right-headedness is derived via movement operations. There is Kiowa evidence
pointing toward left-headedness. For instance, we have seen that quantifiers and
demonstratives precede their accompanying noun phrases. If these are heads, and
not adjoined DPs or QPs, perhaps QPs and DPs are left-headed. In addition, the
yes/no question particle is found sentence-initially. Assuming the standard ac-
count placing yes/no question particles at C◦, we can suspect that at least some
CPs are left-headed.18
(22) H´¯au
hO´:
Q
Yísàum
j´ısO˜m
Y.
át`¯adè
a´+tha-de
his+wife-nom
chê
¯
tsˆ˜e:
horse
á
Pa´−
[3s:3s:3s]
káun?
kh´˜On
bring.pf
‘Did Yisaum bring a horse for his wife?’
18This suspicion may not be warranted after all, as discussed in section 4.4.2.
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That said, this dissertation will maintain a right-headed analysis, for two rea-
sons. The first is that headedness is not crucial to the analysis of switch-reference;
either way will work. Second, assuming left-headedness would simply add to the
assumptions requisite for a working model, thereby increasing the theoretical and
expositional cost, with no concordant benefit.
1.5.4 Morphology
Kiowa morphology is generally agglutinative and suffixal. There are many key
exceptions, though. Many nouns and verb morphemes involve fusion or partial
fusion. So does switch-reference. Verb agreement is always prefixed. Some in-
flectional morphemes, like the habitual marker, are free forms. This section will
focus on the morphological processes that occur most frequently in the examples
presented in this dissertation.
1.5.4.1 Nominal morphology.
Nominal morphology consists only of numbermarking, which reveals the nom-
inal class. There is no case marking. Kiowa exhibits a curious mismatch between
morphological and semantic number marking that has long attracted the attention
of linguists. Kiowa nouns have three semantic numbers: singular, dual, and plural.
However, almost no noun has more than two forms.19 Up to two of these forms are
marked, the rest remain unmarked.
Kiowa nouns can be classified broadly by the correlation between semantic and
morphological number on the noun, and in the agreement form. For Class I, the
marked number is plural. For Class II, the marked number is singular. Class IV
has no markings at all, and Class III marks singular and plural. Class III only has
four attested members, and has no cognate class in the related Tanoan languages.
19The key exceptions are nouns with the compound forms meaning ‘big’, which are +èl, +bîn,
and +bì
¯
dàu.
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class: Class I Class II Class III Class IV
noun: yáucáui áivì´¯e ´¯al`¯au áis`¯e
¯
gà
gloss: ‘young woman’ ‘potato’ ‘apple’ ‘smoke’
singular: yáucáui áivì´¯egàu ´¯al`¯aubàu áis`¯e
¯
gà
dual: yáucáui áivì´¯e ´¯al`¯au áis`¯e
¯
gà
plural: yáucáuigú áivì´¯e ´¯al`¯aubàu áis`¯e
¯
gà
Table 1.4. Kiowa nominal number morphology
Wonderly et al. (1954) called the unmarked form the ‘basic’, and the marked
form the ‘inverse,’ building off the semantic correlations in Classes I and II. Class
I nouns tend to be animates, and Class II nouns tend to be inanimates. These
classes are productive in this sense. Abstract and deverbal nouns are in Class
IV. Morphologically, of course, the terms ‘marked’ and ‘unmarked’ may be more
neutral, but Kiowa scholars use basic/inverse, and this study will stick with these
(see Harbour (2003, 2007) for a thorough discussion).
1.5.4.2 Verb morphology
Verb agreement Verbal inflection consists of a prefixed agreement marker, and
post-stem inflection. The agreement prefix is a crucial component of the Kiowa
sentence. Any complete sentence must contain a verb inflected by agreement.
Verbs agree with up to three arguments: an agent, an ‘absolutive’ argument, and an
oblique argument. The term ‘absolutive’ is used here without making a theoretical
claim; it simply stands for ‘intransitive subject or transitive object.’ It correlates
to the structural notion of internal argument, and should not be understood as
implying ergativity. These agreement morphemes are portmanteaux, often to an
extreme level. For instance, in (23), the agreement form is just one vowel, but it
indicates that ’you X it to me’.
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(23) É
¯
P´˜e−
[2s:3s:1s]
´¯a
¯
u.
P´˜O:
give.pf
‘You gave it to me.’
The decomposition of these markers was a significant contribution of Watkins
(1984)’s descriptive grammar. This decomposition requiredmixing diachronic and
synchronic processes, so we cannot assume any synchronic composition of these
particles; they must have been acquired whole. Harbour (2003, 2007) provides a
feature-based morphological analysis that decomposes them more completely.
Not only do agreement markers contain a lot of information, they also involve
enormous amounts of syncretism. The sentenceDét ´¯a
¯
u can be translated in dozens
of ways, because the agreement prefix dét can point to dozens of agents and several
different objects and recipients. Depending on the context, this expression can
mean one of the following:
(24) Dét ´¯a
¯
u ([de´P−P´˜O:]) =
They (two) gave them (dual) to you (sing)
We (dual, excl) gave them (dual) to you (sing)
We (excl) gave them (dual) to you (sing)
They (plural) gave them (dual) to you (sing)
They (inverse) gave them (dual) to you (sing)
Any subject gave them (dual) to us (dual)
Any subject gave them (dual) to us (plural)
Notice the last two meanings of dét ´¯a
¯
u, which involve ‘any subject’, minus first per-
son. ‘Any subject’ entails many additional meanings for this agreement form. This
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syncretism raises interesting questions concerning acquisition and processing.20
It is also relevant for the methodology of this study. When eliciting judgments and
production, I took pains to employ as many sentences as possible with overt ar-
guments, to avoid any misinterpretation or ambiguity that syncretism would lead
to.
Tense/aspect/mood inflection The postverbal morphology indicates the values
of various functional categories that describe properties of the event the verb de-
scribes. The ordering of these morphemes is demonstrated in Table 1.5.
VERB -aspect -negation -modality -evidentiality
`¯a
¯
um ∅ `¯au -j`¯au -d`¯e
O˜.m ∅ O: tO`: -d`¯e:
make (pf) neg mod evid
‘(someone told me) X won’t make’
Table 1.5. Post-verbal morphology template
Kiowa has no tense morphology. Modality marking is used to indicate fu-
ture times, but it also indicates deontic modality, and conditionals (Watkins 1984;
Baker & Travis 1997). It has two forms: th´¯au ([t’O´:]) is used on intransitive verbs,
and j´¯au ([tO´:]) is used on transitive verbs.21 Evidentiality covers knowledge not
gained by direct perception, including any reported knowledge.22 My consultants
found evidential marking necessary for knowledge learned by watching TV, even
from people visible on screen.
20Unfortunately, the fact that no children currently acquire the language make questions about
acquisition unanswerable, perhaps forever.
21The transitive modal is homophonous with the verb meaning "stay at" or "be at." The intransi-
tive modal is homophonous with the verb meaning "act, behave." I am unaware if this is more than
coincidence.
22This evidentiality is often called "hearsay mode" in the descriptive literature.
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Incorporation. Incorporation is a common way to build words and phrases in
Kiowa. In the verbal domain, incorporated items include internal arguments,
compounds, control clauses, certain adverbials, and certain bound verbal stems
(Watkins 1984; Adger & Harbour 2007a; Adger et al. 2009). In the nominal do-
main, possessors incorporate onto the possessum, and compounding involves in-
corporation. In all cases but one, the incorporated item is preposed. The exception
is when a verb modifies a noun adjectivally.23 Several items can be incorporated at
once, as the examples in Table 1.6 shows.
example Kiowa gloss English
internal argument cút+h´¯augà book+get ‘get books’
verbal compounds cút+´¯a
¯
gà book+sit ‘go to school’
control clauses c´¯ı+h´¯augà+jét meat+buy+send ‘send to get meat’
adverbial stems k`¯aulé+b´¯a together+go ‘go together’
bound verbal stems dê+q´¯au sleep+lie down ‘be sleeping’
possesors n´¯au+t´¯a me+wife ‘my wife’
compounds jémáun+c´¯audòk`¯ı
¯
ten+hundred ‘thousand’
adjectivals mátàun+syân girl+small ‘little girl’
complex t´¯o
¯
+áulkáui water+crazy ‘whiskey’
Table 1.6. incorporation examples
Some Kiowa verbs are compounds composed of some stem incorporated with
the stems v´¯aidè ([p’a´:jde]), meaning ‘fight’, or j´¯au ([tO´:]), meaning‘act’ or ‘behave a
certain way’. The exact semantic contribution of the act/fight stem seems to be
aspect— ‘fight’ is perfective, while ‘act’ is imperfective (Watkins 1984).
Other aspects of Kiowa grammar will either be raised as we go along, or omitted
from this dissertation. This brief sketch should provide you with a feel for the
23One other possible exception is the use of auxiliary verbs. I suppose that it might be possible
that in a noun+verb compound, it is the noun that modifies the adjectival verb. A word like f´¯ı
¯
èl
([p´˜ı+el]) which means ‘feast, Thanksgiving’, is composed of the roots ‘food+big’. We assume that
‘big’ is modifying ’food’, but since both are properties of the noun, it might be the other way around.
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Kiowa IPA English
d´¯auv`¯aidè dO´:+pĳajde ‘sing’
k´¯uv`¯aidè kwu´:+pĳajde ‘have a fistfight’
s´¯o
¯
gav`¯aidè s´˜o:gja+pĳajde ‘flirt’
s´¯aujév`¯aidè sO´:te´pĳajde ‘work’
j´¯o
¯
v`¯aidè t´˜o+pĳajde ‘talk, chat’
t´¯olv`¯aidè tho´:l+pĳajde ‘have sex’
Table 1.7. Some act/fight verbs in Kiowa
language, and a sense of what to look for in the examples, and where to look for
them.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the major questions that this investigation aims
to answer, and the methodologies used to do so. It also introduced the Kiowa
language. The next chapter will introduce the main empirical phenomenon of the
dissertation, switch-reference, from a cross-linguistic perspective.
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CHAPTER 2
A SURVEY OF SWITCH-REFERENCE
This chapter introduces the reader to switch-reference and discusses important
cross-linguistic generalizations of the phenomenon that must serve as the basis of
any attempt to theorize about it. It also refutes several generalizations that have
appeared in the switch-reference literature. In doing so, it underlines the impos-
sibility of generalization based solely on the morphosyntax of the SR-morphemes.
Section 2.1 introduces the phenomenon and discusses the terminology used to
describe it. Section 2.2 is a cross-linguistic exploration of the morphological and
syntactic facts about switch-reference. It demonstrates that little can be discerned
from these facts alone. Section 2.3 lays out the components of a theory of switch-
reference, notably the kinds of facts one should account for. Section 2.4 presents
Finer’s (1984) influential theory of switch-reference based on the Binding Theory.
It also exposes crucial flaws that undermine its applicability. Finally, section 2.5
summarizes the findings of this chapter, and highlights the necessity of examining
the semantics of switch-reference.
2.1 Introduction to switch-reference
Switch-reference is a morpheme found at the juncture of two clauses that typi-
cally indicates whether the subjects of those two clauses co-refer. For instance, in
Kiowa, there are two sentential connectives translated as when. When the subjects
of the two joined clauses co-refer, the form of when is ch`¯e
¯
(/tse˜:/), glossed as SS, as
seen in (25). When the subjects are disjoint, the form is `¯e
¯
(/e˜:/), glossed as DS (26).
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(25)
[∅−
[3s]−
H´¯ebàch`¯e
¯
he´:ba`=tse˜:]
enter.pf=when.SS
èm
e˜m−
[3s:rfl]−
s´¯au.
sO´:
sit down.pf
‘[When she1 came in], she1/*2 sat down.’1 (Kiowa, field notes)
(26)
[∅−
[3s]−
H´¯ebà`¯e
¯
he´:ba`=e˜:]
enter.pf=when.DS
èm
e˜m−
[3s:rfl]−
s´¯au.
sO´:
sit down.pf
‘[When she1 came in], she*1/2 sat down.’ (Kiowa, f.n.)
2.1.1 Origins of the study of switch-reference
Jacobsen (1967) first proposed the term switch-reference to describe a proposed
morpheme of Washo (Hokan-Coahuilan, California) that only appeared at the
juncture of two clauses whose subjects were disjoint in reference. The term switch-
reference referred to this apparent switch. The morpheme in question, -š ([S]), ap-
pears in (27) cliticized to a sentence-initial particle, itself cliticized to a sentential
coordinator.
(27) gáh1la
her:leg
Máhaduwetihayi.
she:lay across
P−išda
and−there:SR
šáhaduePi
she:went across
(no gloss provided) (Washo, Jacobsen (1967))
Jacobsen’s insight proved quite helpful for linguistic documentation, for soon, lin-
guists applied his description to morphemes in many more American languages,
as well as hundreds more in Papua New Guinea, Australia, and around the world.
Inmany languages, linguists found another morpheme that was in complementary
distribution with the switch-reference morpheme, only appearing at the juncture
of two clauses whose subjects co-referred.
1In both (25) and (26), the pronouns could also be translated as ‘he’.
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This identity-maintaining morpheme received various names, the most com-
mon being same-reference. For instance, in Mojave (Munro 1976: 39), -k marks
same-reference, while -mmarks switch-reference.
(28) a. pap
potato
P-@kčo:r-k
1-peel-SS
P-salyi:-k
1-fry-tns
‘I peeled the potatoes and then I fried them’
b. Pinyeč
I
pap
potato
P-@kčo:r-m
1-peel-DS
Judy-č
Judy-nom
salyi:-k
fry-tns
‘I peeled the potatoes and then Judy fried them’
2.1.2 Terminological issues
As these morphemes were being discovered in and described for more and
more languages, somewhere along the way, the term switch-reference underwent
a shift in meaning. Munro (1976) uses it as a “cover term” (p. 41) to describe
the phenomenon that includes both the same-reference and switch-reference mor-
phemes. To avoid subsequent confusion, Munro describes the morpheme Jacobsen
that called ‘switch-reference’ as different subject or DS, while ‘same-reference’ be-
came same subject or SS. Both terms are intended to reflect the observation that
switch-reference ‘tracks’ the reference of subjects from one clause to the next. In
the literature, it is common to say that switch-reference tracks subjects.
This terminology is still in use today, even though later research demonstrated
that switch-reference does not solely track subjects. Chapter 3 will discuss this
‘non-canonical’ switch-reference in detail, but even as early as Langdon & Munro
(1979) and Dahlstrom (1982), it was noted that switch-reference seemed on occa-
sion to track a topical event, rather than any of the participants described. Stirling
(1993) proposed a semantic structure whereby switch-reference only tracks the
verb’s Davidsonian event, and I will argue that what is being tracked in those cases
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is the topic situation of the joined clauses. Despite the fact that switch-reference
sometimes ignores subjects, I will continue to use SS and DS to describe the values
of the morpheme. The names only exist in the linguist’s models, so they ought
to be used for the linguist’s convenience, and I judge continuity to be convenient
enough to keep using these terms. If one seeks further justification, one might
imagine that SS and DS are orphan initialisms that no longer stand for anything in
particular, or that SS stands for ‘same something’, and DS for ‘different something’
(Craige Roberts, p.c.).
Switch-reference the phenomenon and switch-reference the morpheme are of-
ten indiscriminately abbreviated in the literature as SR, especially in journal arti-
cles, where space is scarce. With no such constraint here, I will, in the interest of
clarity, distinguish the two. I will only use SR to describe the switch-reference mor-
pheme, independent of its value, and write out “switch-reference" to describe the
phenomenon itself. Accordingly, switch-reference is marked by an SR morpheme,
which can exhibit either SS or DS marking.
2.1.3 Pivot and anti-pivot
Switch-reference doesn’t always track subjects, so we need a way to refer gen-
erally to the item it does track. I will adopt Stirling (1993)’s term pivot as a cover
term for the various kinds of things this argument can be. But I will diverge from
her usage, and introduce the term anti-pivot, which I explain below.
SR markers sit at the juncture of two clauses, but it does not have the same
relation with the two clauses. All clause juncture types are asymmetric, and SR
morphemes are necessarily a constituent embedded within one clause or the other.
Therefore, switch-reference is an asymmetric phenomenon as well. For instance,
in (25) and (26), the SR morpheme is fused with the connective, which is syn-
tactically a part of the embedded clause. An SR morpheme relates two arguments;
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one is its clausemate, while the other is not. Thus, neither the two clauses nor their
prominent arguments share an identical structural relation to the switch-reference
morpheme.
This asymmetry will turn out to be important, so it is necessary to distinguish
the two arguments of switch-reference. Therefore, throughout this dissertation, I
will employ the term pivot to describe the clausemate argument of SR, and intro-
duce the term anti-pivot to describe the non-clausemate argument. An SR mor-
pheme exhibits SS marking when its pivot and anti-pivot arguments co-refer. It
exhibits DS marking when they don’t.
In addition to describing the arguments of SR as pivot and anti-pivot, we will
need to distinguish the two joined clauses. I use the term pivot clause to describe
the joined clause that contains the pivot (along with the SR morpheme), and anti-
pivot clause to describe the joined clause containing the anti-pivot. The main
reason for this usage is to link the terms to the relations borne by the arguments
that switch-reference tracks to the switch-reference morpheme itself. In (25) and
(26), the pivot of the switch-reference marker is typically the embedded subject,
and the pivot clause is the embedded clause. The anti-pivot of the switch-reference
marker is typically the dominant clause’s subject, and the anti-pivot clause is the
dominant clause.
A secondary reason for this terminology is neutrality with respect to the struc-
ture. Haiman & Munro (1983) employ the terms marked clause for the clause with
SR (the pivot clause), and controlling clause for the other clause (the anti-pivot
clause). While these terms have been widely used in the switch-reference liter-
ature, they presuppose dependencies between the clauses that rely on particular
theories of grammar. The use of pivot/anti-pivot clause makes no such suggestion,
freeing us to pursue whichever structure analyses our observations lead us to.
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2.1.4 Anti-pivots seem to be pivots as well
One important observation that Jacobsen (1967) made about switch-reference
is that the pivot of one SR morpheme serves as the anti-pivot of an SR morpheme
embedded under it, and that the anti-pivot of an embedded SR morpheme serves
as the pivot of an SRmorpheme in its own clause. This effect is visible when several
clauses are linked by SR morphemes. In the Kiowa example in (225), the subject of
the third clause is pro, but DS marking indicates a change from the subject before
it. It may be the first sentence’s subject, or it might be another person altogether.
In (225), the second clause is the pivot clause of the first SR marker, as well as the
anti-pivot clause of the second.
(29) Yísàum
j´i:sO˜m
Y.
∅−
[3s]
h´¯ebàhèl
he´:jb-a-hel
enter-pf-evid
nàu
nO˜
and.DS
∅−
[3s:3s]
dónhêl
d´˜on-heˆl
look at.pf-evid
nàu
nO˜
and.DS
∅−
[3s:3s]
j´¯onê. . .
t´˜o:w-nˆ˜e:j
say.impf.evid
‘Yisaum1 came in and he*1/2 looked at him and he1/*2/3 said. . . ’ (f.n.)
This property of pivots appears so evident that it might seem barely worth
mention. However, in section 4.5.2, I show that in certain configurations, the anti-
pivot cannot be the pivot of its own clause. This observation will follow from
the proposal that switch-reference can track topic situations, rather than sub-
jects. However, in many cases, Jacobsen’s observation still holds, and any theory of
switch-reference must account for that.
2.1.5 Disambiguation does not trigger switch-reference
If we look at examples (25) and (26) again, we see that there are no overt ar-
guments in either clause. In (25), the SS marking on the connective is the sole
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overt indication that the person who came in is also the person who sat down. In
(26), the DS marking is the only overt indication that someone else sat down. The
English translation of both sentences, when spoken, is ambiguous, so from our per-
spective, the switch-reference is performing a helpful disambiguating function.2
This use of switch-reference can be very useful in texts involving two characters,
as it allows listeners to track who’s doing what (Watkins 1990). Indeed, for a long
time, many researchers considered this pragmatic effect he primary function of
switch-reference (Moser 1978; Langdon & Munro 1979; Haiman & Munro 1983);
they claimed that SR is licensed by the need to disambiguate.
However, there is no clear link between discourse function and licensing of
switch-reference. Finer (1984) points out that switch-reference’s distribution is
grammatically determined, because it appears when it does not help disambiguate.
A pair of Kiowa examples demonstrates his point. The subject in both clauses
of (30a) is the first person singular, which is clearly distinguished in the verbal
agreement marker. There can be no ambiguity among the subjects, but SS-marking
with when is obligatory, as proven by the negative evidence in (30b).
(30) a. À h´¯ebàch`¯e
¯
Pa-he´:ba=tse˜:
[1s]-enter.pf=when.SS
dè s´¯au.
de-sO´:
[1s:rfl]-sit.down.pf
‘When Ii came in, Ii/*j sat down. ’ (f.n.)
b. *À h´¯ebà`¯e
¯
Pa-he´:ba=Pe˜:
[1s]-enter.pf=when.DS
dè s´¯au.
de-sO´:
[1s:rfl]-sit.down.pf
‘When Ii came in, Ii/*j sat down. ’ (f.n.)
2It should be noted that the prosody of English usually gives a disjoint-reference effect that
disambiguates the sentence. When the two subjects differ, the second tends to be pronounced with
greater intensity due to contrastiveness.
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Furthermore, the kind of ambiguity that ought to trigger switch-reference does
not automatically do so. Two sentences can be joined by a connective that does
not mark SR; in this case none appears. For instance, the Kiowa connective -dò,
‘because’, does not allow SR marking, even if it would disambiguate the sentence.
(31) Háun
h´˜On
not
∅−
[3s]
ch´¯a
¯
nâu
ts´˜a:n-Oˆ
arrive-neg
[∅−
[3s]
kópd`¯audò.
kho´p+dO:=do]
sick+be=because
‘(He/she)1 didn’t come because (he/she)1/2 was sick.’ (f.n.)
What determines the appearance and value of SR is the effect of the interaction
between the lexicon, the syntax, and the semantics. SR is found with, borne by, or
fused with certain sentential connectives, and it appears if and only if those con-
nectives are used. The pragmatic usefulness of disambiguation that SR ultimately
provides is epiphenomenal.
2.1.6 Where switch-reference is found around the world
This dissertation is focused on the Kiowa language, but any theory of switch-
reference needs to be compatible with what is known about switch-reference cross-
linguistically. The next section offers a cross-linguistic discussion of switch-ref-
erence morphosyntax. Before we can begin that, let us begin with a discussion of
where switch-reference is found around the world, to see just how cross-linguistic
the investigation must be.
Switch-reference is found in hundreds of languages on several continents. For
convenience, these are called switch-reference languages, or SR-languages. The
most detailed studies have beenmade on SR-languages in Papua NewGuinea, Aus-
tralia, and North America. However, switch-reference also been attested in South
America (Dixon & Aikhenvald 1999), in East Africa among the Omotic languages
of Ethiopia (Azeb Amha 2001), and in the Munda languages of Eastern India (An-
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derson 2007). Typologies of markings and usage of switch-reference have been
published for North America (Jacobsen 1983), for Australia (Austin 1981), and for
Papua New Guinea (Roberts 1997). Switch-reference is unattested in Mesoamer-
ica (Campbell 1997) and the Caribbean, as well as anywhere else not mentioned,
including no language of Europe. In North America it is found in many differ-
ent cultural areas and language groups, including Muskogean, Yuman, Numic,
Siouan, Pomoan, and Piman. The map in Figure 2.1 shows the pre-contact distri-
bution of known switch-reference languages in North America.3 The languages
are found in several cultural areas, though notably none in the Northeast. In fact,
no Algonquian or Athapaskan language employs switch-reference. This may be
related to the fact that many languages in these groups have obviation systems
(Mithun 1997).
Some researchers have reported switch-reference in Bantu languages (Wiese-
mann 1982), the Caucasus (Nichols 1983), and on the island of Vanuatu in the
South Pacific (Crowley 1998). However, these reports concern phenomena that
provide a switch-reference effect, but do not themselves involve a switch-refer-
ence morpheme. Many phenomena have the effect of indicating subject identity or
disjointness. However, they do this using a syntactic phenomenon that is licensed
by co-reference, instead of using an actual grammaticalized morpheme that marks
co-reference or disjointness. For instance, obligatory subject control in English
(e.g., We1 want PRO1 to have lunch.) triggers a same-subject effect, but does not
involve switch-reference. Switch-reference effects and the ways they are used in
language to mimic reference-tracking are very interesting. I discuss one example
in section 4.3.3, but by and large these effects fall outside the scope of this study
and will be left alone for now.
3See Austin (1981) for a map of Australian SR languages, and Roberts (1997) for a map of
Papuan SR languages.
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Figure 2.1. Pre-contact speech areas of known switch-reference languages in
North America (based on the language area maps in Campbell (1997))
great 
basin
california
southwest
plains
plains
southeast
muskogean
siouan
numic
This section has introduced the phenomenon known as switch-reference. It
tracks a clausemate argument (the pivot) and a non-clausemate argument (the
anti-pivot), and indicates whether they co-refer (SS marking) or are disjoint from
one another (DS marking). The anti-pivot of one SR marker is usually the pivot
for an SR marker in its own clause. The SR morpheme must appear with certain
sentential connectives, whether it aids in disambiguating subjects or not, and must
not appear elsewhere. The next section examines the distribution of SR morphol-
ogy in more detail, including the types of connectives it is found with.
2.2 A cross-linguistic examination of SR morphosyntax
This section examines the morphosyntax of SR morphology from a cross-ling-
uistic perspective. It demonstrates that morphosyntactic generalizations alone do
not inform us much about the nature of switch-reference. This nearly null finding
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suggests that the semantics of switch-reference is at least as crucial to its under-
standing as its syntax, thereby setting up the analysis in the subsequent chapters
of this dissertation.
The most important cross-linguistic generalizations that can be made about
switch-reference morphology are that the morphemes always appear at clause
junctures. In a structural sense, SR only occurs at the edge of an extended ver-
bal projection. SR morphemes form their own category. In most SR-languages, an
overt sentential connective is required for SR to attach to. These facts about the
distribution of switch-reference must be accounted for.
2.2.1 Morphology of switch-reference morphemes
This section will ask whether we can uncover any other informative cross-
linguistic generalizations about the distribution of SRmorphemes. Some linguists,
focused on one language or family of languages, have proposed that we can, but a
broad enough view proves the opposite. Apart from a requirement for SR to ap-
pear at clause junctures, we cannot make any generalizations based on the forms or
distribution of the SR morphemes themselves, nor can we rule out any particular
structure of clause juncture that switch-reference might appear with.
2.2.1.1 SR is not nominal
SR is not a nominal morpheme. In a strictly morphological sense, it does not
belong to the class of morphemes that are typically associated with nouns, includ-
ing number, gender, or case marking. In no language has it been attested to appear
affixed to the nominal expressions it is tracking, or any other nominal expression.
In addition, it does not license any specific morphology on them (via a syntactic
agreement relation). In a syntactic sense, a nominal morpheme is one that is in-
troduced by a head within an extended nominal projection (notably, NP and DP).
Switch-reference is not nominal in this sense. It never appears inside a DP or NP,
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unless it is on a relative clause within one; in that case it is found at the edge of the
relative clause, which contains an extended verbal projection.
There are two cases that at first glance appear to be exceptions: SRmarkers that
cliticize onto nouns, and quantifiers. The first apparent exception is exemplified
by Kiowa. Kiowa is typically verb-final but allows right-dislocation.4 A right-
dislocated DP can serve as the phonological base for the cliticized postpositive
that bears switch-reference. This is shown in (32a), where the DP meaning ‘pencil’
is right-dislocated. Without right-dislocation, the SR-marked connective cliticizes
to the clause-final verb (32b).
(32) a. John
J
J.
é
e´−
[3s:3i]
zón
z´˜on
pull out.pf
cút´¯a
¯
dàuch`¯e
¯
,
ku´P+a´:−dO=tse˜:
write+stick-inv=when.SS
é
Pe´−
[3s:3i]
têm.
tˆ˜em
break.pf
‘When John pulled it out, the pencil, he broke it (in two).’ (f.n.)
b. John
J
J.
cút´¯a
¯
dàu
ku´P+a´:−dO
write+stick-inv
é
e´−
[3s:3i]
zónch`¯e
¯
,
z´˜on=tse˜:
pull out.pf=when.SS
é
Pe´−
[3s:3i]
têm.
tˆ˜em
break.pf
‘When John pulled out the pencil, he broke it (in two).’ (f.n.)
The fact that =ch`¯e
¯
/`¯e
¯
is a clitic tells us that its attachment to the noun cút´¯a
¯
dàu
is phonological in nature, not syntactic— the SR is marked on the connective, not
the noun.
Another apparent example comes from quantificational constructions, as seen
in (33) and (34). However, independent facts about these quantifiers show that
4Kiowa’s basic word order is SOV (Watkins 1984). According to standard practice in the genera-
tive literature, ‘basic word order’ simply describes the word order that would derive from the syn-
tactic structure before any demonstrable movement operations take place. So English is a Subject-
Verb-Object (SVO) language, which makes Bill likes coffee grammatical. However, movement can
displace objects for various grammatical purposes. If you want to evoke a contrast, an OSV order
is possible: Coffee, Bill likes. Tea, he doesn’t. This contrastive mechanism ‘left-dislocates’ the object,
because it moves the contrasted item to the left-edge of the clause.
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they are actually verbs, and the quantifier phrases are actually sentences (ex-
tended verbal projections). (33) can be paraphrased as ‘them being all, you will
eat them’, while (34) can be paraphrased as ‘the boys were all and they met at
church.’ Broadwell (2006) notes that quantificational verbs in Choctaw can take
tense and aspect, bear agreement markers, and be embedded under participial
and complementizing morphemes, which bear switch-reference. Indeed, in (34),
the universally quantifying verb moma is inflected with an intensive marker (the
geminating ‘y-grade’ infix), that gives the sense of ’every single one’.
(33) [po-kóo
DepFut-be all
ta]
DS.DepFut
in-síi-PPiit-aPa
2-fut-eat-TM
‘You will eat them all’ Seri, (Moser 1978: 114)
(34) [Alla’a
child
nakni’
male
móyyoma-ka-t]
all:Y-comp-SS
oklah
plur
aa-ittanáaha-’
loc-meet-nml
itt-afaama-tok
rcp-meet.past
‘All the boys met at church.’ Choctaw, (Broadwell 2006: 226)
The absence of any effect of switch-reference on nominal morphology is impor-
tant for two reasons. First, it suggests that there is no inherent link between the SR
morpheme and subjects, a suggestion that will be confirmed by investigations of
non-canonical switch-reference (chapter 3). The second is that this absence makes
switch-reference significantly different from other reference-tracking devices it is
often compared to, such as logophoricity, pro-drop, or obviation. These others
all involve changes in the form of the DP in question, either through special pro-
nouns or a morpheme replacing case marking, and the effects often re-appear in
verb agreement. This difference ought to be accounted for by any theory of SR.
2.2.1.2 SR is not (pre-theoretically) verbal
In the literature, a consensus seems to have formed by Haiman &Munro (1983)
that SR is a verbal morpheme, in a family with tense, agreement, aspect, andmood,
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because it generally tracks subjects and is generally found affixed to verbs. This
description-based use of the term ‘verbal’ differs from its use in syntactic theory. In
a theoretical sense, ‘verbal’ describes amorpheme that heads a lexical or functional
projection that ‘extends’ from the verb phrase. These morphemes include tense,
agreement, aspect, and mood, which may appear on the verb, but if they do, the
appearance is derived by the effect of independent syntactic processes.
If we apply the descriptive sense, switch-reference cannot be characterized
as verbal, since it is not necessarily affixed to verbs, and it doesn’t always track
subjects. Jacobsen noted in his seminal (1967) paper that switch-reference mor-
phemes can appear affixed to sentence-initial particles instead of sentence-final
verbs. The following example from Washo demonstrates this, with an initial par-
ticle he glosses as ‘X’.
(35) píteliP
lizard
yát’umuwaP-aP
go down in-aor
P-i-š-da
X-impf-DS-loc
géwe
Coyote
gePišúwam-i-da
pursue him-impf-DS
‘The lizard went in and then Coyote pursued him and. . . ’ (Washo,
Jacobsen 1967)
A possibly effective reply to Jacobsen’s observation is that these sentence-initial
particles are actually verbs. Many languages employ recapitulative pro-verbs in
sentence-initial positions to express some kind of narrative continuity to previous
sentences. This may be the case here, and the imperfective marking is strong ev-
idence to that effect. If this reply is correct, (35) does not disprove the notion of
SR as descriptively verbal. No matter; the accuracy of Jacobsen’s observation is
unnecessary for us to address this question. Many languages provide ample coun-
terexamples that are much more clear than the Washo case. For instance, in many
languages, switch-reference is affixed to or fused with coordinating conjunctions.
One such language is Kiowa (Watkins 1984). In (36), switch-reference appears on
58
the coordinating conjunction gàu ([gO]), which is not attached to the sentence-final
verb.
(36) Bé
be´=
[2p:rfl]
yâiv`¯aidè
jaˆj+pĳajde
play+fight.pf.imper
gàu
gO
and.SS
bé
be´=
[2p:3pa]
d´¯aufènàum
dO´:+pe˜n+O˜m
kill+fire+make.pf.imper
‘Y’all play, and then burn them to death.’ (Kiowa, f.n.)
This detachment is quite clear in cases where the coordinated clause is used
with respect to a previous utterance, even if each conjunct is spoken by a different
speaker. Example (37) involves the form gìgáu, which is a contraction of the SS
coordinator gàu with the adverbial hègáu ([hegO´]). Watkins (1993) points out that
this contraction only occurs if the coordinator is part of the second clause.
(37) Dáu
dO´−
[any:3s:1p]
´¯a
¯
u.
O˜:
give.pf
Ş
full stop
gìgáu
gigO
and.SS+then
èm
e˜m−
[2s]
h´¯o`¯ai
ho´:w+aj:
travel+start off.pf
’You gave it to us. And then you left’ (f.n.)
(38) a. A: Cút`¯a
¯
dàu
ku´P+a˜:-dO
write+stick-inv
dáut
dO´P−
[any:3i:1p]=
´¯a
¯
u.
´˜O:
give.pf
b. B: Gàu
gO
and.SS
´¯e
¯
dèàl
´˜e:j-de=al
this-bas=also
é
¯
´˜e−
[3s:3s:1s]=
´¯a
¯
u.
´˜O:
give.pf
A: ‘He4 gave us a pencil .’
B: ‘And he4 gave me this.’ (f.n.)
Further evidence that switch-reference is not attached to verbs comes from
cliticization. We saw earlier that an SR-marked connective can attach to a right-
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dislocated noun. Here is another example (39), which shows that switch-reference
in Kiowa is clearly associated with clause-level morphemes, not verbs.
(39) John
J.
John
Bill
B.
Bill
áu
O´=
[3s:3i:3s]
´¯a
¯
u
P´˜O:
give.pf
cút`¯a
¯
d`¯au`¯e
¯
,
ku´P+a:-dO:=Pe˜:
write+stick-inv=when.DS,
è
Pe=
[3s:3i]
têm.
thˆ˜e:m
break.pf
‘When John1 gave it to Bill2, the pencil, he2 broke it.’ (f.n.)
2.2.1.3 SR is in the extended verbal projection
SR morphemes are not verbal in a descriptive sense, but they can be considered
to be verbal in a broad structural sense; that is, they are part of the extended
verbal projection. If SR is on the extended verbal projection, we predict that it
should appear on the verb in many languages, and away from it in others. Verbal
morphology (tense, aspect, mood, etc.) is introduced by a series of functional heads
that extend from the verb phrase in a universally fixed order, whenever they are
present. The functional projections extend beyond the inflectional heads into the
complementizers as well. The exact number and nature of heads is disputed, but
(40) reflects a standard structure.
(40) CP
C◦ TP
T◦ NegP
Neg◦ AspP
Asp◦ vP
v◦ VP
V◦
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The morphemes introduced by these functional heads are found attached to
the verb in many languages. The theory has three mechanisms for this. One is
agreement; syntactic features on the verb seek out a tense or an aspect feature, and
adopt it. This mechanism is found in many languages, including English; tense
morphology appears on a verb that merges at V◦ and stays there. In (41), the past
tense feature on T◦ agrees with the unvalued tense feature on the verb, providing
it with a value. The tense affix is interpreted at T◦, but appears on the verb at V◦.
This process is shown in the abridged tree.
(41) Travis quickly finished the book.
TP
DP
Travis
T◦
[past]
VP
AdvP
quickly
VP
V◦
finished
[uT: __ ]
DP
the book
The second mechanism is head movement, where the V◦ head raises up the
chain, picking up the other morphemes as it goes; they all appear on the verb. This
process is found in many languages, including French; its discovery by Emonds
(1978) and its development by Pollock (1989) were both major milestones in our
understanding of syntactic processes. In (42), the verb (mange) merges at V◦, but
the feature valuation process triggers its movement to T◦. It leaves behind a copy,
which is deleted at PF, thus remains unspoken.
4I use ‘ModP’ to stand in for mood or modality marking.
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(42) Nolwenn
nOlwEn
N.
mange
mA˜Z-∅
eat-pres.3s
toujours
tuZuK
always
un
E˜
a.masc
kébab.
kebab
döner kebab
‘Nolwenn always eats a döner kebab’ (French)
TP
DP
Nolwenn
T◦
[present]
mange
VP
AdvP
toujours
VP
V◦
mange
[uT: __ ]
DP
un kébab
The third mechanism is cliticization, where the heads stay in their respective
positions, do not enter agreement relations, but are spoken together phonologi-
cally. This option is only available when the heads are linearly adjacent. In head-
final languages, like Turkish (43), the heads are lined up, and cliticization can
occur (Kornfilt 1997).5
(43) bana
me
gör-me-di-niz
see-neg-past-2p
‘you guys didn’t see m’ (Turkish)
TP
NegP
VP
DP
bana
V◦
gel
Neg◦
me-
T◦
di-niz
5Two things: First, since the heads are adjacent, it actually isn’t clear that this isn’t just head
movement, at least to some extent (Kelepir 2001), and second, I assume right-headedness.
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Between these mechanisms, especially the latter two, we can conclude that the
apparently verbal nature of switch-reference is nothing more than an illusory ar-
tifact of phrase structure. Every language verified to have switch-reference has a
verb-final basic word order6, so either of the two latter mechanisms ought to work.
If SR is on the extended verbal projection, we can predict the different types
of SR morpheme exponence. The most straightforward are those where the SR
morphemes are easily distinguished. This is the case in languages like Chickasaw
(Muskogean, Mississippi/Oklahoma), where the SS marker -t is independent of
tense, aspect, mood, agreement, and complementizer. This could arise either by
head movement or cliticization.
(44) aya-l-a’chi-ka-t
go-1s-irr-Comp-SS
ithaana-li
know-1s
I know I’m going’ (Munro 1983)
We should also see SR forming portmanteaux with another morpheme. Typi-
cally this other morpheme is the connective, as in Kiowa, or a marker of mood or
tense, as in Mandan (Siouan, North Dakota) where the SR morpheme is fused with
the realis and irrealis (Mixco 1997).
Table 2.1. Mandan switch-reference suffixes
realis irrealis
SS -ri¸ -ri¸
DS -ak -ki
In addition, if SR is on the extended verbal projection, we ought to see condi-
tioning effects. The fusion of verbal functional heads creates morphological condi-
tioning environments, where the morphology of one head is determined in part by
6The Vanuatu language Lenakel is the only proposed counter-example (Lynch 1983); in fact,
this phenomenon in Lenakel and related languages (known as the ‘echo subject’ construction) is
not switch-reference, but a kind of VP-coordination.
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the value of another. For instance, in many languages, the aspect morphology de-
pends on the tense; in such a case we can say that the tense marking conditions the
aspect marking. If SR is introduced by a verbal functional projection, we should
see conditioning effects in some languages, and we do. In some clause-chaining
languages, tense or agreement marking varies by value of switch-reference. In
Amele, for instance, Roberts (1988) shows that subject agreement morphemes vary
depending on the value of SR present. The 1st person singular agreement forms
in (45) and (46) change, depending on the SR marker they are next to.
(45) Ija
I
hu-m-ig
come-SS-1s
sab
food
j-ig-a
eat-1s-TodP
‘I came and ate the food.’
(46) Ija
I
ho-co-min
come-DS-1s
sab
food
ja-g-a
eat-2s-TodP
‘I came and you ate the food.’ (Roberts 1988, (3-4))
The conditioning goes one step further in Apal1 (Emuan family, Papua New
Guinea). Wade (1997) reports that SS and DS do not appear as independent mor-
phemes. Instead, they condition the subject agreement and the dependent tense.
For instance, with DS, the simultaneous tense is -da, and the 1st person singular
agreement is -liN (in final clauses, 1s is marked -n.) However, with SS, no agree-
ment appears, and the simultaneous tense is expressed by verb reduplication.
(47) vi-da-liN
get-sim-1s.DS
iam1gali
woman
l1gu-av-i
wash-3p-3
‘I was getting it while the women washed it.’
(48) ha-meN
MD-like
aba
speak
aba
speak
mig-u-i.
move down-go-3
‘She spoke like that (SS) while she went down.’ (Wade 1997)
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Finally, in some languages, the SS and DS forms of the conjunction do not re-
semble each other at all. This is the case in Maxakalí (Jê, Brazil). This exponence
type may have come about in different ways; it is impossible to tell. Perhaps the
fusion with the connective is so complete that no deconstruction is possible. Per-
haps the conjunction is asyndetic (i.e., lacking an overt conjunction), and the SR
morpheme is free standing.
(49) a. Pı˜-mo˜N
3-go
t1
and.SS
P-n˜ın
3-come
‘He went and returned.’
b. Pı˜-mo˜N
3-go
ha
and.DS
P-n˜ın
3-come
‘He1 went and he2 returned.’ (Rodrigues 1999)
2.2.1.4 SR is introduced by a specific head
It is clear that the SR morpheme is in on its own head in the extended verbal
projection. This conclusion should not be controversial, but so far, no one has
made an argument for it. My argument in favor of this conclusion has four points.
The first and strongest is that in many languages, SR is an easily distinguished,
independent morpheme. It is clearly not attached to T◦ in many languages, as we
saw above. In some, even, it does not even appear attached to connectives (at C◦).
For instance, in Mojave, the SR marker is not attached to the connective nya- (50).
The fact that both are attached to the final verb is predicted if SR is in the extended
verbal projection.
(50) nya-avač+ku:Pe:-kum,
when-arrive.pl+poor.pl-DS
ahwer-k
fence in-SS
‘When the [poor] parents had a chance to come in, they [the Whites] had
fenced the place off’ (Mojave, Powskey et al. (1980))
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Another reason is that SR’s fusion with T◦ and/or C◦ in any given language is
derived from its being on the extended verbal projection. The fusion is no more
an argument against an SR head than the fusion of tense and aspect are arguments
against T◦ and Asp◦ heads.
A third reason to posit an SR head is conceptual economy. SR morphology has
to be introduced by some head. Under a strong cartographic approach (Cinque
1999), the idea that SR is introduced by an SR-devoted head is axiomatic. But
even under a more standard approach, we can safely assume as a null hypothesis
that every non-φ functional morpheme is introduced by its own head. We’ve seen
no evidence against that hypothesis, so it stands to reason that SR morphology is
introduced by its own head.
Finally, there are unwelcome consequences to associating SR with other func-
tional heads. If SR is on T◦, it would be too tightly tied to the subject. As we will
see in the next chapter, SR does not always track subjects. If SR is on C◦, it would
be too high for the pivot to be a semantic argument of SR. Other than those po-
sitions, then, all that remains of the extended verbal projection are left-periphery
heads like Top◦ and Foc◦. Neither (overt) topic nor focus phenomena interact with
switch-reference. So there must be a head devoted to SR.
In short, SR morphemes are introduced by their own head, somewhere high
in the verbal projection. In chapter 4, I present a theory that localizes this head.
From this location, SR morpheme can interact with other functional heads, and
this interaction derives the facts described in this section.
2.2.1.5 On the origin of switch-reference morphemes
A curious fact about switch-reference morphology in many languages is that
the SS and DS markers are homophonous with an opposing pair of morphemes
found elsewhere in the language. If we were only looking at one language (or
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family) where this occurs, we might conclude that the homophony is no accident,
that there is a direct link between the meaning of switch-reference and whatever
the homophones mark, which in turn would cast doubt on the conclusion that SR
is introduced by its own functional head.
A cross-linguistic examination casts strong doubts on any such link. There is no
means of predicting whichmorphemes the SRmarkers will be homophonous with.
Predicting a link to homophones can have unwelcome consequences. In addition,
in many languages, the homophones are not in direct opposition with each other.
In others, the SR markers are homophonous with a multitude of morphemes, and
there is no way to tell which one is the one with a link. Finally, in most languages,
the SS and DS markers are not homophonous with anything. I conclude that any
homophony between SR and some other morpheme pair is accidental.
To demonstrate this conclusion, I will discuss one well-studied example of ho-
mophony in SR, that of case-markers. Homophony with case is perhaps most strik-
ing feature of the SR morphology in the Muskogean family of languages, whose
speakers’ homelands are in the Southeastern United States. Throughout the group,
SS-marking is reliably marked on complementizers with a form identical to nomi-
native case (usually −(a)t), while DS is reliably marked with a morpheme identical
to accusative case (−V˜).7 The following Choctaw examples demonstrate this. In
(51), the subject and object (which has been left-dislocated) are clearly marked. In
(52), the SR markers are identical, except for phonological vowel deletion.
(51) John-a
J.-acc
Pam-at
Pam-nom
písa-tok
see-pt
‘Pam saw John’ (Broadwell 2006: 74)
7In Choctaw orthography, nasalization is written as an underscore. See Martin (1998) for
Creek, Kimball (1991) for Koasati, Broadwell (1997) for Choctaw, Munro (1983) for Chickasaw.
In Choctaw and Chickasaw, some clause-chains can have a different SR pair, fused with the con-
nective (-cha and -na); these have no homophony with any other morpheme pair.
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(52) a. Alla’a
child
nakni’
male
móyyoma-ka-t
all8-Comp-SS
oklah
plur
aa-ittanáaha-’
loc-meet-nml
itt-afaama-tok
recip-meetpt
‘All the boys met at church.’ (Broadwell 2006: 226)
b. Shókha’
hog
moma-ka
all-Comp:DS
abi-tok
kill-pt
‘He killed all the hogs’
Given this striking identity, a link between case and switch-reference seems in-
triguing and intuitively plausible. All the more so since it’s the nominative that
marks subject identity. Rising (1992) even makes a bold claim that the homophony
goes the other way: (structural) case is a marker of continuity or disjointness. Let’s
set aside the particulars of that claim, which would require us to ignore observa-
tions about structural case in nearly every other language. Instead, let’s focus on
the notion that case and switch-reference are linked.
Proposing a strong link between case and switch-reference makes two major
predictions that fail. If the distribution of case and switch-reference are tightly
linked, languages that don’t mark case shouldn’t have SR morphology. Kiowa is
a very salient counterexample, and it is far from alone. Most SR markers are not
homophonous with case markers. Some of these are listed in Table 2.2 on page
73, and many others are listed in the typologies of Jacobsen (1983) and Roberts
(1997). The second prediction is that any language with case should use it for
switch-reference. That is also not the case. Clearly, there is no cross-linguistic link
between case and SR.
8Quantification in Choctaw is expressed on verbs (Broadwell 2006). They take aspectual grades,
bear agreement, and are subordinated by complementizers or participial morphemes.
(1) Hash-moma-ka-t
2p-all-Comp-SS
hash-iya-k
2p-go-tns
mak-aachi-h
be-irr-tns
‘You all must go’
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One might reply that these predictions are not necessary, that case and switch-
reference might be linked or identical, but exogenous factors prevent the expo-
nence of one or the other. For instance, perhaps Kiowa actually does have case, but
exogenous factors like historical change prevent its exponence. Also, one might
say that languages that mark case, like German, also have switch-reference, but
for some reason it does not get expressed. Such an attempt would be rather weak
on its own. But a better reply is that there is a weak link between case and switch-
reference. However, if we look at languages where case and switch-reference are
homophonous, we see that there can be no link between the two phenomena. Look-
ing back at the Muskogean languages, once we take the absence of a link into con-
sideration, it becomesmore plausible to suppose that switch-reference was present
in Proto-Muskogean, whence it spread to the daughter languages, instead of sug-
gesting a cross-linguistic link between switch-reference and case.
Two facts demonstrate that there is no link between the particular cases used
in Muskogean and SR marking. One is that switch-reference makes the ‘wrong’
case appear. In Chickasaw, for instance, relative clauses are marked for SR, and
not for case. In (53), the relative clause, a subject of the matrix clause, should
be marked with nominative case (−at, which is identical to SS marking), since the
matrix verb illi, ‘die’, selects for nominative-marked subjects. However, it bears DS
marking, identical to the accusative. The lack of any nominative case marking in
the sentence shows that case and SR can be in complementary distribution. Thus,
they cannot be intrinsically linked.
(53) ihoo-at
woman-nom
ofi’
dog
yamma
that
pis-to-ka
see-past-Comp:DS
illi-tok
die-past
‘The dog the woman saw died’ (Munro 1983: 230)
In Choctaw, relative clauses are marked by complementizers bearing switch-
reference or a case-marked determiner. In (54), the relative clause has a comple-
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mentizer and SS marking, which is identical to the nominative case marking, de-
spite being the object, and despite there being a nominative-marked subject.9 The
SS marking indicates that the subject of the relative clause and that of the matrix
clause co-refer.
(54) Kátomma-h
where-tns
John-at
John-nom
[ofi’
dog
aa-písa-to-ka-t]10
loc-see-past-Comp-SS
chopa-tok?
buy-past
‘Where did John1 buy the dog he1 saw? (Broadwell 2006)
The second reason to believe there is no link between any particular case and
SR is that other languages with SR markers homophonous with case markers use
different cases for the same value of SR, or use the same case for different values of
SR. For instance, Austin (1981) finds that many Australian SR markers are hom-
phonous with case markers. In many languages (including Gugada, Pitjantjatjara,
and Arabana-Wangganguru), the realis DS marker is homophonous to the locative
case. However, in many others (like Alyawana, Wagaya, and Garawa-Wanyi), it’s
the realis SS marker that’s homophonous to the locative. In some (but not all) of
the languages where this latter situation holds, the allative marks DS. Given evi-
dence like this, it seems that there is no link between any particular case and any
particular value of SR.
Another difficulty of relying on homophony is that the case markers might not
be the only homophonous pair. In Jamul Tipaay (Miller 2001), for instance, the SS
marker -k is homophonous with no fewer than thirteen other morphemes, and the
DS marker -m is homophonous with no fewer than twelve. Some of these are case
markers (e.g., cislocative and translocative), but others are tense/aspect markers,
or relativizers.
9Choctaw wh-words are verbs, like the quantifiers are.
10Broadwell glosses this example a little differently; I’ve made minor irrelevant changes for
clarity.
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In addition to the empirical concerns with a strong link between case and
switch-reference, there is a theoretical problem as well. Assigning case to switch-
reference markers would be problematic whenever a sentence had both a transi-
tive verb and a DS-marked subordinate clause, for the direct object and the clause
would both take accusative case. The same problem occurs for SS-marking and
nominative case— any subject would also be nominative-marked. For SR-marking
to involve case, wemust assume that any structural case can be generated indepen-
dent of any assigning functional heads.11 Given all this evidence, we can conclude
that there is no meaningful link between case and switch-reference.
If case and switch-reference have no overt link, what is going on in these lan-
guages? It seems quite clear that the homophony is not a sign of homosemy. So
why is there homophony at all? I propose that what is happening is the exapta-
tion of morphemes from one system to the switch-reference system. Exaptation
is a biological term that describes the change in function of a trait over time. A
well-known example is bird feathers, which evolved as a heat-regulation system,
but later became used for flight, without significantly changing form. Exaptation
is also common in cognition. In fact, Mercier & Sperber (2011) argue that reason-
ing itself is an exaptation of a cognitive system meant merely to win arguments
sophistically to gain social dominance.
I use the term exaptation to describe the co-opting of morphemes from one
module of grammar to another, without changing phonetic form, in order to serve
a different function. This change in function is derived from a change in se-
mantics, for the semantics of a functional item essentially describes its function.
For the Muskogean languages, the exaptation would have taken place as follows:
11Broadwell (2006) mentions another Choctaw fact that casts doubt on a link between case and
SR. Accusative case-marking in Choctaw is not obligatory on objects. It depends on a lot of dis-
course factors, and Broadwell notes that up to 90 percent of objects in texts are not marked (p. 73).
By contrast, switch-reference’s appearance in Choctaw does not depend on discourse factors at all.
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As switch-reference arose in Proto-Muskogean, the morphemes -t and -V˜ were
exapted from the case system to the emergent switch-reference system.12
We might ask, though, why does exaptation occur at all? Why doesn’t each
language create its own SR morphemes? The answer to those questions lies in the
way SR emerges. Exaptation obviously did not occur in every SR language; switch-
reference had to arise somewhere. However, switch-reference is well-observed
to spread by language contact in addition to language divergence (Oswalt 1976;
Austin 1981; Roberts 1997). This means of spreading is called areal diffusion.
Areal diffusion of a grammatical item is signaled most clearly by geographic con-
tiguity and lack of genetic relation between the languages that have that item.
Recall that some Australian languages use a DS marker that is homophonous with
the locative case marker, while others use an SS marker homophonous with loca-
tive case. Austin (1981) mapped them and made a striking discovery: The lan-
guages where locative marks DS are to the southwest, while those where it marks
SS are to the northeast, and a solid line can be drawn between the two groups.
Not only that, the languages in each of the two groups are not genetically related,
and each uses their own language’s marker for the locative for SR. This suggests a
combination of areal diffusion and exaptation.
Areal diffusion is also suggested by the distribution of switch-reference lan-
guages in North America, as the map on page 54 indicates. The only outliers are
the Muskogean group and the Tonkawa of modern-day southeast Texas, but most
of the tribes that lived between the Muskogeans and the other switch-reference
language speaking tribes died out or dispersed into other tribes before anyone
could record their languages. Perhaps these, too, employed switch-reference, and
the proto-Muskogean speakers borrowed it from them.
12The suggestion I make here does not rule out the possibility that the exaptation went in the
other direction.
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Areal diffusion, coupled with exaptation, is the source of many SR morphemes
around the world.13 However, it does not explain the independent appearance of
switch-reference systems on the different continents. New Guinea and Australia
are close enough to allow for diffusion from one to the other, but there is no such
link to the Americas, or to Africa or the Subcontinent. It is likely, then, that switch-
reference arose more than once in the history of language, and that suggests that a
theory of switch-reference should form part of a theory of universal grammar.
When areal diffusion and exaptation work in tandem, we get homophony. The
process would work like this: A language’s speakers adopt switch-reference from
a neighboring language. They borrow the phenomenon but not the morphology.
Instead, they employ their ownmarkers, exapting some pair that shows an opposi-
tion. This leads to some languages using case markers, others using tense markers,
and so on. Table 2.2 lists a few examples of homophonous SR marking.
language/family location SS marker DS marker
Creek N.Amer. nominative (-t) accusative (-v˜)
Mpwarnte Arrente Australia ergative nominative
Mojave N. Amer k-class tense (-k) m-class tense (-m)
Crow N. Amer subject relative (-ak) indef. object rel. (-m)
Table 2.2. Examples of exaptation of switch-reference morphemes
Switch-reference is not the only phenomenonwhere areal diffusion and exapta-
tion work together. The Yiddish language allows non-argument expletive demon-
stratives in the Initial Field (Prince 1998). In (55), the demonstrative before the
verb is neuter, while the arguments are masculine and feminine. The resulting
13Jacobsen (1983) makes a suggestion in this direction.
73
meaning is something like a cleft in English, though the Yiddish structure is not a
cleft.
(55) Dos
this:neut
hot
has
Leyb
Leonard:masc.nom
gezen
seen
Erike-n.
Erica-fem.acc
‘It’s Leonard who saw Erica.’
Yiddish is a Germanic language, yet no other Germanic language allows this.
However, there is a structure in Russian identical to the Yiddish, minus the verb-
second effect.
(56) Eto
this:neut
L’eon’id
Leonard:masc.nom
uv’id’el
saw
Er’iku.
Erica:fem.acc
‘It’s Leonard who saw Erica.’
Prince argues that Yiddish speakers borrowed this usage from Russian,and
mentions several facts that are consistent with areal diffusion. This phenomenon
is missing from genetically related languages. It is found in no other extant Ger-
manic language, and is even missing from Old Yiddish. The presence of this phe-
nomenon is also geographically determined. As Prince points out, Old Yiddish was
only spoken in Germanic-speaking areas before migration into Slavic-speaking ar-
eas. In addition, this use of the neuter demonstrative only appears in the eastern
dialects of Yiddish, spoken in Slavic-speaking areas. It never appeared in West-
ern Yiddish, which comprises the dialects spoken in Germanic-speaking areas of
Western Europe.
The areal diffusion of this phenomenon is clear, but the exaptative process is a
little more subtle than it is with switch-reference in Muskogean. Yiddish speak-
ers did not borrow the Russian demonstrative itself. We might conclude that this
was due to Yiddish having the neuter demonstrative. However, if we consider
the semantics involved, we see that it actually didn’t. The neuter expletive and the
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meaningful deictic demonstrative are homophones, but are not synonymous, since
the expletive lacks deixis.14 Thus, they are two separate lexical items. Before areal
diffusion, Yiddish only had the meaningful neuter demonstrative. To serve as an
expletive, we could imagine several options that could have been chosen: Borrow-
ing the Russian eto, creating a new expletive, or using an already extant expletive,
like es. Instead, Yiddish-speakers exapted the Yiddish neuter demonstrative from
its deictic meaning. The homophony is a result of exaptation, but does not signal
synonymy.
To summarize this discussion: I argue that there is no clear link between the
semantics of an SR morpheme and a morpheme it is homophonous with. Any
apparent link is the result of exaptation in the development of switch-reference.
SRmorphemes have a variety of etymological sources, but the only thing they have
in common is their use in switch-reference. These facts strongly suggest that the
meaning of switch-reference is independent from any morpheme it is found with
in a given language.
Note that I am not proposing that every language acquires switch-reference this
way. Some SR languages use morphemes that don’t seem to match anything else in
the language. The origin of these is unknown, and perhaps unknowable. It may be
a case of exaptation where the original morpheme has changed since, or dropped
out of use. It may be that the language speakers came up with a new morpheme.
Or, it may be that the switch-reference arose natively, without being borrowed.
2.2.1.6 Kiowa switch-reference morphemes
Kiowa is not very instructive on the matters of exponence or exaptation, but
I will discuss its switch-reference morphology because of its importance in this
14It may be the case that the expletive does not even have an index to point to a referent via an
assignment function.
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dissertation. Watkins (1993) gives the first detailed description of Kiowa SR mor-
phemes, adding to the discussion in Watkins (1984). The SR markers form port-
manteaux with various conjunctions and postpositions, as shown in Table 2.3. It
appears with these and no others. Because of the fusion of SR with the connectives,
it seems futile to attempt to deconstruct these portmanteaux to find an indepen-
dent SS or DS form in Kiowa.
Table 2.3. Kiowa switch-reference markers (Watkins 1993)
Sentence-initial connectives Sentence-final connectives
Kiowa English gloss Kiowa English gloss
gàu/nàu ‘and’ =gàu/=nàu ‘if, as, etc.’
qàut/àut ‘and+expressive15 =qàut/=àut ‘and, if, as, etc.+ expressive
=ch`¯e
¯
/ =`¯e
¯
‘when’
Exaptation may have occurred in the development of the Kiowa SR markers.
It is possible, perhaps probable, that the DS postposition meaning ‘when’ (`¯e
¯
) is
exapted from the postposition `¯e
¯
, meaning ‘at’ (See chapter 4 for the role of ‘at’ in
the meaning of when-clauses). However, there is no morpheme ch`¯e
¯
in the language
that might have served as a source for an exapted SS marker.
Based on the lack of a homophone for ch`¯e
¯
, we might suppose that SR is not
fused with the postposition, but rather an independent morpheme that is phono-
logically attached to the postposition. That is, SS is marked (by ch− (/ts/)), while
DS is simply null, or the absence of any SR-marking at all.
This proposal is tempting, but it is too narrow. If we look at the other Kiowa
connectives where SR appears, it falls apart, for several reasons. The first is that if
the SS marker is /ts/, there is no phonological mechanism that could account for
the other adverbial forms being [g] and [kĳ]. The second, admittedly weaker due
15Watkins (1993) reports that “the pair qàut/aut expresses the speaker’s assessment of the event
in the [anti-pivot] clause as either disfavored or unexpected. (p. 139)” I thus gloss it as expressive,
after Potts (2005).
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to lexical selection, is that if the SS morpheme were independent from these three
postpositions, its absence with all other sentential postpositions is unexplained.
The third is that if SR is sentence-final with =ch`¯e
¯
/`¯e
¯
, its sentence-initial appearance
at the beginning of a conjoined clause with gàu/nàu or qàut/àut is unexplained. It
makes more sense if =`¯e
¯
is a portmanteau.
Similar reasoning applies to coordinating conjunctions. If either gàu (SS) or nàu
(DS) is a bare conjunction, it should be gàu, the SS-marker. Since non-sentential
coordination in Kiowa employs gàu, and no other conjunction (65a), this seems
plausible, and leads to the observation that only DS is marked on coordination in
Kiowa, and only SS is marked on subordination. Unfortunately, this observation
does not hold, for three reasons. First, it would suggest the same distribution for
the cliticized =gàu/nàu, which is subordinating (57). Second, the same reasoning
applies to the expressive coordinator qàut/áut, and the subordinator =qàut/áut,
which have the same distribution as gàu/nàu and =gàu/nàu
(57) À
Pa−
[1s]
f´¯o
¯
chân
p´˜o:+tsaˆn
see+arrive.pf
èm
[e˜m−
[2s]
kópd`¯aum`¯enàu.
kho´p+dO:-me:=nO]
hurt+be-evid-and.DS
‘I came to see you because (I heard) you were sick.’ (Watkins 1993, (5c))
Finally, as the next chapter will make clear, SS and DSmarking in Kiowa always
mean something— there is no SRmorphology without some SRmeaning. Since the
semantics is always there, we can conclude that the ‘bare’ forms in Kiowa that seem
to be merely exapted are actually fused with SS or DS morphemes that trigger no
apparent change in form. The origins of the SR morphemes in Kiowa are murky.
Possible origins of Kiowa SR morphemes While exaptation may or may not
have played a role in the development of SR morphology in Kiowa, it does seem
more certain that areal diffusion did. Kiowa is in a family with the Tanoan lan-
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guages, spoken in the Rio Grande Valley (See Figure 2.2). Yet, no Kiowa-Tanoan
language besides Kiowa has switch-reference (Trager 1946; Leap 1970; Zaharlick
1977). This kind of distribution is a solid sign of areal diffusion (section 2.2). Areal
diffusion is also suggested by what we know about Kiowa history. The Tanoan
tribes’ homelands are in modern-day New Mexico. Since the Kiowa language is of
the same family, we can safely presume that the Kiowas once formed part of that
Pueblo society. They migrated away from the Rio Grande Valley sometime before
any oral or calendar histories record (i.e., many hundreds of years ago). The first
written account of Kiowa history is Mooney (1896)’s famous book Calendar History
of the Kiowa Indians, and he records stories that reach as far back as around 1700.
However, nothing in Kiowa culture suggested a relationship to the Pueblo peoples,
and the Kiowas of that time denied any. Yet, the linguistic evidence is undeniable.
The migratory history of the Kiowas may provide us with a way to understand
why it alone among the Tanoan language developed switch-reference. This devel-
opment stems from the fact that they are the only Tanoan people to leave the Rio
Grande Valley. Over the course of a few hundred years, they wound up tracing an
arc down to their final pre-reservation range, in the Western Plains (Figure 2.2).
By the time their language began to be recorded, they had long been in close con-
tact with speakers of several switch-reference languages, notably the Crow and
the Comanche, with whom the Kiowas had formed strong and lasting alliances. In
addition, these two tribes were more dominant in their respective regions, and far
more populous.16 It has long been observed that language borrowing tends to pro-
ceed from more dominant and prestigious cultures to those that are less so, as the
Yiddish case discussed also exemplifies. While nothing can be proven beyond a
16For example, the Comanche may have numbered some 20,000 strong in the early 19th century,
and were richer and more powerful, having been the first Plains tribe to master the horse culture
(Hämäläinen 2003), while the Kiowas never grew beyond 2,500 before the mid-20th century (P.
McKenzie, ms.) and only number some 12,000 today.
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Figure 2.2. Known migrations of the Kiowa, ca. 1700-1867, with the names of
tribes in close contact with Kiowa whose languages have switch-reference
< c.1700
 < c.1775
< 1867
??
Tanoan
Crow
Arikara
Mandan
Comanche
doubt, I find it plausible to speculate that Kiowa borrowed switch-reference from
one or more of its neighbors.
2.2.2 Types of clause juncture where switch-reference is found
While SR is always found at a clause juncture, it has almost no other cross-
linguistic restrictions. It appears in a wide variety of syntactic configurations,
and with a range of connectives that support different structures of subordination:
complementation, relativization, and adverbial clauses. The only obvious cross-
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linguistic lacuna is semantic— switch-reference never appears with disjunction in
any language.
Language-particular restrictions seem lexical in nature. Switch-reference is re-
stricted to particular sentential connectives, but there is no way to predict for any
given language which clauses will have SR, and which won’t. Some languages only
mark SR on certain adverbial connectives, while others only allow it on coordinat-
ing conjunctions. No language is attested to allow SR with all connectives. These
facts lead to the conclusion that switch-reference is not restricted by the syntax of
clause juncture, because any theory relying on the syntax will fail to have cross-
linguistic import. As a result, any theory of switch-reference will have to rely on
the semantics and the lexicon to understand the distribution of SR morphemes.
Recall the notions of pivot and anti-pivot (section 2.1.3), which describe the ar-
guments tracked by switch-reference. Across the various types of clause-juncture,
we can see a generalized structure for switch-reference:
(58) [anti-pivot clause Aanti-pivot . . . [pivot clause SR [ Bpivot . . . ] ] . . . ]
2.2.2.1 Subordination
Switch-reference is often found associated with subordinating connectives. It
is generally considered in such cases to be a part of the embedded clause, where
it tracks the embedded ‘subject’ and the matrix ‘subject’. The pivot clause is the
embedded clause, and the anti-pivot clause is the matrix clause. I schematize this
general subordinating structure in (59). The embedded subject, being clausemate
to the SR morpheme, is the pivot (B). The matrix subject, being non-clausemate to
the SR morpheme, is the anti-pivot (A).
(59) [matrix Aanti-pivot . . . [embedded SR [ Bpivot . . . ] ]
As Finer (1984, 1985) demonstrated, linear order is ignored in favor of structural
hierarchy. When two linearly adjacent SR-marked clauses are subordinate to the
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same matrix clause, the SR marker on each will refer to the main clause, not to the
adjacent subordinate clause. In other words, all pivot clauses subordinate to the
same dominant clause also share an anti-pivot clause. This is schematized in (60),
where the first SR marker, SRa, tracks B and A. The second (SRb) tracks C and A,
not C and B.
(60) a. [matrix Aanti-pivot a,b . . . [α C SRa [ Bpivot a . . . ] ] [β CSRb [ Cpivot b . . . ] ]
b. SRa tracks B and A
SRb tracks C and A ; not C and B
In a subordinating configuration, the pivot is always in the embedded clause,
no matter whether the embedded clause is spoken first or last vis-à-vis the matrix
clause, as this example from Diyari (Pama-Nyungan, Australia) shows.
(61) nawu
3sg
pali-na
die-pcp
wara-yi
aux-pres
[ munta
sick
Nama-nandu
sit-seq.SS
]
‘He died after being sick.’ (Diyari, Austin 1981).
The same fact applies in Kiowa (Watkins 1993):
(62) À
a-
[1s]
f`¯o
¯
chân
p´˜o:w+tsˆ˜an
see+arrive.pf
[èm
e˜m-
[2s]
kópd`¯a
¯
um`¯enàu]
kho´p+dO˜:-me˜:=nO˜
sick+be-evid=adv.DS
‘I came to see you because (I heard) you were sick.’ (Watkins 1993, 141)
Center-embedding of an SR-marked clause is also possible; the bound-variable
reading demonstrates that the pivot clause is embedded inside the matrix clause.
(63) Háun
h´˜On
neg
hájél
ha´te´l
person.indef
[èm
e˜m−
[3s.rf]
gúnm´¯auch`¯e
¯
]
gu´n-mO˜:=tse˜:j
dance-impf=when.SS
èm
e˜m−
[3s.rf]
d´¯auj`¯aug`¯u
dO´:+tO:-gu:
sing+act-neg
‘Nobody sang1 while they1 danced.’ (Kiowa, f.n.)
81
The subordinating configuration is the most commonly studied configuration
that switch-reference is found in. Indeed, the Binding Approach (Finer 1984;
Broadwell 1997), as discussed in section 2.4, predicts it to be the only one. How-
ever, it appears in two other configurations— coordination, and clause-chains.
2.2.2.2 Coordination
Switch-reference appears with coordinating conjunctions in many languages,
including Kiowa (Watkins 1993).
(64) a. Yísàum
j´ı:sO˜m
Y.
∅−
[3s]
h´¯ebà
he´:ba`
enter.pf
gàu
gO
and.SS
èm
Pe˜m−
[3s:rfl]
s´¯au.
sO´:
sit down.pf
‘Yisaum1 came in and he1 sat down.’
b. Yísàum
j´ı:sO˜m
Y.
∅=
∅−
[3s]
h´¯ebà
he´:ba`
enter.pf
nàu
nO˜
and.DS
èm=
Pe˜m−
[3s:rfl]
s´¯au.
sO´:
sit down.pf
‘Yisaum1 came in and he*1/2 sat down.’
As coordinators, gàu and nàu only appear in opposition when linking matrix
clauses. For coordinations smaller than that, only gàu is allowed.
(65) a. Q´¯a
¯
hî
¯
kĳj ´˜æ:h˜ı:
man
gàu
gO
and
m`¯ay´¯ı
ma˜:y´ı:
woman
è
¯
Pe˜-
[3d]
k`¯auléchàn
khO:le´+tsa˜n
together+arrive.pf
‘The man and the woman showed up together.’
b. *Q´¯a
¯
hî
¯
nàum`¯ay´¯ı è
¯
k`¯auléchàn
Switch-reference is found in coordinating contexts in other languages as well,
for instance in the Australian language Pitjantjatjara (66) and the North American
language Lakhota (67).
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(66) a. Munu
and.SS
kunyu
evid
ngari-ngi
lie down-pt.impf
kunkunpa
sleep
‘And he (the child) was sleeping.’
b. Ka
and.DS
kunyu
evid
kuta
older brother
panya
anaph
mungawinki
morning
mulapa
intens
paka-nu
get up-pt
‘And the older brother got up early.’ (Bowe 1990: 96)
(67) Joe
J.
wı˜yã
woman
wã hãska
tall
čha
‘a’
wãyãkı˜
see
na
and.SS
heye. . .
say
‘Joe saw a woman who was tall, and he said, . . . ’ (Dahlstrom 1982, 72)
While SR is fairly common with sentence-initial conjunctions, there are no at-
tested cases of SR occurring with other types of coordinating conjunctions. For
instance, Haspelmath (2004) describes in his typology of coordinating construc-
tions that many languages employ coordination markers that are cliticized to the
second conjunct. Perhaps most well known is the Latin enclitic -que (68), which
is by and large interchangeable with the intercalary coordinators et or ac/atque
(Devine & Stephens 2006). While such coordinating enclitics are not uncommon
across languages, I have found no cases of SR appearing with one.
(68) agricola et senator = agricola senatorque ‘a farmer and a senator’
It may also be the case that in some languages, SR occurs with asyndetic clause
coordination (the coordinator is not overt). If so, it would look no different from
clause conjunction with conjunctions that form portmanteaux with SR. In Kiowa,
SR can form a portmanteau with the conjunction, but because it also forms port-
manteaux with other connectives, we can rule this possibility out for Kiowa.
The structure of switch-reference with coordinating conjunctions differs from
the structure of switch-reference with subordinating connectives. Attached to a
matrix clause, SR tracks that clause’s pivot against that of the previous matrix
83
clause. The anti-pivot clause always precedes the pivot clause. This generalized
coordinating structure is schematized in (70). I assume that coordinating struc-
tures are asymmetric; instead of involving a ternary branching structure with two
sister conjuncts, coordination involves an embedding binary branching structure
(69).
(69) *
A and B
A and B
In a series of coordinated clauses, schematized in (71), SRa tracks arguments B
and A, while SRb tracks C and B, never C and A.
(70) [matrix Aanti-pivot . . . ] [matrix and SR [ Bpivot . . . ] ]
(71) a. [matrix Aanti-pivot a . . . ] [matrix and SRa [ Bpivot a
anti-pivot b
. . . ]]
[matrix and SRb [ Cpivot b . . . ]]
b. SRa tracks B and A
SRb tracks C and B ; not C and A
2.2.2.3 Clause-chaining
Switch-reference is often found in languages with clause-chains. A clause-
chain is a series of verb-final sentences in which only the final verb is fully in-
flected. Non-final verbs, calledmedial verbs, either lack inflection altogether or ex-
hibit fewer inflectional categories than final verbs. When they are inflected, they
often exhibit different paradigms from those for final verbs.
Clause-chaining is found throughout the world, but it is extremely common
in Papua New Guinea languages, which have often been extensively studied. For
instance, in Tauya medial verbs lack tense/mood marking, and have a different
agreement paradigm from final verbs. This is evident in the aorist, where the
agreement forms on a final verb (72) do not distinguish between first and second
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person, but those on a medial verb do (73). Note also the lack of mood marking on
the medial verbs.
(72) yate-e-Pa
go-1/2-ind
‘I / you(sg.) went’ (Tauya, Macdonald (1990))
(73) a. yate-e-te
go-1s-DS
‘I went and. . . ’
b. yate-a-fe
go-2s-DS
‘You (sg.) went and. . . ’
Switch-reference has been attested in India in the Munda family of languages
(Anderson 2007). These languages, like those in PNG, use switch-reference solely
on clause-chaining configurations. The sentence in (74) is an example from GtaP;
SS marking and DS marking appear on verbs that lack tense or aspect marking.
(74) karwali
bitter gourd
li-ce
creep-SS
cu-la
bear fruit-DS
goóæ=o
boy
atwaP-haP
there-emph
llæP-miaP-k[e]óak-ke
red:remain-hab-t/a-state-t/a
‘It is said that the bitter gourd sent out creepers and bore fruit, and the
child stayed there (as always) (GtaP, (Anderson 2007: 752))
Chains can be quite long, covering enormous stretches of discourse, as shown
by this example from the Crow language (Siouan, Montana/Canada). This passage
contains ten chained clauses, two of which contain subordinate clauses, one of
which itself contains two chained clauses. In each of these clauses, the subject is
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the same, so the SS marker -(a)k is used at each chain boundary. Only the final
verb is fully inflected for declarative mood and habitual aspect.
(75) bassée
formerly
“dakáak-duut-uua”
bird-get-pl
huua
say.pl
alachée-t
ridge-det
koon
there
awé
earth
xakúpp-aa-(a)k
hole-caus-SS
baliiché
willow
shóshiw-ii-ak
lay_in_row-caus-SS
áakee-n
top-loc
bikkée
grass
dúusaa-(a)k
put_down-SS
iisché
rabbit
áakee-n
top-loc
dúusaa-ak
put_down-SS
kalakoón
then
hinne
this
xakúpee-sh
hole-det
awúua-l-ii-ak
inside+be_at-caus-SS
[dakáake
bird
shilashoonn-áa-(a)k
whoosh-punct-SS
duú-o-t]
come-pl-temp
ihch-íassii-ak
refl-watch-SS
[hinne
this
iischée-sh
rabbit-det
dútchi-wi-o-t]
get-would-pl-temp
ichkíiseetii-ak
take_by_ankle-SS
awuú-ss-dakaa-(a)k
inside-goal-pull-SS
áap-uua
their_neck-pl
dúuwiil-ak
twist-SS
kalakoon
then
dútchi- i-lu-k
get-hab-pl-decl
‘in the old days when they would catch eagles, they would dig a hole on a
ridge, lay willows over it, put grass on top, and lay a rabbit on top; then
they would get into this hole, and when the eagles came flapping their
wings, they would watch carefully, and when the eagles tried to get this
rabbit, they would grab them by the feet, pull them inside, and twist their
necks, and then they would have them.’ (Crow; Graczyk 2007: 403)
The syntactic status of clause-chains has been a subject of controversy in the
switch-reference literature. Roberts (1988) argues against Finer’s (1984) theory
of SR by claiming that clause chains are coordinating. Finer’s theory relies on
the Binding Theory, which relies on c-command. Assuming a ternary structure
like he does, coordination would not provide a necessary binding domain. Broad-
well (1997, 2006) counters with evidence that clause chains are indeed subordi-
nating, thus saving Finer’s binding-based approach. As it turns out, both may be
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right, since the behavior of clause-chains may vary from one language to the next
(Roberts focuses on Amele, Broadwell on Choctaw). Also, even within a single
language, the evidence is conflicting.
Along several criteria, a medial clause is subordinate— modals later on in the
chain may take scope over them, they cannot stand on their own, they violate Ross
(1967)’s Coordinate Structure Constraint (Broadwell 2006). Also, the temporal
morphemes on medial verbs are often relative tense markers indicating simultane-
ity or sequence, to the event in the next chain. That is, they are not indexically past,
present, etc. Indexical tense morphemes only appear on the final verb. However,
along other criteria, they are coordinate structures– they do not allow cataphora,
they cannot be postposed, they may be independent of later scope-bearing items,
their event is considered separate from that of the next clause (Roberts 1988), and
they allow across the board movement (Dickey 2000).
Let me discuss just one example to demonstrate the difficulty of categorizing
the type of clause juncture used in clause-chaining. In Amele, only the final verb
bears tense marking, and all the medial verbs are interpreted as having the same
tense as the final verb. This suggests that the final verb dominates the others.
(76) Ija
I
bili-m-ig
sit-SS-1s
uqa
he
ho-ho-n
sim-come-3s.DS
f-ig-a
eat-1s-TodPt
‘I sat and as he came I ate’ (Amele, Roberts 1997: 184)
On the other hand, negation can be marked in medial clauses, by the particle
qee ([Pe:]), which scopes over every event in the chain thereafter, including the final
verb. This suggests that the final verb is dominated by the others.
(77) a. Ho
pig
busale-ce-b
run out-DS-3s
dana
man
age
3p
qee
not
qo-l-oin.
hit-neg.pt-3p
‘The pig ran out and the men did not kill it’ (Roberts 1988: 52)
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b. Ho
pig
qee
not
busale-ce-b
run out-DS-3s
dana
man
age
3p
qo-l-oin.
hit-neg.pt-3p
‘The pig did not run out and the men did not kill it’
Outside the switch-reference literature, Foley & Van Valin, Jr. (1984) proposed
that clause-chains are a third type of sentential connective that they call co-sub-
ordination, which encompasses clauses that are syntactically subordinate but se-
mantically independent. Stirling (1993) suggests that clause-chains can be either
coordinating or subordinating, depending on their semantics. Suffice it to say that
there is little consensus on the nature of clause-chains, and little hope of arriving
at one without detailed cross-linguistic investigation.
The controversy on clause-chains is intriguing, since so many languages show
SR on them, but ultimately, I bring up the phenomenon only to set it aside for the
rest of this dissertation. I have three reasons for doing so. First, the lack of any
solid understanding of the syntax and semantics of clause-chains entails that any
theory of switch-reference that focuses on them will require excessive amounts of
speculation. Second, the language this dissertation focuses on the Kiowa language,
and Kiowa lacks clause-chains.
The third reason is that the question of syntactic configuration may be moot as
far as switch-reference goes, because recent research indicates that coordination
is a type of subordination. The first to propose this was Munn (1993), who pro-
posed a structure wherein second conjuncts are complements to a coordination
phrase that adjoins to the first conjunct. Johannessen (1998) proposes instead that
the first conjunct is the specifier of the coordination phrase. In chapter 4, I will
adopt Munn’s proposal for this dissertation, but if either of these is correct, then
any remaining syntactic differences should not be very consequential for switch-
reference. Indeed, I suspect that only detailed semantic fieldwork will be able to
tell us about the true nature of clause-chains.
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It is well beyond the scope of this study to fully understand the structure of
clause-chains. It seems best, therefore, to treat them on their own terms. Let us
keep on target and focus on the relation of clause chains to switch-reference. On
that count, the evidence is unequivocal. With respect to switch-reference, clause-
chains behave like coordinated structures in that switch-reference applies linearly.
However, clause-chains are unlike coordination in that one clause chain is the pivot
clause of the next. In (78), SRa tracks A and B, while SRb tracks B and C.
(78) [[[ Apivot a . . . ]medial SRa ] [ B[ [ [ anti-pivot
a
pivot b
. . . ]medial SRb ] [final Canti-pivot b . . . ]
]]]
(79) SRa tracks A and B ; not A and C
SRb tracks B and C
The difference between clause-chains and coordination may be derivable from
an independent difference between the two clause types. Coordinated phrases are
second conjuncts. If we assume an adjunction analysis, they are strictly forced to
right-adjoin and thus follow the first conjunct. Clause-chains are strictly forced to
left-adjoin, and precede the next chain clause. In both cases, the adjoining clause
is the pivot clause.
By now, it should be clear that the configuration question is not very infor-
mative about the limits of switch-reference. Any theory of switch-reference will
have to be compatible with all three types of configuration. Therefore, focusing on
their syntactic differences is unfruitful, especially since there is no consensus on
the structures of some of these configurations. This suggests that any relevant dif-
ference between clause types is semantic, so exploring their semantics is the right
approach.
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2.2.3 Conclusions drawn from morphosyntactic facts
This section has demonstrated that attempts at describing switch-reference
based on the form of the morphemes or the structure of the clause junctures will
fail to deliver any positive cross-linguistic generalizations. What can be concluded,
however is the following:
1. SR morphology in a language often (but not always) consists of a pair of
complementarily distributed morphemes, labeled SS and DS.
2. SR often spreads through areal diffusion.
3. SR morphemes are often exapted from some other morpheme pair in the
language that exhibits a complementary distribution.
4. The exapted forms do not have any semantic link to the semantics or usage
of switch-reference.
These are not conclusions a theory must necessarily account for, since they are
not predictable, but facts that a theory must be compatible with. These facts can
rule out a theory, and are useful in that regard. However, if we are to understand
the workings of switch-reference, we need generalizations that allow us to propose
a theory. To that effect, this section has shown some interesting facts which can be
generalized about the syntactic distribution of SR morphemes:
(80) Distribution facts of SR morphemes
1. SR morphemes are introduced by a specific functional head in the
extended verbal projection
2. SR morphemes only appear at clause junctures
3. SR morphemes appear at all types of clause junctures
4. SR morphemes appear at the edge of their clause
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5. SR morphemes only appear once per clause
These generalizations are informative, and suggest that switch-reference is a
sentential phenomenon, rather than a nominal one. Still, they will not suffice as
the basis of a complete theory of switch-reference.
2.3 Components of a theory of switch-reference
What must a theory of switch-reference account for? It must account for the
distributional facts in (80), the generalized structure of switch-reference in (58), as
well as a way to predict whether SS or DSmarking appears. These components can
be organized into four desiderata of a theory of switch-reference, each of which is
addressed by several more precise questions.
1. the SR morpheme: What kind of object is the SR morpheme? What syntactic
category is it in? What is its semantics? How do these predict its distribu-
tion? This question has already been addressed to some extent, though not
completely.
2. pivot selection: How does the SR morpheme select its pivot? A theory of
switch-reference must derive the generalizations about pivots, in a way that
is compatible with the morphosyntactic facts detailed in the last section.
3. anti-pivot selection: How does the SR morpheme select its anti-pivot? Is it
identical to the pivot selection mechanism? If not, how does it get selected,
and by what?
4. anaphoric relation: What kind of relation links the pivot and anti-pivot? How
can we derive a reading of co-reference or disjointness?
In the next section I will discuss the first formal theory of switch-reference, re-
organizing the argument in terms of these desiderata. I will also show how it is
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inadequate for what is now known about switch-reference, while mentioning that
much of its inadequacy comes from its dated formal mechanism.
2.4 The Binding approach
Daniel Finer, in his dissertation (1984) and ensuing article (1985), proposes
an account of switch-reference that makes elegant use of a generalized version
of Chomsky (1981)’s Binding Theory. He argues that switch-reference is an A-
pronoun at C◦ that acquires its index from the subject via T◦.17 This pronoun is
then subject to the Binding Theory, generalized to apply between A-pronouns. If
it is a bound anaphor, it shows up as SS, and if it is a (free) pronominal, it appears
as DS.
Finer builds on the observations that switch-reference tracks subjects and ap-
pears at clause junctures, but also makes important novel generalizations. First,
he notes that switch-reference is structurally restricted. An SR morpheme is sub-
ject to locality constraints; it can only ‘see’ up to the next CP, and no higher. This
generalization is based on two facts. One is that in a series of embeddings, SR can-
not skip the clause immediately dominating it. The second is that when multiple
clauses are embedded under the same clause, they all have the same anti-pivot.
A second generalization is that switch-reference is not dependent on discourse
function or linear order. Instead, it depends on the grammar. Finer is the first to
discuss the theoretical implications of the fact that it appears even when it is not
necessary for disambiguation.18 He also pointed out that switch-reference occurs
on postposed embedded clauses, even if the SR morpheme was clause-final and
‘backward-looking.’
17I update the category labels and terminology that Finer used to their modern equivalents. This
includes the use of DP for nominal expressions, whereas he used NP
18The fact itself had been noted before, e.g., byMoser (1978) for the Seri language.
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2.4.1 Finer (1984): SR as an A-pronoun
Recall that any theory of switch-reference must contain four key desiderata:
The nature of the morpheme itself, pivot selection, anti-pivot selection, and the
anaphoric relation between them. Finer addresses the first desideratum, the nature
of the SR morpheme, by assuming (by hypothesis) that the SR morpheme is an A-
pronoun at C◦.
To address the second desideratum, pivot selection, Finer offers his most novel
theoretical proposal. It is built on the empirical generalization that SR only tracks
subjects. In generative syntax, the notion of subject is not a primitive; instead it is
derived structurally— anything in a certain syntactic position is the subject. At the
time, the subject was believed to merge at [Spec, TP], where it entered Spec-head
agreement with T◦.19 By this Spec-head relation, T◦ assigns nominative case to
the DP, and the DP’s φ-features trigger agreement on T◦, which ends up expressed
on the verb. Also by this relation, the DP transfers its index to the T◦ head. In
this way, T◦ acquires the index of the subject. So much is uncontroversial. But the
SR morpheme is at C◦, and has to acquire the subject’s index. Finer explains this
acquisition by claiming that C◦ forms a discontinuous constituent with T◦. Thus,
it will always have T◦’s index.
(81) CP
TP
DP
pro1
. . . T1◦
C1◦
SS
Finer’s solution to the second desideratum provides the solution to the third,
anti-pivot selection. Building off the generalization that anti-pivots are pivots, it
stands to reason that anti-pivot selection occurs via the same mechanism as pivot
19It is now known that subjects arrive in [Spec, TP] by movement from an argument position,
[Spec, vP].
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selection, but in the dominant (anti-pivot) clause. The anti-pivot clause’s subject
transfers its index to T◦, which forms a constituent with C◦. The dominant C◦ has
an A-pronoun, which I will call pron.
(82) CP
TP
CP
TP C1◦
SS
TP
DP1 . . . T1◦
C◦
pron1
The fourth desideratum, the anaphoric relation, follows from the others, and
comes for free with the Binding Theory. The SR pronoun at C◦, like any pronoun,
is subject to the Binding Theory. However, since it is an A-pronoun, it cannot be
bound by an A-pronoun. The only thing that can bind it is another A-pronoun;
i.e. the one at the dominant C◦ head. If the SR pronoun is bound, like it is in (82),
Condition A dictates that it must be an anaphor. The anaphor form of SR is what
we call SS. Since the A-pronoun at C◦ in each clause is tied to the subject of that
clause, this mechanism derives the co-referent subject effects of SS marking.
If the SR pronoun is free, however, Condition B dictates that it must be a
pronominal. The pronominal form of SR is what we call DS. Since the A-pronoun
at C◦ in each clause is tied to the subject of that clause, we have derived the disjoint
subject effects of DS marking. The SR pronoun is free when the dominant subject
does not co-refer with the embedded one. The dominant subject transfers its in-
dex to T◦, thence to C◦ (83). Since the SR pronoun is not A-bound in its domain, it
appears in its pronominal form, which we call DS.
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(83) CP
TP
CP
TP C1◦
DS
TP
DP2 . . . T2◦
C◦
pron2
This structure is infinitely recursive, so it captures the ability of SR to work
with recursive CPs. It also captures Finer’s observation that when a single matrix
clause has multiple subordinate clauses, those clauses share an anti-pivot (section
2.2.2.1). If two clauses are embedded under one CP, the pronouns at each clause’s
C◦ head will have the same binding domain, the dominant CP, and will be free or
bound with respect to the same dominant C◦ pronoun.
2.4.2 Problems with the Binding approach
The Binding Approach’s utility and insight has made it the benchmark of the-
ories of switch-reference in the generative literature. However, it is untenable as
Finer presented it. It suffers from theory-internal conceptual problems, theory-
related empirical problems, and it makes false predictions about switch-reference.
Two problems arise from using the Binding Theory. The first is that it over-
generates. Assume a configuration with matrix clause and an embedded clause
with SS marking. The matrix clause has no SR morphology of its own. The SS mor-
pheme is an A-anaphor at the embedded C◦, bound by an A-pronoun at matrix C◦.
Since the matrix A-pronoun is not bound, by Principle B, it must be free. If the A-
free form is spelled out as DS, it should appear as such at matrix C◦, but it doesn’t.
This problem can perhaps be obviated by assuming that DS is a disjoint anaphor
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rather than an unbound pronominal.20 in this case, the unbound A-pronoun at
matrix C◦ would be null.
A second theoretical problem concerns inclusive or overlapping distribution.
In a sentence likeWhen we went in, I sat down, the subjects do not strictly co-refer,
but they do share a subset of their referents. Langdon & Munro (1979) report
similar results for the Yuman languages. However, in some languages, SS marking
appears. For instance, in Diyari (Austin 1981: 316), SS appears if the pivot set
intersects with the anti-pivot set.
(84) ngathu
I:erg
nganyja-yi,
want-pres
ngalda
us two:nom
diyari
D.
yawada
language:abs
yathayatha-lha.
speak-impl.SS
‘I want us to speak Diyari’
In Kiowa, such marking is always DS (85).
(85) a. Bà
ba−
[1pi]
hébòp`¯e
¯
,
he´:b-op=e˜:
enter-impf=when.DS
àn
æ˜n
hab
à
a−
[1s]
tháumhébòp
tĳ´˜Om+he´b-op
enter-impf
‘Whenever we go in, I go in first.’ (f.n.)
b. *Bà hébòpch`¯e
¯
, àn à tháumhébòp
This kind of co-reference poses significant problems for the binding approach.
The first problem is getting the coreference to work at all. Finer proposes a kind of
double-indexation he calls "diagonal binding," where the two share a group index;
some languages, the group index is transferred to T/C◦ (resulting in SS marking),
while in others, the individual index is (resulting in DS marking). This accounts
for the switch-reference facts, but it is ad hoc and only works for switch-reference.
20Finer (1985) (fn. 12) raises this possibility, though not for this reason. Enç (1989) does follow
this route, and offers an explanation for the null A-binder at matrix C◦ (We will see in Chapter 4
that this explanation is unsatisfactory.) Broadwell (1997) proposes that DS in some languages is a
pronominal, while in others it is a disjoint anaphor.
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Generally speaking, anaphors subject to the Binding Theory are not attested to
work this way in any language. There is no known language where something like
We like myself or I like ourselves is grammatical. The idiosyncraticity of diagonal
bindingmeans that overlapping and inclusive reference are extremely problematic
for a theory of switch-reference reliant on the Binding Theory.
A third, but weaker, problem with using the Binding Theory is discussed by
Roberts (1988). The notion of binding domain required for the Binding Theory
relies on c-command, which in turn relies on a subordinating structure. To under-
mine this reliance, Roberts offers several examples of switch-reference on coordi-
nating structures, namely evidence from clause-chaining structures in Amele. As
I pointed out earlier in this chapter, the configurational question is moot as a syn-
tactic matter. Not only is the syntactic status of clause-chains unclear (Broadwell
1997), but it is well-accepted by now that coordinated structures involve structural
subordination as well (Munn 1993; Johannessen 1998).
The problems listed here are difficult to reconcile with the Binding Theory,
suggesting that it doesn’t play a role in switch-reference. However, the Binding
Theory was only proposed for the fourth desideratum; it does not concern the
others, and perhaps it would be the only part of Finer’s proposal that needs to
be replaced. As it turns out, the accounts for the other desiderata have major
problems as well.
The second and third desiderata involve pivot and anti-pivot selection. Finer
accounts for these through the relation between T◦ and the subject, but he crucially
depends on the generalization that pivots are always the subjects. This is simply
not the case, even if we broaden the account to include whatever is the target of
T◦, whether or not it winds up in [Spec, TP]. For one thing, the notion of syntactic
subject is not as clear-cut as it is in a language like English.
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Broadwell (1997, 2006) describes a double nominative construction in Choctaw
that has an effect on switch-reference.21 DP possessors in Choctaw are unmarked
(86). The possessum bears a possessor agreement prefix reflecting a 3rd-person da-
tive (im-). However, in some cases, the possessor can be marked with a nominative;
the verb then bears agreement reflecting a 3rd-person dative ((87), examples from
Broadwell 2006).22 In the related Chickasaw cases (Munro 1983), the possessum
lacks possessor agreement.
(86) John
John
im-ofi-yat
3s-dog-nom
∅-illi-h
3s.subj-die-tns
‘John’s dog died.’
(87) John-at
John-nom
im-ofi-(yat)
3s-dog-nom
im-illi-h
3s.dat-die-tns
‘John’s dog died.’
Importantly, the higher nominative is visible to switch-reference, not the lower
one that is the argument of the verb.
(88) John-at
John-nom
im-ofi’
3s-dog
im-illi-tok-oosh23,
3s.dat-die-Past-SS
nokhá
¯
klo-sh
sad-SS
bínniili-h
sit-tns
‘Because John’s dog died, he’s sad.’
Examples like this demonstrate a crucial break between pivots and subjects.
One might object that subjects merge at [Spec,vP], rather than at [Spec, TP]. Thus,
it may be the case that the higher nominative is at [Spec, TP], where switch-
21The closely-related language Chickasaw has the same construction, and similar switch-
reference effects (Munro 1983).
22Broadwell calls this structure possessor raising. Since I will not assume that raising actually
occurs, and since the term ‘possessor raising’ is more widely used in the literature to describe a
different phenomenon, I will simply call this a ‘double nominative’ construction.
23-sh is a morphophonological variation of -t.
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reference can select it as a pivot. However, there are two problems with this ob-
jection. First, it would sever the link between nominative case and T◦. Second,
double nominative phenomena in unrelated languages24 involve clearly topical
high nominatives, and ordinary subject low nominatives. The Choctaw double
nominative may be like these phenomena in more than a superficial way. If so, the
SR is ignoring the subject (at or related to T◦) for the higher nominative-marked
DP, and Broadwell (1997) even claims as much. This phenomenon is informative
and intriguing, and warrants more investigation through detailed fieldwork with
Choctaw speakers.
Another concern with subjects is brought up by Farrell et al. (1991)’s discussion
of switch-reference with passives in Seri. Notably, passive subjects are not selected
as pivots. When an embedded passive subject co-refers to a matrix active subject,
DS marking is obligatory.
(89) ĳp-po-a:ĳ-kašni
1s-Irr-Pass-bite
*(ta)-x
DS-UnsT
ĳp-si-o:ĳa
1s-Irr-cry
ĳa=aĳ
Aux=Decl
‘If I am bitten, I will cry’
(90) m-yo-a:ĳ-kašni
2s-DistR-Pass-bite
kokašni
snake
šo
a
m-t-aĳo
2s-Real-see
*(ma)
DS
‘You were bitten, after you had seen a snake’
On the other hand, if the passive subject is disjoint from a matrix passive sub-
ject, DS marking is not allowed25 (there is no SS marking in Seri).
24Japanese (Kuroda 1972) and Hebrew (Doron & Heycock 2003)
25This fact suggests that the SR morpheme has the index of the anti-pivot, contrary to Finer’s
account, where it only has the pivot’s index. In (89) and (90), the DS can be derived if SR has the
anti-pivot’s index, and signals disjointness to the unspecified subject. Likewise, the non-DS can
be derived in (91) if there is no referent at all. One way to derive it is if the unspecified subject
has some arbitrary index, and the two subjects co-refer. There is no overt SS marking, so nothing
appears. Or, perhaps we could assume that in Seri, the use of SR presupposes reference of at least
the anti-pivot or the pivot. Either way ought to work, depending on other facts. Notably, an account
where SR only has the pivot’s index cannot derive this fact.
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(91) ĳa:t
limberbush
kiĳ
the
p-a:ĳ-ka:
Irr-Pass-look for
(*ta)-x
DS-UnsT
ĳe:pol
ratany
kiĳ
the
mos
also
si-a:ĳ-ka:
Irr-Pass-look for
ĳa=ĳa
Aux=Decl
‘If limberbush is looked for, white ratany also should be looked for.’
The authors suggest that this data can be explained if there are different types
of subjects (they employ a Relational Grammar that distinguishes between active
subjects and passive subjects), rather than the single structural subject of a gener-
ative approach. Even if we abstract away from the theory-driven hypotheses they
propose, we see that the authors suppose that Seri passives contain an unspecified
agent in the passive clauses, and switch-reference is sensitive to that subject in-
stead of the overt one. This is an interesting supposition, since the object of the
passive-marked verb still triggers subject agreement, not object agreement, though
this is available in Seri. Howmight it work with a more modern generative theory?
I can only speculate at this stage, without doing more fieldwork. That said, we can
perhaps derive this unexpected switch-reference by assuming that passivization
in Seri introduces a null quirky subject, perhaps a PROarb. The term quirky de-
scribes the case and agreement facts in phrases with a non-nominative subject, in
languages like Icelandic. In (92), the subject (the liker) is dative-marked, while
the object (what is liked) is nominative-marked, in apparent violation of theories
of case assignment (An extensive literature has established that the dative-marked
argument is in fact the subject.) Also, the verb agrees with the nominative object,
rather than with the dative subject.
(92) Einum
one
málfræðingi
linguist.dat
líkuðu
liked:3p
þessar
these
hugmyndir.
ideas.nom.pl
‘One linguist liked these ideas.’ (Sigurðsson & Holmberg 2008, cited in
Ussery (2009))
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Quirky case depends on the predicate; in the case of Icelandic it depends on
the verb. For Seri, however, perhaps a similar dependence can be derived from the
v◦ head that introduces the passive, rather than from the verb itself. Let’s jump
into formal structure for a moment. Assume that passive is introduced by a special
head in the extended verbal projection (Kratzer 1996; Chomsky 2001), and further
assume a link between T◦ and subject agreement. We can thus imagine a structure
like (93) for (89) and (90). In this structure, a passive v◦ head introduces an un-
specified subject (PROarb), which is invisible to agreement at T◦, perhaps through
lack of φ-features. The agreement then picks out the internal argument, the DP
in VP. However, the unspecified subject is visible to switch-reference. Assuming
that switch-reference involves a relation with a head, then, that head cannot be the
same T◦ head that triggers φ-feature agreement.
(93) [XP X◦DS [TP T◦[uφ] [vP PROarb v◦passive [VP DPφ V◦ ] ] ] ]
In quirky structures, the actual subject does not trigger subject agreement;
rather, either the internal argument does (if there is one), or a default agreement
comes out. Since the Seri passive always has an internal argument, its triggering
of agreement should come as no surprise. As far as speculation goes, this works
out well. But I only offer the notion of null quirky subject based on Farrell et al.
(1991)’s characterization of the facts. Based on accounts of quirky subjects in other
languages, many other phenomena interact with the quirky structure. Thus, this
conjecture suggests a large number of subtle empirical predictions that only field-
work with Seri speakers could verify.
The two cases I have just discussed cast doubt on a strong link between piv-
ots and subjects. Through the relationship of subjects to the T◦ head (either by
Agree or Spec-head relationships), these phenomena cast doubt on a strong link
between switch-reference and the T◦ head. Further evidence against relying on T◦
is empirical: sometimes, switch-reference ignores all the arguments in the clause.
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Finer’s account of the second and third desiderata also depend on the way that
T◦ and C◦ are linked. Even assuming that T◦ is the relevant head. The notion that
the two heads interact with each other is not controversial, but Finer proposes that
T◦ and C◦ form a discontinuous constituent. This is implausible, since it is well
established that discontinuous constituency is derived by movement. For instance,
Percus (1997) argues that it-clefts are discontinous constituents, containing a right-
extraposed relative clause and a pronoun replacing the null definite description.
Benmamoun (1999) provides one of many proposals of quantifier float that in-
volve discontinuity, and Fanselow & Ćavar (2002) show that some discontinuity is
explained by the copy theory of movement, whereby the various parts of a moved
constituent are spelled out at PF at different copies within the chain. Importantly,
none of these accounts involve head movement. For T◦ and C◦ to form a discon-
tinuous constituent, the SR pronoun (or all of C◦) would have to move out of T◦,
while leaving the rest of T◦ behind.
This leaves the first desideratum, the nature of the SR morpheme. Finer pro-
poses that it is an A-pronoun at C◦, but there are two problems with this. The first
is that we have seen in section 2.2.1.4 that SR is introduced by its own functional
head. Let’s set that aside, and focus on Finer’s account. The other problem is that it
is not clear how the pronoun at C◦ is meant to be interpreted. Finer does not work
out a semantics for his account, so any one we attempt is necessarily anachronis-
tic. Still, even in a broad sense, the interpretation of SR does not work. I will only
discuss this briefly here, and in detail in chapter 4. If there is an A-pronoun at C◦,
there needs to be an element below it that will create an expression it can com-
pose with. Typically, A-pronouns saturate a property created by C◦. The C◦ head
bears an index that is shared with that of some pronoun (or a trace or a copy) in
the clause. Following Heim & Kratzer (1998), the index at C◦ is interpreted as a λ-
operator that binds the pronoun’s index. This is essentially Predicate Abstraction,
102
and it creates a semantic property. The A-pronoun either saturates this property
or adds no semantic content; in the latter case, the CP expresses a property. The
latter is exemplified with the relative pronoun who, in the relative clause who I saw
yesterday.
(94) a. who C◦1 [ I saw who1 yesterday ]→
b. λ1 [ I saw x1 yesterday ] = λx. I saw x yesterday
Applied to Finer’s theory, what this means is that if SR is an A-pronoun, it can-
not be at C◦, but must rather be at [Spec, CP]. This is problematic, since it predicts
that SR should be, like all specifiers, to the left of the clause, and never at the
right edge. Also, if C◦ binds T◦, T◦ must be interpreted as a bound variable, and
it’s not clear how that variable would be inserted compositionally. Furthermore,
there is no compositionally satisfactory way for the two heads form a discontin-
uous constituent. Finally, the semantics does not distinguish between A-binding
and A-binding, so the pronoun at [Spec, CP] is in danger of being bound before
the dominant C◦ head.
One final problem touches upon the first three desiderata. Roberts (1988)’s
second objection to the Binding approach is that switch-reference ignores subjects
altogether. Finer’s use of T◦ to mediate between the pivot and C◦ is based on the
generalization that switch-reference tracks structural subjects. Even the cases de-
scribed above rely on some kind of subject or subject-like argument (the point was
that they couldn’t be at T◦). However, Roberts demonstrates that switch-reference
can ignore all the arguments in a clause. For instance, in (97), DS marking is used
between the first two clauses, despite the subjects being co-referent. He writes,
“The explanation given by native speakers for such instances is that ‘something
has changed’ or this is ‘a new situation’." (p. 60). The following example shows
a shift from Mike starting the car to the journey to Sioba’s house. DS marking
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after the first medial verb indicates this shift; the subjects of the first and second
chained clauses are identical.
(95) Mike
M.
uqa
3s
car
car
tuli-do-co-b
start-3s-DS-3s
jic
road
tod-u
follow
b-i
come up
Sioba
S.
na
of
jo
house
cemenug
near
ono
there
uqa
3s
car
car
heewe-ce-b
hold-DS-3s
taw-en.
stand-3s-RemPt
‘Mike started the car and then followed the road up to Sioba’s house and
held the car as it stood there near the house.’ (Roberts 1988:61)
Examples like (97) have been observed inmany languages bymany researchers.
They raise an important question: If switch-reference is ignoring the subjects,
what is it tracking? The next chapter will focus on examples like (97), and ex-
plore that question in detail. The answer will complete our understanding of
switch-reference pivots. Armed with that understanding, we can begin to develop
a working theory of switch-reference.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that relying on the morphological and syntactic
aspects of switch-reference is insufficient for developing a full empirical under-
standing of its usage and structure. This insufficiency suggests that a look at the
semantics is crucial.
In addition, I discussed the empirical generalizations we can make, and the
four desiderata of a theory of switch-reference. I exposed major flaws with Finer’s
approach to switch-reference, which relies on Binding Theory. Indeed, it is insuf-
ficient for all four desiderata. However, a look at the semantics is important here,
as well. Our understanding of binding, A-phenomena, and pronouns has grown
considerably since Finer’s proposal. In light of that, a modern Binding approach
might be successful after all.
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For now, though, we need to explore the subject-ignoring cases of switch-ref-
erence. In the next chapter, I will discuss an alternative theory proposed by Stir-
ling (1993), which addresses these cases, and is the first to explore the semantics
of switch-reference in detail. Stirling follows Roberts in jettisoning the Binding
approach26. However, as we will see, her theory is insufficient as well.
26I should note that both Roberts and Stirling worked from a perspective of functional grammar,
so the Binding Theory was ruled out ex ante as a major factor in their proposal.
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CHAPTER 3
SWITCH-REFERENCE AND TOPIC SITUATIONS
3.1 A cross-linguistic survey of non-canonical switch-reference
In this section I relate cases of switch-reference ignoring subjects in languages
all over the world, and describe its major properties. First, this ‘non-canonical’
switch-reference can appear with SS or DS marking. Second, linguists have noted
speaker judgments about the choice of SS or DS: It correlates strongly to continu-
ity or shift in the ‘scene’ that the sentence is describing. Third, some cases do not
seem to be about any particular scene, but simply a set of related events. Finally,
an important and novel observation: non-canonical SR is not attested in subordi-
nating configurations. These observations form the empirical foundation of the
proposal about non-canonical switch-reference.
3.1.1 Switch-reference oblivious to subjects
Ever since Jacobsen (1967) first proposed switch-reference as a subject-tracking
device, researchers adopted subject tracking as the basic function of the phe-
nomenon. However, it was observed that this characterization is not completely
correct. Dahlstrom (1982) shows that in Lakhota (Siouan, Dakotas), switch-ref-
erence sometimes ignores subjects. SR in this language is marked on the coordi-
nating conjunctions na (SS) and yu˜khã (DS). In (96), we see three examples of SR
from a text, split across two examples. The two clauses in (96a) have co-referent
subjects, and SS marking appears on the conjunction between them, as Jacobsen’s
theory predicts. However, the third clause (96b) begins with DS marking despite
having a subject co-referent with the previous one.
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(96) a. khoškalaka
young man
nu˜p
two
kholakičhiya-pi
friend-rcp-pl
na
and.SS
lila
very
thekičhixila-pi
love-rcp-pl
‘Two youngmenwere friends with each other and loved each other very
much.’
b. . . . lila
very
thekičhixila-pi
love-rcp-pl
yu˜khã
and.DS
heniyos
those
nu˜phila
two only
zuya
to war
iyaya-pi
set off-pl
‘..and loved each other very much. One day, those two set off to war.’
(Dahlstrom 1982, (3))
Dahlstrom observes that switch-reference in this case and cases like it occurs
with the unexpected value when the scene shifts or is particularly maintained.
She proposes that the switch-reference marker seems to be working, but tracking
something besides the subject. Roberts (1988) and Stirling (1993) made further ob-
servations, and Stirling explicitly distinguishes canonical switch-reference, which
tracks subjects as expected, from non-canonical switch-reference (NCSR), which
tracks unexpected items. The following subsections discuss other linguists’ obser-
vations of non-canonical switch-reference.
Canonical switch-reference is found either in an SS (same subject) form or a DS
(different subject) form. Non-canonical switch-reference is found to show up in
both forms as well, even though it ignores subjects. Although subjects are irrele-
vant for NCSR, we will still use the abbreviations SS and DS for the two values of
SR, as a matter of convenience.1
The following sections will show a strong correlation between SS and scene
maintenance, and DS and scene shift. Investigation of data from many languages,
collected independently by various researchers, shows that speakers routinely as-
sign to non-canonical SS marking an indication of continuity in the ‘scene’, the
1As it turns out, given the analysis proposed later in this chapter, we can say that the ‘S’ in SS
and DS stands for ‘situation’ when it does not stand for ‘subject’.
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place, or the time. Speakers routinely assign to non-canonical DS marking an in-
dication of change in time, space, or scene.
3.1.2 Semantic observations concerning non-canonical DS marking
The most common use of non-canonical DS marking across languages is to in-
dicate a change in scene. Often this change in scene is accompanied by a change in
time or space. Dahlstrom (1982) was the first to describe this usage of DS marking,
in her aforementioned paper on Lakhota.2 She writes that “[DS] is a signal that the
scene is going to shift, or that the next clause will introduce a new element. (p.74)"
Recall that the non-canonical DS marking in the second clause of (96) occurs
despite the subjects of the two joined clauses being the same. However, the sec-
ond clause indicates a change in scene, from the scene-setting introduction to the
beginning of the core of the story. This shift is indicated in the English transla-
tion with the adverbial expression one day. There is no equivalent adverbial in the
Lakhota text; the adverbial is an attempt to capture the flavor of the shift that is
indicated by the switch-reference marking.
Roberts (1988) provides several examples of non-canonical DS marking from
the Amele language (Gum, Papua NewGuinea). He writes, “The explanation given
by native speakers for such instances is that ‘something has changed’ or this is ‘a
new situation’." (p. 60). The following example shows a shift from Mike starting
the car to the journey to Sioba’s house. DS marking after the first medial verb in-
dicates this shift; the subjects of the first and second chained clauses are identical.
2Another source of examples is Richard Lungstrum’s dissertation (1995) on the use of DS mark-
ing in narrative in Lakhota.
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(97) Mike
M.
uqa
3s
car
car
tuli-do-co-b
start-3s-DS-3s
jic
road
tod-u
follow
b-i
come up
Sioba
S.
na
of
jo
house
cemenug
near
ono
there
uqa
3s
car
car
heewe-ce-b
hold-DS-3s
taw-en.
stand-3s-RemPt
‘Mike started the car and then followed the road up to Sioba’s house and
held the car as it stood there near the house.’ (Roberts 1988:61)
Mixco (1997) gives several examples from Mandan (Siouan) that seem to indi-
cate a shift from description of an individual to the presentation of an event. In
the following example, the mythical character Coyote has experienced a fall. After
this event, Coyote begins his journey. Between the fall and the journey, DSmarking
indicates a narrative shift. Once the story gets going, canonical SS marking links
the events ‘he got up’ and ‘he started traveling’.
(98) kipxeak
ki-pxe-ak
mv-land-DS
kira¸tEri¸
ki-ra¸tE-ri¸
mv-get up-SS
kasi:wi¸owa¸koPš
ka-si:-wi¸-o:wa¸k-oPsˇ
icpt-travel-prog-npst-Pma
kiru¸wa¸Pkšis
ki-ru¸wa¸Pk-ˇsi-s
?-man-good-def3
‘Coyote landed, got up, and started traveling.’ (Mixco (1997), p. 248)
Several other languages have attested non-canonical DS marking, although the
particular sources do not discuss the nature of what is different. For instance, in
his reference grammar of the Crow language (Siouan, Montana/Canada), Graczyk
(2007) provides examples like (99). The subjects in all four clauses are the same,
but the third connecting switch-reference marker appears as DS.
3The final word refers to Coyote. The question mark in the gloss is Mixco’s; it represents a
morpheme (ki-) whose meaning is uncertain. It looks like the middle voice marker, but apparently
should not appear on the stative stem.
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(99) chichíil-ak
look for-SS
baatcháatt-aa-(a)k
outstanding-cause-SS
óolapi-ssuu-m
find-neg.pl-DS
daákaa-u-k
go home-pl-decl
‘they searched for him long and hard, they didn’t find him, they went
home.’
Kiowa texts also have examples of NCDS marking scene shift. Here is one from
a story recounted by Palmer, Jr. (2003), which was told to him by Oscar Tsoodle. In
the following example, some hunters have been chasing after a deer. The narrator
recounts the chase heading in one way, then all of a sudden, the direction changes.
This shift is marked by DS marking on the coordinating conjunction.
(100) a. Óp
o´p
there
á
a´-
[3p:3s]-
`¯a
¯
l`¯e
¯
Pa:l-e:j
chase-pf
‘They1 chased it over there’
b. nègáu
nO˜=hegO´
and.DS=then
óp
Po´p
there
jáuchò
tO´=tso
like this=instead
á
Pa´-
[3p:3s]-
`¯a
¯
l`¯e
¯
Pa:l-e:
chase-pf
‘And then they1 chased it this way’ (Palmer, Jr. 2003)
In (101), from the Nêlêmwa language of New Caledonia (Bril 2004), DS is used
even though the subjects are the same.
(101) hla
3pl
tu
go.down
kuut
stand
bwa
on
on
sand
ba
and.DS
hla
3pl
axi
see
bon
seagull
. . .
. . .
‘They go down to the beach and then they see the seagull.’
In light of this data, it may come as no surprise that non-canonical DS marking
is commonly found at the beginning of ‘paragraphs’, or episodes in texts. Watkins
(1993) reports this as a common use of non-canonical DS marking in Kiowa, and
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Lungstrum (1995) even argues that switch-reference’s main function in narration
is to delimit ‘episodes’.
Besides simply marking a scene change, non-canonical DS marking is also re-
ported to indicate distance in space or time. In (102), DS marking indicates a long
time passing between the first event (doing that in November 1977), and the sec-
ond (leaving it for us). Roberts does not provide further context to clarify just
how long had passed, but captures this shift in the translation, with the English
adverbial then.
(102) Eu
that
1977
1977
jagel
month
November
N.
na
in
odo-co-b
do-DS-3s
cul-ig-en
leave-1p-3s-Rem.Pt
‘That was in November 1977 that he1 did that and then he1 left it for us.’
(Amele, Roberts 1988)
In the Western Desert language Pitjantjatjara, Bowe (1990) notes that “clauses
beginning with a new time and place (p. 97)” take DS marking (ka), even though
they have the same subject. Note that here, the second clause does not contain a
time or place adverbial, though one appears in translation.
(103) a. Pula
3d.nom
ngalkula
eat-merge
wiya-ri-ngkula
neg-inch-merge
ngari-ngu
lie-pt
‘When they1 both had eaten it all they1 lay down.’
b. Ka
and.DS
kunyu
evid
palu-mpa
3s.gen
mama
father
ngunytju-ku
mother-gen
ngura
place
ila-ri-ngu-lta
near-inch-pt-emph
‘They1 were really getting near their mother and father’s place now.’
In (137), another example from Lakhota, there are three clauses, all with the
same subject (the speaker). The first two clauses are joined with canonical SSmark-
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ing, while the second and third are joined with non-canonical DS marking. The
shift in time is captured in the English translation by the adverbial later on.
(104) wakhalapi
coffee
blatke
1-drink
na
and.SS
wagli
1-go home
yukha
and.DS
čhahapi
sugar
ewaktuže
1-forget
poetušni
buy-neg
‘I had some coffee and went home.
Later on I realized I had forgotten to buy sugar.’ (Dahlstrom 1983)
Of course, scene shifts also generally include changes in space and time, so it is
likely that spatiotemporal shifts can simply be included into scene shifts. That is,
whatever DS is indicating as different ought to vary based on scenes, locations, or
times.
3.1.3 Semantic observations concerning non-canonical SS marking
Non-canonical SS marking is found when the highest nominal arguments of
two joined conjuncts are disjoint, yet SS marking appears. Its most commonly at-
tested use is to highlight scene continuity despite a change in subject. However, its
attested use in Kiowa suggests that like non-canonical DS marking, non-canonical
SS marking is sensitive to something more complex than just a scene.
3.1.3.1 Scene continuity
Non-canonical SS marking often indicates the continuity of a scene across two
clauses, even if they do not share a highest nominal argument. For instance, in
(105), there are three clauses. The first two have identical subjects, and are linked,
as expected, by a SS marked coordinating conjunction. The second and third
clauses, however, are linked by SS marking even though the subject of the third
clause is the man placed on the pyre (as Dahlstrom notes, the verb lacks plural
subject agreement).
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(105) čhã
wood
ota
much
ileya-pi
make.burn-pl
na
and.SS
el
on
ixpeya-pi
place-pl
na
and.SS
hečhel
thus
xuGnaGe
burn_up
‘they set fire to a lot of wood and they placed him on it and he burned up.
(∼ “was in a burned-up state")’ (Lakhota, Dahlstrom 1982: 73)
SS marking is also used to indicate a particular kind of scene continuity: More
than one clause is describing a scene seen by a participant, as if we have ‘zoomed
in’ on it. In (106), from the Mojave language, SS marking is used between the first
and second clauses, and second and third, even though the subjects differ. They
are linked by being the object of the sight of the subject of the last verb— they are
all included in what this person saw. Notably, the clause describing the seeing is
separated from what was seen by DS marking.
(106) ko:-vch
pine-Dem
hak
there
wa:-k
lie-SS
yasé’k
shade
han-dav-k
good-very-SS
ha-k
there-Loc
wa-m
lie-DS
nya
that
ha:m
see
‘There was a pine tree there and the shade was very good; the pine tree was
there and she saw that at a distance.’ (Mojave, Powskey et al. 1980: 65)
A similar sense comes from the following example from Crow: The boy looks
over at the campsite, and what he sees is described in a pair of clauses that are
linked by SS marking. Like in the Mojave example, the seeing and what was seen
are linked by DS marking.
(107) chiláakshe
morning
shikáakee-sh
boy-det
asall-ák
go_out.SS
kuss-íkaa-lee-m
goal-look-!-DS
ashé
lodge
ah- ak
many-SS
bilaxpáake
people
chiwakálaa-(a)k
go_back_and_forth-SS
dahkú-m
continue-DS4
‘in the morning the boy went out, he looked in the direction of [the old
campsite], and to his surprise, there were lots of lodges, and people going
back and forth. (Crow, Graczyk 2007: 415)
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3.1.3.2 Shared purpose
Watkins (1993) reports another use of non-canonical SS marking, this time in
Kiowa. In (108), the two subjects are distinct individuals, but SS marking is gram-
matical and felicitous. However, Watkins’s consultant’s judgment does not involve
anything involving an apparent scene. Instead, it links two events that are spa-
tiotemporally noncontiguous by their shared purpose.
(108) Kathryn
K.
K.
gà
gjæ-
[3s:3p]
gút
gu´P
write.pf
gàu
gO
and.SS
Estheràl
E.=al
E.=too
gà
gjæ-
[3s:3p]
gút.
gu´P
write.pf
‘Kathryn wrote a letter and Esther wrote one too.’ (Watkins, 1993)
My native speaker consultants affirmed this judgment, and it will be discussed
in detail in section 3.3. It raises an important question for switch-reference: What
kind of semantic object includes scenes and episodes, and also things like events
linked by shared purpose?
3.1.4 Configuration and non-canonical SR
Another important property of non-canonical switch-reference concerns the
type of clause juncture it occurs with. Switch-reference is widely observed with
subordinating conjunctions, as well as with coordinating ones. However, non-
canonical switch-reference has not been described as occurring in configurations
that are clearly subordinating. An examination of the descriptive literature leads
to a clear observation: Non-canonical switch-reference is found only with coor-
dination or with clause-chains.5 For instance, the Muskogean languages are well
4The DS marker on the last verb indicates that this is not the end of the sentence (SR in Crow
occurs only on clause-chains), but this is the end of the example as published; it is an excerpt from
a Crow narrative.
5Clause chains’ configurational status is undetermined, but with respect to switch-reference
they behave linearly, like coordination.
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observed to exhibit switch-reference with a variety of subordinating conjunctions,
but no cases of non-canonical SR have been observed.
Most switch-reference languages only have the phenomenon on one type of
clause connection. Kiowa is a rare language, for it has switch-reference on coordi-
nating and subordinating connectives.6 Watkins (1993) found that non-canonical
switch-reference7 occurs only on the coordinating conjunctions gàu/nàu, and my
fieldwork will confirm this finding in section 3.5.
The only language I have found besides Kiowa with SR in both configurations
is the Australian Western Desert language Pitjantjatjara.8 Bowe (1990) writes that
“clauses beginning with a new time and place (p. 97)” take DS-marking (ka), even
though they have the same subject. Ka is a DS-marked coordinating conjunction;
clause-final switch-reference marking subordinating conjunctions are not attested
to be used in this way.
This configurational difference is pervasive and important enough to require
any complete theory of SR to account for it. It is also intriguing, for two reasons.
The first is that there is no apparent syntactic motivation behind it. As discussed
earlier, one of Roberts (1988)’s arguments against Finer (1984)’s Binding Approach
relies on coordination having a syntactic structure that prevents binding. Standard
theory now holds coordination to be a special kind of subordination. Conjuncts are
either adjoined (Munn 1993) or enter a Spec-Comp relationship to a head (Johan-
nessen 2000), but either way they are subordinated. There is no syntactic difference
between the two configurations that could account for this observation. However,
canonical and non-canonical SR do not track the same objects. Therefore, we must
6I speculate on the reason for this in Chapter 1.
7Watkins describes it as ’discourse functional’ SR.
8What is unclear is the question of languages with switch-reference on subordinating particles
and on clause chains. One such language is Choctaw. Of course, if the Choctaw clause chains are
subordinating, as Broadwell (1997) demonstrates, we should expect no non-canonical SR at all.
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explore semantic correlations between the types of configurations and the different
targets of SR.
3.1.5 An important ambiguity
Non-canonical switch-reference has been attested in many languages, always
on coordinating conjunctions. However, it is only attested when it is plainly visi-
ble. A key tacit assumption in the literature is that any case that is not evidently
non-canonical is canonical. However, we should question that assumption, be-
cause in any case in any language where switch-reference on a coordinating con-
junction bears its expected value, the SR could be canonical or non-canonical.
This is the case for simple examples like (109). This example might seem obvi-
ously canonical, but absent an understanding of what NCSR tracks, and a way to
distinguish what SR is tracking, it is actually not clear whether it is canonical or
non-canonical. In section 3.4, I will use semantic fieldwork techniques to examine
this issue.
(109) Dè
de−
[1s:refl]
hâ
haˆ
stand up.pf
gàu
gO
and.SS
à
Pa−
[1s]
tép
the´p
exit.pf
‘I stood up and I left.’
This ambiguity raises an important methodological issue. When we as re-
searchers encounter an expected switch-reference marker on a coordinating con-
junction, how can we be absolutely certain of its canonicity? This issue is partic-
ularly acute for doing descriptive work, because with texts alone, the ambiguity
simply raises a question only fieldwork can answer. Through elicitation, working
with speakers— even with follow-up contexts, we can rely on their robust intu-
itions to control for canonicity.
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For example, let us examine such a case, taken from a text about the so-called
"Cut-throat Massacre" of 1833. It describes the events surrounding the massacre
of a Kiowa camp by marauding Osage warriors. The atrocity stands out in Kiowa
history, not only for its horrific outcome, but also because it led to the Kiowas’
first recorded encounter with the U.S. government. Watkins (1993) reports that in
Kiowa narratives, non-canonical DS marking can be used to mark the beginning of
a new epsiode in the story.9 The switch-reference marker in this example appears
at such an episode boundary.
Episode 1: Having learned of a nearby party of enemy Osages, the Kiowas are
debating whether to move their camps. One band leader, the narrator’s grandfa-
ther, appeals to his wife’s late-term pregnancy as grounds to flee to the hills.
(110) K`¯o
¯
jè
kh`˜o:wte
Grandfather
hègáu
hegO´
then
∅−
[3s]
j´¯o
¯
nê,
t´˜o:w-nˆ˜e:j,
say-impf.evid
“N´¯au,
n´˜O:
Nowintj
hóldé
ho´lde´
hurriedly
bá
ba´−
[1p]
k`¯ocàuètm`¯au
kho:+kOeP+mO˜:
now+fearfully+decamp
bôt
boˆ:wt
because
m`¯ayí
ma˜:y´ı:
woman
é
¯
P´˜e
[∅:3s:1s]
ílbé. . .
P´ılbe´
be unsteady
‘Then Grandfather said, "Now, we should break up camp quickly, because
my wife is pregnant. . . ’10
Episode 2: All the camps but one move, and encounter difficulties along the
way.
Connecting these episodes is a DS marker. The form, nègáu, is a contrac-
tion of the DS conjunction nàu and the adverb hègáu, ‘then’. Note that the anti-
9Lungstrum (1995) makes a similar point for Lakhota.
10The ellipsis stands in place of the rest of the quote, which continues (in translation): “She could
deliver any minute, so let’s break up camp and head to the mountains."
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pivot clause connected by the conjunction is the matrix clause "Grandfather said
(quote)."
(111) Nègáu
ne˜gO´
and.DS:then
gá
gjæ´−
[3p:3p]
kùtèl-hèl
khutel-hel
pull stakes.pf-evid
gàu
gO
and.SS
j´¯e
te´:j
all
háundé
h´˜Onde´
things
gà
gjæ−
[3s]
òlpá
¯
idéhèl
Pol+ph´˜ajde-hel
bundle up.pf-evid
gìgáu
gigO´
and.SS:then
qópf´¯egù
kĳo´p-pe´:jgu
mountain-toward
ém
Pe˜m−
[3p:refl]
h´¯o`¯a
¯
uzònhèl.
ho´:w+PO˜:zo˜n-hel
drive+leave.pf-evid
‘And so, they pulled up stakes and bundled up all their possessions and
drove off towards the mountains’. . . ’
Because this DSmarker is located an easily noticed episode boundary, wemight
suspect that it is indicating a change in topic situation. However, the subjects of
the two sentences (Grandfather; the Kiowa band), are also different. So, is this
DS marker canonical or non-canonical? We could consult native speakers for their
intuitions about this example, but the best way to be sure is to elicit with novel but
similar contexts.
3.1.6 Summary
In this section, I have introduced the notion of non-canonical switch-reference,
observed in languages around the world. I showed that speaker judgments gath-
ered by many different researchers are similar enough to warrant analysis as a
single phenomenon with a single explanation. In the next section I will discuss
and dismiss the most well developed account of it, before proceeding with a more
successful one.
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3.2 The Bundling Approach
Several researchers have used non-canonical switch-reference to argue that
switch-reference indicates coherence rather than co-reference. Givón (1983) and
Rising (1992) independently claim that it signals topic continuity, and Ariel (1990)
suggests that it is governed by an accessibility relation. Keine (in press) goes a
step further, with a proposal that relies solely on coordination type. Each of these
lesser-known proposals has empirical problems, but these stem from the proposals
not having been thoroughly developed,
Lesley Stirling (1993) develops a theory of switch-reference that derives the
coherence effects (i.e., scene-tracking) from the nature of the object that switch-
reference is tracking. She examines non-canonical switch-reference in the Amele
language (Gum, Papua New Guinea), and provides the first semantic account of
the phenomenon, which differs significantly from the purely structural Binding
Approach.
3.2.1 The basic idea
Stirling claims that switch-reference is not a reflex of the structure of various
items tied to the subject. In fact, switch-reference does not deal directly with co-
reference at all. Instead, the morpheme expresses a sort of ‘agreement’ between
the eventualities introduced by each clause’s verb. To account for this agreement,
Stirling conceives a structured eventuality index, which not only provides an index
for the assignment function, but provides more detailed information in a set of
eventuality parameters whose values denote certain properties of the eventuality,
including the agent. These parameters either match or do not, and whether they
do is the source of the agreement (SS marking) or disagreement (DS marking) in-
dicated by switch-reference.
119
That is to say, Stirling’s approach bundles together a set of co-references to de-
rive SS or DS marking. I call this the Bundling Approach, in contrast with Finer’s
Binding Approach. Bundling attempts to account for non-canonical SR by elim-
inating any meaningful difference between canonical and non-canonical switch-
reference. Both are derived from the same mechanism, which allows NCSR when-
ever the subjects happen to be disjoint.
While Stirling’s approach is very insightful for recognizing the importance of
semantics, and clever in its use of co-reference to derive apparent coherence ef-
fects, it encounters several major flaws that prevent its adoption. First is that the
proposed mechanism is idiosyncratic and hard to generalize. Second is that it re-
lies on the reference of Davidsonian events, which don’t refer. Third is that it
makes several predictions that are too strong: It cannot account for events that
are not spatiotemporally contiguous, and it cannot account for non-canonical SS
marking. These predictions can only be ironed out if we severely weaken the the-
ory, and since even the strong version has no independent motivation to support
it, there is no reason to keep it.
3.2.2 Critique of the binding approach
Stirling builds on Roberts (1988)’s article on switch-reference in Amele, which
offers several points against the Binding Approach. Roberts had argued that clause
chains were examples of coordination, which would violate the Finer’s declaration
that switch-reference only appears with subordination. Of course, this point is
moot in light of current syntactic theory. Besides, Stirling remains agnostic as
to the syntactic status of clause chains (as I point out in section 2.2.2.3), because
they seem to be either coordinating or subordinating. However, she points out two
faults with the Binding Approach’s reliance on subjects: Switch-reference in Amele
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seems sensitive to agents, not subjects; and switch-reference does not always track
subjects.
3.2.2.1 Switch-reference is sensitive to agentivity
Stirling claims that switch-reference is not sensitive to a structural notion of
subject, but is sensitive to a semantic concept of agentivity. This claim is based on
the behavior of switch-reference in Amele with non-agentive subjects. Agentivity
relates the property of entities that are agents of a given event. The exact semantic
nature of agentivity is still a matter of debate, but it is generally accepted that
volition is its condition sine qua non. Stirling proposes as a ‘universal’ that switch-
reference tracks only DPs with an agentive feature (p. 222), which is typically on
subjects.
As evidence, she argues that non-canonical SS marking occurs when the anti-
pivot clause (the first of the two) has one of these properties:
1. The ‘subject’ is an experiencer topic that is object marked:
(112) Ija
I
co-cob-ig
Sim-walk-1s.SS
cucui-te-i-a
fear-1sO-3s-TodPt
‘As I walked, I was afraid.’ (Stirling 1993: 85)
2. The ‘subject’ is an inalienably possessed body part. In (113), the subject of
the pivot clause is the possessed ‘eyes’.
(113) Ija
I
ta-taw-ig
Sim-stand-1s.SS
ija
I
am-i
eye-1s
wal-do-i-a
spin-3sO-3s-TodPt
‘As I stood, my eye(s) spun (= I became dizzy)’ (Stirling 1993:86)
3. The clause has a non-agentive inanimate subject.
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(114) M-i
put-Pred
he-du-me-i
finish-3sO-SS-3s
ceta
yam
wal
ripe
me-ce-b
become-DS-3s
. . .
. . .
‘He finished doing that and then since those yams were ripe. . . ’ (p.
87)
Stirling proposes that what unifies facts like (112-114) is that switch-reference
tracks an agent. That is, the lack of agent in the anti-pivot clause allows the agent
pivot to carry over and be the agent of the pivot clause. The actual agent-tracking
mechanism is syntactic— the semantic feature of agenthood is represented by a
syntactic feature that switch-reference is sensitive to. While this is not implausible,
it is difficult to put into place because there is no agent argument in the anti-pivot
clause. It is also empirically implausible to expect ‘he’ in (114) to be the agent of
‘those yams were ripe’, simply to meet the demands of the theory. If ‘he’ is not the
agent, then SS is simply indicating the non-change of agent. However, Stirling’s
own mechanism relies on coreference of agents, so it would not work.
3.2.2.2 Non-canonical switch-reference
Another problem with the Binding approach is that switch-reference is not re-
stricted to subjects, or even the highest nominal argument. This is non-canonical
switch-reference. Non-canonical SR is used with regular meanings. Roberts re-
ports that native speakers of Amele indicate that “something has changed,” and
points out that what is different is ‘deictic’— the place, time, or world of the event.
For instance, in (115), the location has changed.
(115) Age
They
ceta
yam
gul-do-co-bil
carry-3s-DS-3p
li
go-pred
bahim
floor
na
on
tac-ein
fill-3p.RemPt
‘They carried the yams on their shoulders and went and filled up the yam
store.’ (Roberts 1988, 61)
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The Binding Approach depends crucially on the index transfer from the subject
to switch-reference via the T◦ and C◦ heads. Examples like (115) show that switch-
reference can ignore the subjects completely, showing up as DS even though the
subjects co-refer. Roberts does not dwell long on possible theories of switch-
reference; his main point was arguing against the Binding Approach. Stirling
builds on Roberts’s findings and proposes an account of switch-reference that
would explain these facts.
3.2.3 Switch-reference indicates eventuality agreement
Stirling proposes that switch-reference relates the eventualities of the two
clauses, rather than their subjects. This proposal has the welcome effect of explain-
ing why switch-reference so often appears on verbs— it’s tracking one of the verb’s
arguments. It also explains switch-reference markers’ common co-occurence with
markers of sequential tense, which temporally sequence two eventualities. Stirling
argues that there seem to be aspectual effects from the use of switch-reference.
Thus, it seems more plausible to propose eventuality tracking rather than entity
tracking.
3.2.3.1 Switch-reference does not track eventuality reference
Stirling proposes that switch-reference is not a reference-tracking device stricto
sensu. It does not track the reference of eventualities. Rather, it marks a novel kind
of agreement between the eventualities introduced by the verbal predicates of two
joined clauses. In terms of modern semantic theory, this eventuality corresponds to
the Davidsonian event argument. We can thus recast Stirling’s proposal as follows:
Switch-reference marks agreement between two Davdisonian events.
This account relies on agreement between events instead of identity because of
the way events are used in sentences. One key property of Davidsonian event argu-
ments of verbs was demonstrated by Krifka: They must be existentially bound in
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each occurrence.11 Krifka proposed existential closure mechanisms to introduce
this binding. Here, we assume a theory of tense based on Kratzer (1998), where
aspect provides this existential operator. This is important for switch-reference,
because the use of existential quantification is infelicitous to describe entities al-
ready mentioned in the discourse. Therefore, no matter how the existential quan-
tification over the event argument is implemented, its necessity means that the
Davidsonian event in each clause is disjoint from that of any other clause.12
Consequently, if switch-reference tracked event reference, there would be noth-
ing but DS marking, because every clause would have a different event. This con-
clusion is quite evidently false, so Stirling deduces that switch-reference cannot
simply be indicating co-reference. Instead, she proposes that it indicates a kind
of agreement between the eventualities. This agreement is based on whether or
not the events match along certain parameters, whose definition allows a way to
connect switch-reference with subjects.
3.2.3.2 The structured eventuality index
When Stirling introduces ‘agreement’, it does not describe what the term usu-
ally refers to (i.e., a relation between syntactic heads or the morphological reflexes
of such relations).13 Instead, it refers to a novel form of concord between parame-
ters of the events.
For SR to access these parameters in a systematic way, Stirling creates a formal
mechanism for events called a structured eventuality index (SEI). The SEI is a
triple, consisting of:
11Stirling simply assumed this property of eventualities; her discussion backs up that
assumption.
12A possible exception might arise in serialized verbs.
13Stirling is using a functionalist syntactic framework anyways; the concept of agreement in the
generative sense has no import in her analysis.
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1. Id is the eventuality’s referential index. It is a uniquely identifying integer
1,2,3,. . . ,n;
2. Aspect is a sorted eventuality variable, chosen from e for an event, s for a
state, a for an aspectually unspecified eventuality, and perhaps others; and
3. Parameters is a parameter list, made up as follows:
(a) the protagonist is an individual discourse marker, x ∈ { x1, x2,. . . xn }. The
protagonist is the agentive subject of the eventuality.
(b) the location is a sorted discourse marker, l ∈ { l1, l2,. . . ln }, which denotes
spatiotemporal location.
(c) actuality is a value in the set {actual, non-actual}.
Of these, only the Parameters are important for SR. Indeed, it seems that only the
Parameters are even plausible. Id provides an index for the events, but David-
sonian events (those associated with the verb) are existentially bound in their
sentences. They do not refer, and should not have referential indices, especially
lexically-assigned ones. Lexical Aspect has not been shown to be relevant to SR in
the literature. Its effects appear through the interaction of the verb, its arguments,
and viewpoint aspect. Stirling includes Id andAspect for completeness, and to help
differentiate events, but since differentiating them is not the role of SR, they are
unnecessary. However, we will continue to include them in describing the analysis.
Each event variable used is lexically assigned an SEI. In a sentence like (116),
we have arbitrarily assigned Id’s to every variable.
(116) Robert3 came in2.
(117) [2, e , 〈x3, l1, actual〉]
When switch-reference compares the eventualities of the joined clauses, it does
not compare their Id, which would be necessarily disjoint. Instead, it compares
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only the parameters: If the two eventualities have identical parameters, they agree,
and SS appears (118). If they differ along any of the parameters, DS appears (119).
This captures the standard apparent subject tracking, as shown in (118).
(118) uqa
3s
jo
house
l-i-me-i
go-Pred-SS-3s
sigin
knife
qee
Neg
o-l
get-3s.Neg.Pt
‘He went to the house and didn’t get the knife.’ (Roberts 1988:112)
he went = [1, e , 〈x1, l1, actual〉]
he didn’t get the knife = [2, e , 〈x1, l1, actual〉]
x1, l1, actual = x1, l1, actual→ SS
(119) Uqa
He
ho-co-b
come-DS-3s
sab
food
je-i-a
eat-3s-TodPt
‘He1 came and he3 ate the food.’ (Stirling 1993: 207)
he came = [1, e , 〈x1, l1, actual〉]
he ate the food = [2, e , 〈x3, l1, actual〉]
x1, l1, actual ! x3, l1, actual→ DS
In essence, switch-reference tracks protagonists, locations, and worlds, but
only indirectly. The pivot clause’s eventuality’s agreement depends on the val-
ues of all three items bundled together within the eventuality description. Due to
this collocation, I will refer to Stirling’s theory as the Bundling Approach.
Bundling accounts for the cases of shift that Roberts first described. For in-
stance, in (120), the subjects are identical, but the locations are different. This
drives different indices for location. Switch-reference finds that the events’ struc-
tured indices are different, so appears as DS.
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(120) Age
3pl
ceta
yam
gul-do-co-bil
carry-3s-DS-3pl
li
go-Pred
bahim
floor
na
on
tac-ein
fill-3pl.RemPt
‘They carried the yams on their shoulders and went and filled up the yam
store.’
carry = (e4, e , 〈x4, l9, actual〉 )
go and fill = (e5, e, 〈x4, l7, actual〉 )
x4, l9, actual ! x4, l7, actual→ DS
3.2.4 Problems with the Bundling Approach
The Bundling Approach offers an insightful account of switch-reference that
covers canonical and non-canonical use. However, a critical look discovers major
problems that cannot be repaired.
3.2.4.1 Lack of motivation for the SEI
One major problem is the idiosyncraticity of the structured eventuality index.
Its only apparent purpose is to handle switch-reference, but it has no independent
motivation in any other structure in any other language, especially once we strip
it of the parts that have nothing to do with switch-reference. This is a problem
for any universal account of switch-reference based on an SEI, but not a fatal one,
so long as it accounts for switch-reference. However, looking at the two major
Parameters, agentivity and location, we see that it fails.
3.2.4.2 Arguments against the relevance of agentivity
Stirling proposes that what unifies facts like (112-114) is that switch-reference
tracks an agent. That is, the lack of agent in the anti-pivot clause allows the agent
pivot to carry over and be the agent of the pivot clause. This is problematic for two
reasons. First, it isn’t clear how SS marking could access the agent feature in an
anti-pivot clause that has no agent. Second, it is empirically implausible to expect
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‘he’ in (114) to be the agent of ‘those yams were ripe’, simply to meet the demands
of the theory. If ‘he’ is not the agent, then SS is simply indicating the non-change
of agent. However, the mechanism for SS marking relies on coreference of agents,
so it could not easily account for this.
Broadwell (1997) also provides empirical evidence against agentivity as a cri-
terion for switch-reference pivots, by showing that it cannot extend to other lan-
guages. He uses a clear case in Choctaw (Muskogean, Mississippi/Oklahoma)
where the agent of the event described by the verbal predicate is ignored by switch-
reference. This case involves a phenomenon known in the Muskogeanist literature
as possessor raising. Possessor raising in Choctaw should not be confused with the
phenomenon in European languages that is sometimes given the same name.14
Possessed DPs can serve as subjects of a Choctaw sentence (121a), like in English.
However, the possessor can be ‘raised’ out of the DP to an external position, where
it receives nominative case. This argument is then reflected as an oblique in the
verbal agreement system (121b).
(121) a. Oblaashaash
yesterday
John
John
im-ofi’-at
3s.obl-dog-nom
illi-tok
die-pt
‘Yesterday, John’s dog died.’
b. John-at
John-nom
oblaashaash
yesterday
im-ofi’-(at)
3s.obl-dog-(nom)
im-illi-tok
3s.obl-die-pt
‘Yesterday, John’s dog died.’
There is no way for raised possessor John to be construed as the agent of the
predicate. But switch-reference is sensitive to the raised nominative argument,
not the agent of the predicate. Thus, (122) is only felicitous if John bit the speaker,
not his dog.
14Possessor raising in this sense involves raising the possessor of a direct object to the object posi-
tion, as in the French Ils m’ont coupé le bras ‘They cut my arm off.’
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(122) John-at
John-nom
ofi’-at
dog-nom
im-ambiika-took
III-sick-past
[sa-kisili-tok-at]
1sPP-bite-when.SS
‘John1’s dog2 was sick when he1 bit me.’ (Broadwell 1997)
In addition to the Choctaw case made against the Bundling Approach, a look
at the literature finds evidence from many Australian languages against a role for
agentivity. Many ergative languages employ switch-reference; Austin (1981) re-
ports that they all ignore ergativity— SS indicates two subjects, even if one is an
agent and the other is not. Here is a pair of examples, from the Diyari language.
In (123), the SS marker indicates subject co-reference across clauses, even though
the pivot bears ergative case, and the anti-pivot bears nominative case. In (124),
DS marking indicates subject disjointness, even though the absolutive argument
of the pivot clause is the subject of the anti-pivot clause.
(123) nhulu
he-erg
puka
food-abs
thay-rna,
eat-NonFut.SS
nhawu
he-nom
pali-rna
die-ptp
warrayi
aux
‘While eating some food, he died.
(124) karna-li
man-erg
wilha
woman-abs
nhayi-yi,
see-pres
kirli-rnanhi
dance-NonFut.DS
‘The man sees the woman dancing.’ (Austin 1981: 318)
It turns out that these facts do not by themselves condemn the Bundling Ap-
proach. They only render the agent condition on Protagonists unfruitful. The
exact nature of the protagonist would need to be redefined, perhaps as some kind
of topic. Ultimately, though, other evidence undermines crucial predictions of the
Bundling Approach, and renders moot the need to incorporate any notion of Pro-
tagonist into the bundled SEI.
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3.2.4.3 Predicts that location difference triggers DS
The Bundling Approach makes a very strong prediction: Differences in spa-
tiotemporal location should trigger DS marking. For SS marking, events would
have to share a location. They would have to be cotemporaneous, and spatially at
the same place. Of course, the notion of ‘same time’ can be vague, but even so, it
predicts that clearly different locations trigger DS marking. However, SS marking
can be used when the clauses’ events are spatiotemporally non-contiguous. For
instance, in Watkins (1993)’s example ((108), repeated in the next subsection), SS
marking is available to describe a ‘shared purpose’, even though the two letter writ-
ing events are separated by a wide distance. More importantly, even if the agents
co-referred, a significant change in location would require DS marking. Examples
like (125) are easy enough to elicit or encounter, and show this a change in location
does not always suffice for DS marking.
(125) Normancà
N-kjæ
N.-at
mà
ma˜−
[2di:3p]
k`¯aulés`¯aujèv`¯aigàu
khO:le´+sO:te+pĳaj:-gO
together+work+fight-pf
gàu
gO
and.SS
Carnegiecà
C.-kjæ
C.-at
mà
ma˜−
[2di:3p]
k`¯aulés`¯aujèv`¯aigàu.
khO:le´+sO:te+pĳaj:-gO
together+work+fight-pf
‘We’ve worked together in Norman, and we’ve worked together in
Carnegie.’ (f.n.)
In (125), the speaker is referring to two separate events of working togther,
in cities 82 miles (132 km) apart. These cities are not culturally the same place,
either. The subjects/agents of each clause co-refer, so we get canonical SS marking,
but under a Bundling Approach, the disjoint locations would force DS marking.
I will discuss more examples like this in detail in section 3.4.5.1, where I argue
against the use of locations by themselves in light of the situations-based proposal
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of this chapter. But for now, even one example like (125) demonstrates that the
Bundling Approach is too strong.
3.2.4.4 Predicts that non-canonical SS is unavailable
The Bundling Approach makes a very strong prediction: Non-canonical SS
marking is unavailable. For non-canonical SS marking to occur, the protagonists
would have to be different. Under the Bundling Approach, the difference in pro-
tagonist would necessitate DS marking, so non-canonical SS marking should be
impossible.
However, non-canonical SS marking is widely attested, as shown in the previ-
ous section. Here is Watkins’s example again, from Kiowa.
(108) Kathryn
K.
K.
gà
gjæ-
[3s:3p]
gút
gu´P
write.pf
gàu
gO
and.SS
Estheràl
E.=al
E.=too
gà
gjæ-
[3s:3p]
gút.
gu´P
write.pf
‘Kathryn wrote a letter and Esther wrote one too.’
In order for the Bundling Approach to account for this, Kathryn and Esther would
have to not be the protagonists of these events. It is unclear how it could be pos-
sible for the writer of a letter not to be the agent of the letter-writing. It turns out
that there is something that links the two events quite firmly, as Watkins points
out. In the next section, I will propose that a sentence-level situation will obvi-
ate the need for a bundling approach, and will permit the use of reference in the
denotation of switch-reference.
Stirling does discuss cases of non-canonical SS marking, even in Amele (112-
114). To account for these, she appeals to the nature of the event protagonist; the
anti-pivot clauses have the same agent despite lacking any actual agent. As we
just saw, this solution is not available for cases like (108). When exploring the
Amele examples, though, it becomes clear that there is no reason to expect a priori
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that non-canonical SS marking should involve a different mechanism from non-
canonical DS marking. That is, this may well be non-canonical SS marking like
the Kiowa. Looking back, we see that Stirling’s separation of mechanisms for un-
expected SS and DS marking only serves one purpose: It allows us to maintain the
Bundling Approach. Once we bring SS and DS marking under the same mecha-
nism, it becomes impossible to rely on Bundling, without severely weakening it.
3.2.4.5 Against a weakened Bundling Approach
One way to maintain the Bundling Approach is to weaken the Parameters of
the SEI that lead to false predictions, or to weaken the concept of agreement. Per-
haps the Protagonist can be some kind of topic, instead of the agent. Perhaps
we could broaden our concept of spatiotemporal location. Or perhaps we could
soften the conditions of switch-reference, where it permits SS marking if at least
one Parameter matches. Each of these weakenings is problematic for a bundling
approach.
The problem with weakening the Protagonist condition is that topichood is not
restricted to subjects, but (canonical) switch-reference is. You would have to re-
strengthen it back to exclude non-subjects. The problem with broadening location
is that the use of spatiotemporal location is independently useful as it is. Positing
a special version of proximity or cotemporaneity to preserve a theory of switch-
reference is not helpful. And lastly, a weakened Bundling Approach removes any
role for deriving pivot selection in the grammar. The only factor becomes what-
ever the speaker feels relevant. That is, there is no real need for a pivot selection
mechanism in the grammar if the speaker can pick the pivot at will without re-
striction.
By itself, this last factor is not problematic for an analysis of switch-reference;
indeed it would be an intriguing result. However, such a result is problematic for a
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bundling approach, because the main motivators of any pivot selection are outside
the SEI. If the speaker can select a particular pivot, there is no need for any SEI,
because the pivot can be just about anything except the event (which can’t refer).
More broadly speaking, there would be no need for a theory that relates the joined
clauses’ events. Since the whole point of the Bundling Approach is to create a
theory of switch-reference based on relating the joined clauses’ events, weakening
it would remove its justification.
3.2.5 Summary
The Bundling Approach is untenable. It can account for either non-canonical
DS or SS marking, but not both, because the three parameters (or however many
parameters there are) would have to all be in agreement. This is not a problem
with Stirling’s account; it’s a problem for any account of switch-reference that tries
to bundle together canonical and non-canonical switch-reference. Any complete
theory of switch-reference must treat these separately in some respect.
That said, the Bundling Approach does make insightful points that advance
our understanding of switch-reference.. It offers an account of non-canonical
switch-reference, and does so with no small ingenuity. It demonstrates the neces-
sity of a semantic approach, as well as the notion that eventualities play a role in
switch-reference. In the upcoming section, we will explore non-canonical switch-
reference in more detail, and propose a theory based on careful elicitation that
accounts for cases of non-canonical switch-reference attested in the literature.
3.3 Switch-reference and topic situations
Switch-reference does not always track subjects. However, it does still seem
to correlate to shift or maintenance of the ‘scene’. Stirling’s hypothesis meant to
explain this correlation through the tracking of the joined clauses’ Davidsonian
133
event arguments, through the bundling of some of the events’ parameters. As the
previous section demonstrates, any theory of switch-reference that relies on events
or on bundling is crucially inadequate.
3.3.1 The proposal in brief
In the rest of this chapter, I make a proposal that relies on a different kind of se-
mantic object. This proposal retains the simple and intuitive co-reference account,
while accounting for the non-canonical effects. It includes two main hypotheses.
The first is that non-canonical SR tracks the topic situations of each sentence. The
second is that SR tracks situations when the connective is a coordinating conjunc-
tion.
• Hypothesis 1 : Non-canonical switch-reference indicates coreference or dis-
jointness of topic situations of the joined clauses.
Hypothesis 1 is composed of two subhypotheses, one for each value of SR: Non-
canonical SS marking indicates ‘same situation’, while non-canonical DS marking
indicates ‘different situation’.
• Hypothesis 1a : Non-canonical DS marking indicates a change of topic situa-
tion by signaling the disjointness of the joined clauses’ topic situations. This
mechanism derives a sense of scene shift.
• Hypothesis 1b : Non-canonical SS marking indicates a maintenance of topic
situation by signaling the semantic identity of the joined clauses’ topic situ-
ations. This mechanism derives a sense of scene continuity.
Also, I will build off the observed configurational difference to propose another
hypothesis— the type of item tracked by switch-reference correlates to the syntac-
tic type of clause juncture.
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• Hypothesis 2 : The type of connective where switch-reference is found de-
termines the type of object switch-reference tracks.
Hypothesis 2 is composed of two subhypotheses, one for each ‘canonicity’ of SR:
‘Canonical’ or subject-tracking SR occurs with subordination, and ’Non-canonical’
or situation-tracking SR occurs with coordination. These subhypotheses can be
expressed as biconditionals.
• Hypothesis 2a : Switch-reference occurs on coordinating conjunctions if and
only if it tracks topic situations.
• Hypothesis 2b : Switch-reference occurs on subordinating connectives if and
only if it tracks subjects.
The rest of this chapter will evaluate each hypothesis in turn. For each, I first
show how it accounts for the observations related earlier in this chapter, and then
I test it with targeted elicitation.
In section 3.1.2 we saw the repeated observation that non-canonical DS mark-
ing signals a ‘scene shift’ of some kind. In section 3.1.3 we saw that non-canonical
SS marking signals a continuity. Hypothesis 1 explains these observations with the
proposal that switch-reference is tracking the Austinian topic situation instead of
the subject. That is, switch-reference isn’t really ‘non-canonical’, but rather it is
simply tracking a different kind of pivot.
3.3.2 Semantic framework
The theory of semantics that will be employed in this dissertation is a possi-
bilistic situation semantics based on (Kratzer 1989, 2007). It is largely built on
the foundation laid out in (Heim & Kratzer 1998), with the addition to the ontol-
ogy of the class of objects known as situations. Under this framework, meaning
is truth-conditional and compositional. The semantic structure corresponds to
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the interpreted syntactic structure (LF). There are two major components to the
framework; composition procedures and the organization of semantic objects into
types.
3.3.2.1 Type-theoretic semantics
Semantic objects can be classified into different types that encapsulate a certain
inherent property shared by every member set of objects in question. For instance,
all individuals are individuals, though they can be distinguished from one another
by their various properties. They can thus be placed into a type, which is called
type e (for ‘entities’). Another type of object in our truth-conditional semantics
consists of the truth values themselves. There are only two possible truth values,
true and false, here represented as 1 and 0. These truth values are of type t.
In a standard world-based semantics, there are other types of object— worlds,
times, events, etc. However, this dissertation employs a situation semantics, in
which situations replace worlds, times, and events.15 Situations are of semantic
type s.
The type theory does not simply describe classes of objects. It describes classes
of functions as well. For instance, the property dog expresses a function that maps
any entity it to a truth-value, mapping it to 1 if and only if that entity is a dog, and
mapping it to 0 otherwise. It will take Odie, and map it to 1. It will take Garfield
and map it to 0. Since dog takes an entity (of type e) and maps it to a truth value
(of type t), it is of type 〈e, t〉, the type of properties of entities.
Type 〈e, t〉 is a complex type. But it, too, can be part of a function. For instance,
the definite determiner the expresses a function that maps any property of entities
to a specific entity. While the noun phrase dog refers to the set of all dogs, the
15This replacement is not absolutely crucial to the functioning of a situation semantics.
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determiner phrase the dog refers to a specific canine. The function the is of type
〈〈e, t〉, e〉.
The type theory is recursive. Recursive processes are those where the output of
a process can be plugged back into the process ad infinitum. As far as type theory
goes, any type can be combined with any other type to create a new complex type.
For instance, e is a type and t is a type, so 〈e, t〉 is a type. That type can be combined
with another type as well. Since 〈e, t〉 is a type and t is a type, then type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉
is a type. Since 〈e, t〉 is a type and 〈〈e, t〉, t〉 is a type, 〈〈e, t〉,〈〈e, t〉, t〉〉 is a type. And
so on. Types can be infinitely complex; it is not possible to list them all. We can
thus list basic types, and define a recursive rule for the combination of types that
allows for this infinite complexity.
Table 3.1. Semantic types
type object
e the type of entities
s the type of situations
t the type of truth-values
Type theory restricts composition because it defines the nature of the objects
that compose. It also (indirectly) imposes restrictions on which compositional pro-
cedures can be used at a given point in the structure.
3.3.3 Situations in semantics
Situations were first proposed by Barwise & Perry (1983) as a way to restrict
truth-conditions (see section 3.3.4). The framework used here is a more recent
one, based on Kratzer (1989), in which situations are parts of possible worlds, and
their presence in the compositional structure restricts the meaning of the composi-
tion. Effectively, this partiality allows speakers to systematically restrict the scope
of their assertions. Applied to entire sentences, they allow a straightforwardmech-
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anism for deriving Austinian truth— the context is represented in the sentence by
a situation, about which the assertion is made.
3.3.3.1 Partiality and Mereology
Partiality is an important relation in situation semantics. Thus, it is important
to establish a mereology of situations. A situation is simply defined as a part of a
possible world. For instance, let us consider the actual world. If we assume this
world to contain all places and all times up to now, along with anything in them
(let’s leave the future out of it), then any situation that is part of the actual world
will contain some subset of these places and times. It might even be as small as one
place at one time, for instance, Montreal last weekend, or my stomach right now.
It might correspond instead to an event, like the Battle of Bouvines, or Super Bowl
XXVII, or even a picnic. It might even correspond to an individual, or a group of
individuals.
A situation is part of a possible world, and any part of a possible world is a
situation. As a result, possible worlds are defined as situations that are not part
of any other situation. Hence, they are not represented separately in our semantic
types. Consequently every non-world situation is part of some other situation.
Since a situation is generally part of another situation, a situation generally has
parts that are situations. Any two situations can be summed, and importantly,
when you sum any situation with a second situation that it is a part of, the result is
equivalent to the larger situation. In fact, the part relation can be defined as such—
any situation s is part of another s′, if and only if s+s′ = s′. I will represent the part
relation as ≤, so we can re-write the part-relation biconditional as follows:16
16As used in Kratzer (2007), the part relation is expressed as ≤p.
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For all situations s and s′:
( s ≤ s′ )↔ ( s + s′ = s′ )
3.3.3.2 Situations in the syntax
Situations are not only present in the interpretation of the sentences, they are
actually present in the structure, and their meaning composes like any other se-
mantic object. Since there is little to no evidence so far of overt situation pro-
nouns17, we have to rely on semantic evidence. One key piece of evidence is
quantification over situation variables. Cresswell (1990) argued that natural lan-
guages quantify over worlds and times just like it quantifies over individuals (i.e.,
with operators binding variables). Percus (2000) demonstrated that possible-world
variables (or variables like them) are in the syntax, and their position in the syn-
tax affects their interpretation. Stanley & Szabó (2000), Kratzer (2004, 2007), and
Martí (2006) argue specifically for quantification over situation variables.
Formally, situations are referred to in the syntax by a variable, sn, where n is
an index that links the variable to some situation via variable assignment. It is of
semantic type s. A situation’s denotation is as given in (126).
(126) For any index n and any assignment function g:
! sn "g = g(n) : s
3.3.3.3 Propositions in a situation semantics
In a Kratzerian situation semantics, propositions are properties of situations,
of type 〈s, t〉. Like other properties, a proposition’s extension is simply the set of
objects (in this case situations) for which that proposition is an adequate descrip-
tion. Thus, asserting it was raining about a situation is like asserting it was a cocker
spaniel about an animal.
17Kratzer (2004) suggests that the Bavarian pronoun da is anaphoric to situations.
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(127) ! it was raining " = λs. it was raining at s : 〈s, t〉
Recall our example it was raining, which we assumed was true about Montreal
last weekend, but not about Montreal last night. The truth of the proposition
expressed by this sentence depends on which situation it is being asserted over.
Let us assign the variable s4 to the situation covering Montreal last weekend, and
s8 to the situation covering Montreal last night. In that case, the proposition it was
raining is a good description of s4, but not of s8.
(128) a. It was raining (s4) = true
b. It was raining (s8) = false
The use of situations to effect contextual restriction has been found very useful
in understanding the truth-conditions of a wide-variety of semantic phenomena,
including sentence interpretation (Barwise & Perry 1983; Barwise & Etchemendy
1987), attitude ascription (Kratzer 2002), e-type anaphora (Berman 1987; Heim
1990; Elbourne 2005), as well as adverbial quantification (von Fintel 1994; Percus
2000). Situations are used in two major ways to bring about this restriction in
a sentence.18 A topic situation restricts the truth-conditions of a sentence, and
18One objection to the use of situation variables (or any variable) for contextual restriction is
made by Recanati, who argues (Recanati 2002, 2007) for a process of pragmatic enrichment in place
of situation or location variables. He claims that only a few predicates have location arguments—
those like arrive, which require that the speaker know the location of the event. All other predi-
cates, like rain or dance, can still be restricted in a different way. Take his example:
(1) A: Was John present at the ball?
B: Yes, he danced all night.
It is clear that B’s response is restricted by the ball, but how so? Recanati argues that the location is
added pragmatically to the truth-conditions of the phrase, within the scope of the event quantifier:
(2) ∃e ∃t Past (t) & time (t, e) & dancing (e) & agent (John, e) &
all-night (e) & location (the− ball, e)
However, his argument rests on two problematic assumptions. First, the location of an event is
either an argument of the predicate or is supplied via pragmatic enrichment. Second, the linguis-
tically expressed location must be associated with the predicate. ctd. . .
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a resource situation restricts the domain of a determiner or quantifier. The next
subsection discusses how topic situations work.
3.3.4 Austinian truth and topic situations
The analysis of switch-reference that this chapter presents relies on Austinian
topic situations that switch-reference tracks across sentence boundaries. It is thus
necessary to explain what these objects are and how their role in language relates
to switch-reference. This subsection lays out what these objects are, starting with
the description ‘Austinian.’
3.3.4.1 Truth with respect to contexts
The road to employing situations in semantics begins with the essay “Truth” by
J.L. Austin 1981. In this essay, he argues that the truth of an asserted proposition
depends on the context about which it is uttered. If you assert the proposition It
rained, that proposition will be true or false for a particular context. It does not
suffice for it to have rained somewhere, at some time in the past.
Recanati’s first assumption is problematic in cases where there would be an argument and the
kind of restriction seen in pragmatic enrichment. For instance, if the location argument of arrive
is saturated by the place of arrival, and the point of arrival is specified, where does the restriction
come into play? Here is another ballroom example:
(3) A: Was John present at the ball?
B: Yes, but he arrived at the back door— what a faux pas!
The location of arrival is the back door (of the building housing the ball), but the ball is still restrict-
ing the arrival just as much as it does in (1). Presumably, the back door would saturate the location
argument of arrive, leaving no need for pragmatic enrichment. Otherwise, you could pragmatically
enrich at the ball as well (You could say it overtly: He arrived at the ball at the back door). But what
would stop infinite pragmatic enrichment?
We can also eliminate the assumption that the location argument is directly associated with
the predicate. Under the situation semantics assumed here, the location is encoded in the topic
situation, which is not an argument of the predicate. This is not necessarily an argument against
association with the predicate, but rather a reminder that we can get by without it. Since Recanati’s
first assumption is flawed, and the second is unnecessary, we should not accept the conclusions he
draws from them.
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This point is even clearer with negation. As Partee (1973) points out, one might
say a sentence like "I didn’t turn off the stove!" about a particular time, but it
does not simply mean "there is no time in the past where I turned off the stove."
Sentences are used to make assertions about some particular time or place.
A situation semantics derives this ‘partial’ truth very easily. A situation is a
semantic object that corresponds to part of a possible world. Austinian truth is
derived when the proposition is asserted over a situation. The term topic situation
is used to describe the use of situations to restrict truth in this way.
Situations therefore provide a systematic means of introducing partiality into
semantic denotations. For instance, if you assert that It was raining, you aremaking
a claim about some part of the world, and no others. Thus, your assertion’s truth-
value depends on the part of the world you are talking about. For instance, imag-
ine that it rained last weekend in Montreal, but skies were clear there last night.
Given that context, if you said It was raining, and your topic situation corresponds
to Montreal last weekend, the proposition you are asserting is true. However, if
your topic situation corresponds to Montreal last night, the sentence is false.
(129) Context: In Montreal, it rained last weekend, but it did not rain last night.
a. It was raining (topic situation = Montreal last weekend)→ TRUE
b. It was raining (topic situation = Montreal last night)→ FALSE
Topic situations often correspond to spatiotemporal locations. Thus, the truth
of an asserted proposition also depends on the place being talked about, not just
the time. Imagine that you have uttered the sentence It’s raining. Chances are, you
are not saying that it’s raining all over the world, or even the rather uninformative
claim that it’s raining somewhere in the world. Instead, you are only describing
some particular place. For instance, Montreal.
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(130) Context: In Montreal, it is raining, but in Toronto, it is sunny.
a. It’s raining (TS = Montreal right now)→ TRUE
b. It’s raining (TS = Toronto right now)→ FALSE
Topic situations do not always correspond to spatiotemporal locations (else we
could simply call them ‘locations’). For instance, you could imagine asserting My
brother sat on the couch the whole time. This sentence could be describing a situation
involving several smaller events of sitting on the couch, which took place at differ-
ent times and places. For instance, imagine that you asked him to help pack your
moving truck in Arizona. Instead, he sat on the couch and wouldn’t help. One
week later, as you unpacked in Florida, he showed up, but also sat on the couch
and refused to help.
These moving events, and the concurrent couch-sittings, are obviously spa-
tially discontiguous. However, one might claim they are in fact temporally con-
tiguous, because the parts are linked by the week in between, thus forming a con-
tiguous time span. However, My brother sat on the couch the whole time could also
describe a scenario where the brother did not sit on a couch in the meantime. In
fact, it is still felicitous if the brother went hiking in the woods during the week,
and never even saw a couch, much less sat on one. In such a context, if we include
the whole week, the proposition asserted is no longer true. The intervening week
must therefore be excluded from consideration, which means that topic situations
can contain temporally discontiguous parts.
(131) Context: My brother sat on the couch while we packed in Arizona, and
while we unpacked in Florida, but not at any time in between.
a. My brother sat on the couch the whole time.
(TS = packing and unpacking)→ TRUE
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b. My brother sat on the couch the whole time.
(TS = packing, unpacking, and the time between)→ FALSE
Intuitively, then, situations can be describing various events as well. For in-
stance, we could say It was rainy and windy to talk about a football game where the
weather conditions were particularly deplorable.
3.3.4.2 Contextual restriction and coherence
One of the most interesting effects of topic situations derives from their restric-
tion of the scope of an assertion. When someone makes an assertion about some
situation, the assertion does not apply to anything else. So if I assert It was raining
about last weekend in Montreal, the truth of that proposition is only meant to be
judged by the facts of last weekend in Montreal. Everything else is irrelevant to
this particular truth-judgment: Whether it was raining anywhere else, or in Mon-
treal at any other time, or any other property of Montreal last weekend (was it
windy, etc.). Nothing matters but whether or not it was raining last weekend in
Montreal.
Contextual restriction therefore has several effects visible throughout the se-
mantics. For instance, topic situations help maintain coherence throughout dis-
course. If two speakers are discussing different situations, they might both be
speaking the truth, but the conversation will not proceed properly. Imagine two
people discussing their weekend. Adeline asks Jacques about the picnic they had,
but Jacques answers with an assertion about the soccer game after the picnic. Be-
cause these topic situations are unspoken, this change in topic is not obvious to
Adeline. So her response to Jacques is still about the picnic, and the conversation
grinds to a halt.
(132) • Adeline: Did you have a good time? (TS = the picnic)
• Jacques: No. It was raining the whole time. (TS = the game)
• Adeline: Wait a sec, it didn’t rain at all! (TS = the picnic
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Contextual restriction via topic situations can also explain the cancellation of
lifetime effects. Lifetime effects are implications of death that arise from the use
of past tense on certain predicates.
(133) a. Adeline was French. implicates: Adeline is dead.
(TS = her lifetime )
b. Adeline was in France. does not implicate: Adeline is dead.
(TS = last summer)
The assertion in (133a) is past tense, so the speaker is not speaking about the
present. The topic situation corresponds to Adeline’s lifetime, and since that ended
in the past, we get the sense that she is dead.19
Note that if the topic situation doesn’t correspond to the subject’s lifetime, the
effect does not arise. For instance, saying (133b) does not trigger a lifetime effect,
because one is not expected to be in France all one’s life.
Musan (1997a,b) demonstrates that contextual restriction via a variable can
cancel the lifetime effect. This variable, refers to a salient context, thus restricting
the scope of the assertion to that context. We can model this variable as a topic
situation. Like with previous examples, whether Adeline is still French is not rel-
evant. However, since the topic situation is restricted to this meeting, there is no
sense of her being dead— her Frenchness is asserted to hold only of that moment.
(134) a. Jacques introduced me to his friends. Malik was Algerian, and
Adeline was French.
b. Adeline was French (TS = the introduction)
Another effect of contextual restriction is that speakers can even exploit the un-
spoken nature of topic situations to flout expectations of coherence. For instance,
19The effect also requires some pragmatics: If Adeline were still alive, it would be more informa-
tive to say she is French, because the topic situation would be larger, and up to the present.
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in the following dialogue, recorded from my own experience, my wife flouts the
coherence of topic situations to humorously put me in a bind. I made an assertion
about an event the previous evening, and used the past tense because that partic-
ular event took place before the utterance time. My interlocutor ‘interpreted’ my
assertion as being about a much longer situation, her entire lifespan.
(135) • Me: You looked gorgeous. (TS = last night’s party)
• Wife: What, I don’t usually? (TS = her lifespan)
Intuitively, assertions (and questions) are meant to describe some restricted
place, time, or event. I adopt the notion of topic situation, which is used to encom-
pass these different concepts.
3.3.4.3 Theoretical precursors to topic situations
Topic situations also play a role in temporal semantics. Because they can refer
to a part of a world before some particular time, they can be used as an argument
of tense, replacing time variables. For instance, topic situations can be used in
a situation semantics in place of Reichenbach (1948)’s reference time, or Klein
(1994)’s topic time.
For instance, Klein (1994) outlined a theory of temporal relations in sentences
that split apart tense from (viewpoint) aspect. These relations are tied to the time
with respect to which the sentence is interpreted. He calls this time of evaluation
the topic time, because it corresponds to the time the utterance is about. The gram-
matical category tense expresses the relation between the topic time to the time
of speech, which is the utterance time, by precedence relations, and nothing else.
Past tense indicates that the topic time precedes the utterance time; future tense,
that the utterance time precedes the topic time; and present tense, that neither
precedes the other (i.e., they are identical. See Table 3.2 for a summary).
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Linking tense to the topic time predicts certain effects of tense to demonstrate
restriction effects. Klein proposes the concept of topic time to account for the
way that the time under discussion restricts the truth judgment of the sentence’s
asserted proposition. If I utter the sentence The book was in Russian, the past tense
indicates that the topic time precedes now. Crucially, it also indicates that the
scope of the assertion is restricted to some time before now. For instance, Klein
describes the following imaginary dialogue in a courtroom:
(136) a. Lawyer: What did you see when you entered the room?
b. Witness: There was a book on the table. It was/#is in Russian.
(136b) is of particular interest, because replacing past tensewaswith present tense
is is infelicitous, even if the proposition The book is in Russian is otherwise true.
Klein shows that the topic time restricts the interpretation of the sentence to some
particular interval, in this case corresponding to when the witness entered the
room. Using present tense in this utterance, despite being true, is infelicitous
in this utterance, because the present tense does not describe the topic time. It
matters what time you’re talking about. Now, it could also be the case that the book
no longer exists, or its text was somehow changed into another language.20 The
sentence with past tense is still felicitous here, because past tense indicates that
the topic time precedes the utterance time, independent of anything else. What
we know about the world will influence whether we draw the implicature that the
book is still in Russian, but the assertion itself leaves that open.
Klein’s theory of time separates tense and aspect, and sets them up so that
aspect takes the interpretation of the verb phrase and ‘leads’ it up to tense. It is not
only elegant; it later turns out to fit quite snugly with the syntactic structure of the
extended verbal projection. Kratzer (1998) formalizes Klein’s approach (Table 3.3)
20Perhaps with e-books, this will be possible.
147
Table 3.2. Kleinian tense
Tense relation
past TT ≺ UT
present TT = UT
future UT ≺ TT
using a property of times expressing a temporal precedence relation (≺) between
times. This property and relation also applies between situations. If s* is the
utterance situation, past indicates that the topic situation precedes the utterance
situation, present indicates overlap (future is more complicated).
Table 3.3. Tense with situations
Tense relation
past λs. s ≺ s* : 〈s, t〉
present λs. s ◦ s* : 〈s, t〉
3.3.4.4 Summary
This section has introduced the key concepts of situation semantics that are
relevant to this discussion. Situations are parts of possible worlds that are used in
natural language to restrict the scope of truth-conditions. They are used to restrict
sentences, where they are called ‘topic situations’, or to restrict the domain of de-
terminers and quantifiers, where they are called ’resource situations’. The use of
topic situations neatly derives the Austinian conception of ‘partial’ truth. Hypoth-
esis 1 builds off this theory to claim that switch-reference can track these topic
situations, accounting for non-canonical switch-reference, and deriving apparent
coherence effects.
3.4 Hypothesis 1
In this subsection I apply Hypothesis 1 to one of the observations from section
3.1.2 and one from 3.1.3. It applies just as easily to the other examples from these
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sections. Then, I will test the hypothesis to verify it. However, for brevity I will
not discuss the previous examples further, unless doing so elucidates a particular
issue.
3.4.1 Applying Hypothesis 1a
Hypothesis 1a claims that DS marking signals a change in topic situation from
one conjoined clause to the next. This change derives the scene-shift effects in
section 3.1.2, by indicating that the second conjunct is evaluated against a different
topic situation than the first conjunct. For instance, in (137), the DS marking
indicates that the first conjunct (having coffee) and the second (going home) are to
be evaluated against different situations. This change in topic situation is hinted
at in the English translation, which adds the adverbial later on.
(137) wakhalapi
coffee
blatke
1-drink
na
and.SS
wagli
1-go home
yukha
and.DS
čhahapi
sugar
ewaktuže
1-forget
poetušni
buy-neg
‘I had some coffee and went home.
Later on I realized I had forgotten to buy sugar.’
SR TS subject sentence
— s1 x2 I2 had some coffee
SS s1 x2 I2 went home
DS s3 x2 I2 had forgotten to buy sugar
Table 3.4. DS marking indicating scene shift
3.4.2 Applying Hypothesis 1b
The scene continuity effects reported in section 3.1.3 are derived from the sig-
nal provided by SS marking, which indicates that the second conjunct is evaluated
against the same situation as the first conjunct. Non-canonical SS marking was
well exemplified in the Crow example (107) repeated here. The second SS mark-
ing in (107) occurs despite the two conjuncts having different nominal arguments.
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This use highlights that the houses and people are in the same situation— the
camp that the boy is looking at.
(107) chiláakshe
morning
shikáakee-sh
boy-det
asall-ák
go_out.SS
kuss-íkaa-lee-m
goal-look-!-DS
ashé
lodge
ah-ak
many-SS
bilaxpáake
people
chiwakálaa-k
go back and forth-SS
dahkú-m. . .
continue-DS
‘in the morning the boy went out, he looked in the direction of [the old
campsite], and to his surprise, there were lots of lodges, and people going
back and forth.’
SR TS subject sentence
— s1 x2 he2 looked that way
DS s3 x4 there were lots of lodges4
SS s3 x5 people5 going back and forth.
Table 3.5. SS marking indicating scene continuity
The fact that the examples from texts are compatible with Hypothesis 1 lends it
great support. Nevertheless, it is merely suggestive. We need to test the hypothesis
using context-driven elicitation. Building the right context requires an awareness
of what would inform us about the role of topic situations. As we saw in the
previous section, topic situations play a role in managing truth-conditions (129)
and in maintaining coherence (132). Testing for coherence is difficult, because
pragmatic interference can occur, so the ideal testing criteria are truth-conditions.
The identity of topic situations bears a strong relation to the truth-conditions
of their sentences. In the same way an entity corresponds to the set of properties
that apply to it, a situation corresponds to the set of propositions that hold of it.
Two situations differ if there is at least one proposition that is true of one and not
the other. Put another way, no two discrete situations can have the exact same
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set of properties. This fact can be used to test for differences that distinguish two
different topic situations.
3.4.3 Testing Hypothesis 1a
Hypothesis 1a claims that non-canonical DS marking indicates ‘different topic
situation’. If we want to test for situation-based DS marking, we simply need to
construct examples where the two conjoined clauses must have different truth-
conditions. With different truth-conditions, the propositions expressed by the
clauses cannot hold of the same topic situation. Therefore, the clauses must have
different topic situations.
To ensure that the non-canonical DS marking is situation-tracking, we must
control for the clauses’ subjects by ensuring they are co-referential. Hypothesis 1a
is correct if and only if when the subjects are identical and the topic situations are
different, DS marking is obligatory. It is incorrect if SS marking appears.
Prediction : If the subjects are coreferential,
and the topic situations are disjoint,
DS marking is obligatory.
The easiest way to ensure differing truth-conditions is contradiction. If each
conjunct entails the other’s falsehood, they cannot hold of the same topic situation,
so situation-tracking SS marking should be impossible. An example of conjoined
clauses with contradiction is (138).
(138) Mary brought a cake and Mary didn’t bring a cake.
Unfortunately, the pragmatics make it difficult to create a context for elicitation
that would force a clause to have non-canonical DS marking. An example like
(138) is easy enough to produce for introspection by a native speaker trained in lin-
guistics or well-experienced in giving semantic judgments. The hypothesis would
be easy to confirm, even without providing a context, because no matter what the
151
context was, the topic situations would have to differ. However, with naïve speak-
ers, a sentence like (138) can cause confusion, because contradictory statements
are infelicitous.
When I conducted judgment tasks, I got negative results for SS marking. This
is predicted by Hypothesis 1a, but DS marking was also rejected. It seems that the
pragmatic oddity of contradiction overrode any other judgments.
(139) # Travis
T
T.
é
´˜e−
[3s:1s]
b´¯o
¯
b´˜o:
see.pf
nàu
nO˜
and.DS
Travis
T
T.
háun
h´˜On
not
é
´˜e−
[3s:1s]
b´¯o
¯
mâu.
b´˜o-mˆ˜O
see.pf-neg
‘Travis saw me and Travis didn’t see me.’
(140) # Travis é b´¯o
¯
gàu Travis háun é b´¯o
¯
mâu.
On performance tasks, the speakers would change the connective to né, ‘but’
(which does not carry switch-reference), or omit the conjunction altogether. Yet, it
was plain to see they didn’t ‘like’ the examples, and they often expressed confu-
sion. There was too much pragmatic interference to rely on examples like these.
Perhaps in time, speakers with experience at making semantic judgment can easily
judge and produce sentences with contradictions, but for the current study it was
simply not possible.
I was able to test for differing topic situations by relying on differing events.
That is, contexts where the two clauses are judged against two situations suffi-
ciently different from one another as to be recognized as distinct. I got this idea
from a speaker follow-up early on in the project. I was asking about ‘canonical’
(i.e. subject-tracking) switch-reference with wh-subjects.
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Context:
You are talking with your friend about a get-together last weekend. Ev-
eryone was supposed to bring something for everyone to eat or drink.
You can’t remember who it was who brought the coffee and the tea. You
know it was two different people, but can’t remember exactly who.
(141) Hâjêl
haˆ:teˆl
person\wh
chói
tso´i
coffee
∅−
[3s:3s]
b´¯au
bO´:
bring.pf
gàu
gO
and.SS
hâjêl
haˆ:teˆl
person\wh
chóigùl
tso´i+gul
liquid+red
∅−
[3s:3s]
b´¯au?
bO´:
bring.pf
‘Who brought coffee, and who brought tea?
After getting a translation with one SR value, I would ask a judgment about the
same clause with the other SR value. What was interesting is not the (expected)
rejection of the DS value in this case, but the speaker comment, which suggested
that context was crucial.
(142) #Hâjêl chói b´¯au nàu hâjêl chóigùl b´¯au?
comment: “Then it’s like you’re talking about two different parties."
We must first determine what kind of context would lead to considering two
events as distinct situations, since there is no overt signal of any change (besides
the switch-reference that we’re testing for). I provided a context involving two
situations of the same type, where a unique event of a certain kind takes place at
each. The uniqueness triggers differing topic situations. I made the uniqueness
explicit, though I suppose a researcher can rely on cultural cues if they can be
certain that the speaker will be familiar with the type of event.
The task involved a production/judgment— Given a context, the speaker pro-
duces a sentence with one value of SR, and then judges a sentence with the other
153
against the same context. In (143), we see that with different topic situations, DS
marking is obligatory despite co-referential subjects. Hypothesis 1a is confirmed.
Context:
You are teaching a class about Kiowa culture. Each time, you make one
type of food. Yesterday it was frybread, today it was boiled meat. I
haven’t been in your class, so I ask you what you’ve been making to eat.
(143) a. K´¯ıdèl
kh´ı:de`l
yesterday
q´¯au`¯ejàu
kĳO´e:-tO
fry bread-inv
ét
Pe´P−
[1px:3i]
´¯a
¯
um´¯e
P´˜O:m-´˜e:
eat.pf
nàu
nO
and.DS
´¯e
¯
h´¯audèkì
e´:hO´:dekhi
today
císàun
k´ı+sO˜n
meat+boil
é
e´*−
[1px:3s]
`¯a
¯
um`¯e.
PO˜:m-e˜:
eat.pf
‘Yesterday we (excl.) made fry bread and today we made boiled meat.’
b. #K´¯ıdèl q´¯au`¯ejàu ét ´¯a
¯
um´¯e gàu ´¯e
¯
h´¯audèkì císàun é `¯a
¯
um`¯e.
3.4.4 Testing Hypothesis 1b
Hypothesis 1b claims that non-canonical SS marking indicates ‘same topic sit-
uation’. If we want to test for situation-based SS marking, we need to construct
examples that ensure the same topic situation across the clauses, despite the sub-
jects’ reference.
Prediction : If the subjects are disjoint,
and the topic situations are coreferential,
SS marking is obligatory.
It is very difficult to ensure with absolute certainty that the topic situations
are identical, because we lack any overt morphology to tell us except for switch-
reference, which we are testing. However, situations are represented by pronouns,
so this hurdle should be no more difficult to clear than one requiring the judg-
ment of coreference between pronouns— overt or not— that refer to entities. In
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constructing examples, I relied on ordinary properties of anaphora and pragmatic
coherence to create contexts that make it as clear as possible that both clauses are
using the same topic situation.
The following example employs a lead-in translation that tightly links two
events by making them part of a larger event (a powwow). The subjects, young men
and young women, are very distinctly disjoint. We can be confident that the topic
situation is the same, because the context leads up to it, and because the subjects
share a resource situation. The hypothesis predicts SS marking to be available, and
DS marking to be unavailable.
Context:
You went to a powwow recently. Your friend was supposed to come with
you, but couldn’t make it. The next day, you’re on the phone with your
friend, talking about the powwow, and she asks you what people were
doing.
(144) Yáucáuigú
yO´kO´j-gu´
young women
ém
P´˜em−
[3p:rfl]
gún
g´˜un
dance.pf
gàu
gO
and.SS
jóg´¯ud`¯au
to´gu´:-dO:
young men
ém
P´˜em−
[3p:rfl]
d´¯auv`¯aig`¯u
dO´:+pĳa:j-gu:
sing+fight-pf
‘The young women danced and the young men sang.’
The speaker response to the production task shows that SS is available and
preferred, but I did not follow this example with a judgment task to ensure that
DS was unavailable. This example strongly supports hypothesis 1b, but does not
quite confirm it.
The following example does confirm it, because it includes a follow-up judg-
ment:
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Context:
A group of men were seated in a circle. One at a time, the men would
stand up and tell a story or a joke. If two got up at the same time, one
would sit back down; it is rude for two men to speak at the same time.
(145) a. Y´¯ıdè
j´ı:-de
two-nom
én
Pe´n−
[3d:rfl]
kàul´¯ehâ
khO:le´+haˆ:
together+get up.pf
gàu
gO
and.SS
úidè
Pu´j-de
that-bas
èm
Pe˜m−
[3s:rfl]
âuis`¯augà.
Oˆj:+sO:-gjæ
again+sit down-pf
‘Two men stood up together, and one of them sat back down.’
b. #Y´¯ıdè én kàul´¯ehâ nàu úidè èm âuis`¯augà.
In (146), I employ a follow-up context with a production task. The set-up clause
(146) sets up the set of horses as the topic situation of the conjoined clauses that
follow (147a).
The subjects of the two conjoined clauses must differ, since a horse cannot be
both fast and slow. However, the clauses must be judged against the same topic
situation. Otherwise, the reference of the DPs would be unclear, and the follow-
up would be incoherent with the set-up clause. Thus, we can be certain that the
clauses have the same topic situation.
Hypothesis 1b predicts that in such a context, SS marking is good, and DS
marking is bad. This prediction holds. In the original response (147a), SS marking
is offered. A follow-up judgment task confirms that DS marking is unavailable in
that context.
(146) Úi-dè
Pu´j-de
that-bas
q´¯a
¯
h`¯ı
¯
kĳjæh˜ı:
man
chê
¯
gàu
tsˆ˜e:-gO
horse-inv
áu
PO´−
[∅:3i:3s]
âui,
POˆj:
plentiful
‘That man has a lot of horses. . . ’
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(147) a. f´¯a
pa´:
some
á
Pa´−
[3p]
sáui
sO´j
fast
gàu
gO
and.SS
f´¯a
pa´:
some
á
Pa´−
[3p]
sáuibé
sO´jbe´
slow
‘some of them are fast, some of them are slow’
b. #f´¯a á sáui nàu f´¯a á sáuibé
Hypothesis 1b is confirmed. Since Hypothesis 1a was also confirmed, Hy-
pothesis 1 is confirmed. What is called non-canonical switch-reference is actually
situation-tracking switch-reference.
3.4.5 Ruling out alternatives
Before moving on to Hypothesis 2, I will rule out alternatives to Hypothesis 1
by examining other semantic objects (locations, events, times) that one might use
to explain some of the non-canonical cases. Also, I rule out the possibility that
switch-reference is tracking other arguments in the clause.
In a non-situations semantics, semantic objects like times, locations, and poss-
ible worlds provide a lot of contextual restriction. As this subsection explains, the
other types of objects are neither sufficient nor necessary to account for the wide
range of non-canonical switch-reference, especially those that link spatiotempo-
rally disparate events.
In addition, the use of situations greatly simplifies an analysis of non-canonical
switch-reference, because they encompass worlds, times, and locations. Without
situations, we would have to claim that switch-reference tracks all sorts of objects,
depending on the context. It is not clear what mechanism selects one of these
objects on some occasion, but the subject on others.
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3.4.5.1 Controlling for spatiotemporal location
One prediction of Hypothesis 1 is that other semantic objects, like locations or
times, are not sufficient for explaining the use of non-canonical switch-reference.
Oftentimes, situations do correspond to spatiotemporal locations (e.g., last night
in Montreal). However, a situation is simply a part of a possible world, so they are
not limited to spatiotemporal locations. Since any two situations can be summed
together to make a larger situation, a situation’s parts do not even have to be spa-
tiotemporally contiguous (see section 3.3.4). If switch-reference can track situ-
ations and not just times or locations, then situations whose parts are disparate
(i.e., not spatiotemporally contiguous) should be able to be tracked, showing up as
non-canonical switch-reference.
Indeed, the literature contains at least one clear example where location ap-
pears not to matter. Watkins (1993) provides a very interesting example of non-
canonical SS marking. In (148), two subjects are different people, yet SS-marking
may be used.
(148) Kathryn
K.
K.
gà
gjæ-
[3s:3p]
gút
gu´P
write.pf
gàu
gO
and.SS
Estheràl
E.=al
E.=too
gà
gjæ-
[3s:3p]
gút.
gu´P
write.pf
‘Kathryn wrote a letter and Esther wrote one too.’ (Watkins, 1993)
The letter-writings took place in different locales at different times, so it would
not be right to say that there is a spatiotemporally contiguous part of the world
shared by the two events. Instead, Watkins reports her consultant’s impression
that shared purpose is what links these two letter-writings together. The non-
canonical SS-marking would be used when the letters were “written for the same
reason, to the same person, at about the same time." She has more recently con-
firmed (p.c.) that her consultant affirmed the key property is “shared purpose.”
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Under a situations account, we can say that the identical topic situation (s1)
is the sum of the two letter-writing situations (s2) and (s3), that is s1 = s2 + s3.
Perhaps the summing is made to highlight the ‘shared purpose’. I should note
that nothing in the situations framework requires s2 and s3 to be related to each
other. However, von Fintel (2005) has noted that although our logical space allows
any two situations to be summed, observations of natural language usage show
that speakers only sum two situations if there is a coherent relation between them.
Thus, we can rely on pragmatics to ensure that the relation exists, and we can use
fieldwork to understand what kinds of relations are possible.
To rule out spatiotemporal locations, I tested variations of (148) with contexts
that force discontiguity. Ruling out times requires switch-reference that ignores
them; SS appearing despite a time difference, or DS appearing despite simultane-
ity. Ruling out locations requires switch-reference that ignores them; SS appearing
despite a place difference, or DS appearing despite sharing the same space.
The contexts I used were inspired by follow-up comments made by more than
one consultant: One possible scenario would be if Kathryn and Esther were writ-
ing the Governor to pardon a prisoner. The context that leads in to (149) involves
letter-writing events that are hundreds of miles apart on different days. The pro-
duction task resulted in SS marking, and a follow-up judgment affirmed that DS
marking is unavailable.
Context:
Bill is in prison for a crime he didn’t commit. His supporters are sure
that he is innocent, and have started a campaign to convince the gover-
nor to pardon him. As part of this campaign, last week Kathryn wrote
a letter to the governor from her home in Tulsa, asking him to grant a
pardon. Yesterday, Esther wrote a letter to the governor from her home
in Lawton. Today, the chairman of the campaign wants to know what
actions have been taken to get Bill pardoned.
(149) a. Kathryn gà gút gàu Estheràl gà gút.
‘Kathryn wrote a letter and (SS) Esther wrote one too.’
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b. #Kathryn gà gút nàu Estheràl gà gút.
‘Kathryn wrote a letter and (DS) Esther wrote one too.’
This example shows that spatial or temporal contiguity are not necessary for
SS marking.
3.4.5.2 Controlling for arguments
One might object that the context for (149) fails to control for the addressee,
which is the same for both conjuncts. Therefore, it does not definitively show that
SR is tracking the topic situation. This objection is undermined by two observa-
tions. First, there is nothing in either conjunct to indicate the recipient of the letter.
Recipients are marked in the verb agreement, whether an overt DP is used or not.
Second, in no language is switch-reference observed to skip subjects to track an-
other argument of the verb. Just to be sure, I conducted further tests, whose results
show that the identity of the addressee doesn’t matter.
In (150), a lead-in context that followed up (149), the two letters have different
addressees, but SS marking is still felicitous in a similar context.
Context:
What if you are the governor, and Kathryn wrote her letter to you, and
Esther wrote one to your advisor Tom?
(150) Kathryn
K.
y´¯a
[3s:3p:1s]
gút
write.pf
gàu
and.SS
Esther
E
Tom
T
gà
[any:3p:3p]
gút.
write.pf
‘Kathryn wrote me a letter and Esther wrote one to Tom.’ (f.n.)
3.4.6 Situations and plans
The claim that switch-reference can track summed disparate events as topic
situations gains further support by the situations literature. Poesio (1993) shows
that plans are situations by using them as resource situations to restrict uniqueness
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operators in definite descriptions that refer to items identifiable only by their role
in the plan.
In 151, speaker A refers to ‘the truck’, but doesn’t need to know what truck it
will be, or even whether it exists in the actual world (maybe it needs to be built
first). Yet, it is referred to as unique, and carries the existential presupposition that
comes with the, because it is unique in the plan.
(151) (Based on Poesio 1993:5)
A: We have to ship a ton of bananas from Los Angeles to Fresno by Tuesday,
but our delivery people are on strike.
B: No problem. We’ll get a truck, drive it to LA, load up a ton of bananas,
and hurry up to Fresno.
A: Yeah, but who’s gonna drive the truck?
When I asked one consultant about the letter-writing example (148) and the
role of shared purpose, she offered her impression that it was like Kathryn and
Esther were planning something. Then she offered an example (152a), with non-
canonical SS marking, saying it would be fine if you were making a plan. I asked
a follow-up judgment about DS marking in that context. It would not be fine for
that context, but would be fine if you’re simply saying what’s going to happen.
Other consultants made similar judgments.
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(152) a. À
Pa−
[1s]
tháumchànth`¯au
tĳ´˜Om+tsa˜n-tĳO:
first+arrive.pf-mod
gìgáu
gigO´
and.SS:then
náucòm
n´˜O+ko˜m
me+friend
∅−
[3s]
yáugútchànth`¯au
jO´gu´P+tsa˜n-tĳO:
second+arrive.pf-mod
gìgáu
gigO´
and.SS:then
áj`¯a
¯
udè
Pa´+tO˜:+de
his+male’s.sister+his
∅−
[3s]
hônchànth`¯au
hˆ˜o:wn+tsa˜n-tĳO:
last+arrive.pf-mod
‘I’ll get there first and then my friend will get there next and then his
sister will get there last.’
b. À
Pa−
[1s]
tháumchànth`¯au
tĳ´˜Om+tsa˜n-tĳO:
first+arrive.pf-mod
nègáu
ne˜gO´
and.DS:then
náucòm
n´˜O+ko˜m
me+friend
∅−
[3s]
yáugútchànth`¯au
jO´gu´P+tsa˜n-tĳO:
second+arrive.pf-mod
nègáu
ne˜gO´
and.DS:then
áj`¯a
¯
udè
Pa´+tO˜:+de
his+male’s.sister+his
∅−
[3s]
hônchànth`¯au
hˆ˜o:wn+tsa˜n-tĳO:
last+arrive.pf-mod
‘I’ll get there first and then my friend will get there next and then his
sister will get there last.’
A possible objection to the analysis of (152a) involving topic situations is that
the predicates are the same. Since the conjuncts all involve the verb chán ([ts´˜an]),
162
‘arrive,’21 this might be evidence that switch-reference is sensitive to predicates.
To verify the fact that plans are crucial to switch-reference, I attempted to elicit
examples like (153), where the events are of distinct predicates, and take place in
different locations. (153) was perfectly acceptable in a plan-making scenario.22
(153) Carnegiecà
C.-kjæ
Carnegie-at
à
Pa−
[1s]=
th´¯auth`¯au
tĳO´:-tĳO:
stay..pf-mod
gàu
gO
and.SS
ám
P´˜am
you
Normancù
N.-ku
Norman-to
mà
ma˜−
[2d]=
báth`¯au.
ba´:-tĳO:
go..pf-mod
‘I will stay in Carnegie and you two will go to Norman.’
Besides simple plans, Jonathan Bennett 1988 (as reported in von Fintel (2005))
argues that events like multi-day conferences can be held together by coherence,
not spatio-temporal contiguity. Again, definite descriptions diagnose this. Take
the expression ‘the winner’. This denotes the unique person winning a certain
event (The unique winner in s). The event need not be spatio-temporally con-
tiguous. To take a real-life example: In February 2007, a soccer match between
Sevilla and Real Betis of Spain was halted when a Betis fan threw a bottle that hit
the Sevilla coach in the head, rendering him unconscious. The last thirty minutes
were re-scheduled for March, and eventually took place— after both teams played
other matches. Also, it wasn’t held in the original stadium, but in the distant city
of Getafe. No one scored in the second part of the match, but Sevilla was leading
after the first part. Therefore, Sevilla can be and has been rightfully called ‘the
winner’ in s, where s is this non-contiguous match. Imagine they used the same
ball in both parts of the match, and this ball later disappeared. When talking
21The predicates all involve incorporated ordinal adverbials; it does not seem like these form
new lexical items, but that has not been verified.
22Note that the use of an overt subject pronoun (ám) in the second conjunct indicates contrastive
focus, independent of switch-reference.
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about the match one day, you could easily say The game ball (in s) disappeared (in
s’).
Another example of relational coherence, albeit a grim one, involves a scenario
where different resource situations lead to different meanings for the same surface
string. Imagine a conversation between an officer and a subordinate infantryman,
during a pause in battle. The infantryman tells the officer “Everyone’s dead." De-
pending on how the situation is delimited, the contextual domain restriction can
lead to two completely different propositions.
Two divergent scenarios demonstrate this. The first involves spatiotemporal
delimiting. The two soldiers come across a bunker and look inside. The scene is
one of unspeakable carnage. The infantryman says “Everyone’s dead,” referring
to those whose remains lie in the bunker. The bunker at that time provides the
contextual restriction: ∀x. person(x) in s, where s = the bunker at that time.
The other scenario involves some other kind of coherence. Here, the whole
platoon has been slowly wiped out over weeks of fighting across the entire the-
ater of war. All that remains are these two poor fellows. The officer, in a moment
of folly, orders the infantryman to wake the others up to break camp. The in-
fantryman replies "Sir, everyone’s dead." The contextual restriction here cannot be
spatio-temporal, because not only are those who have died not present, but their
deaths took place in no spatio-temporally contiguous or homogenous zone. The
contextual restriction is the platoon; the platoon (or at least the sum of its mem-
bers) is thus a situation.23 This example shows us three points: That the range of
23One might object that the infantryman meant “Everyone (you expect to be) in the present
situation is dead", but I find that objection hard to swallow. It would require the conversation to be
about the people as they are in the mind of the officer, but the proposition is about everyone as they
are in the actual world. An interesting related point is made by McConnell-Ginet (2005). After a
party you can say about the party "not everybody came," where the situation seems to be bigger than
the party itself, because the set of invitees is in this case a superset of the set of attendees. Another
interesting example would be someone who is meeting up with people at a restaurant. She gets
there, but only one other friend has arrived. She could quite felicitously ask “Where is everyone?”
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utterance meaning varies enormously based on resource situations, that resource
situations do not need to be spatio-temporally contiguous, and that non-events
can be situations.
In short, situations need not be spatio-temporally contiguous parts of a poss-
ible world, no matter how they are used: as a topic, event, or resource situation.
Indeed, under the idea that individuals are situations (Kratzer 1989), we should
also expect individuals to have parts that are not spatio-temporally contiguous.
Parts of situations may be linked by relations that merit further investigation, but
which include plans, events, and collectivities of like entities (teams, platoons).
Alternately, we could say that all situations can be linked by relations of coherence,
which include spatial and temporal coherence. Hypothesis 1 ought to serve as a
starting point for in future research of the limit of non-contiguity. How far apart
can two situations be and still be part of a larger situation held fast by coherence?
There should be no logical restriction on joining different situations, but certainly
there would be pragmatic ones, and these may be testable in some way.
3.4.7 A step back from canonicity
To close discussion of Hypothesis 1, let’s examine a terminological consequence
of no small importance. The term non-canonical switch-reference describes the use
of switch-reference that appears to ignore subject co-reference. This led some re-
searchers to question any role for co-reference. However, we have seen that these
uses are explained by co-referentiality of a particular argument in the sentence
besides the subject. That is to say, there is no such thing as non-canonical switch-
reference, only non-canonical pivots.
Setting aside the ironic use of the universal quantifier, the restriction is still interesting: The people
need not be related by any place or time, but at least by some relational coherence (maybe being
invited). Perhaps a mix of all three.
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Therefore, from now on, I will employ the term non-canonical (NCSR) only to
describe observed tokens of switch-reference that seem to ignore subjects, when
not making a claim about its underlying cause. I will use the term situation-
tracking (Sit-SR) to describe the actual type of switch-reference morpheme that
is proposed. According to Hypothesis 1, Sit-SR accounts for NCSR.
I will use canonical switch-reference (SR) in referring to observed tokens of
switch-reference that seem to track subjects, when not making a claim about its
underlying cause. I will use the term subject-tracking (Subj-SR) to describe the
actual type of switch-reference morpheme proposed.
This shift in terminology is important because it benefits us in two ways. First,
it prevents confusion between the observations made in the literature and the pro-
posal made in this dissertation. Second, it allows for the notion that non-canonical
SR and situation-tracking SR are not necessarily in a one-to-one relationship.
3.4.8 A crucial nonambiguity
Earlier, in section 3.1.5, I pointed out that switch-reference canonicity is not
always obvious. In terms of Hypothesis 1, it is not always evident from a sentence
in isolation whether switch-reference is tracking subjects or topic situations. Here
is the example I used:
(109) Dè
de−
[1s:rfl]
hâ
haˆ
stand up.pf
gàu
gO
and.SS
à
Pa−
[1s]
tép.
the´p
exit.pf
‘I stood up and I left.’
I implied that sentences like 109 are ambiguous because it could be canoni-
cal or non-canonical. That is, it could be Sit-SR or Subj-SR. However, there isn’t
really an ambiguity. In any context, consultants allowed one and not the other.
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Furthermore, we saw that in every case, the situation-tracking was preferred to
the subject-tracking. We can generalize this observation.
Generalization about situation-tracking SR: In every case where we
expect sit-SR to appear, it does.
Put another way, if switch-reference can track situations, it does. This gen-
eralization leads us to an interesting conclusion about switch-reference on co-
ordination combining two matrix clauses. All matrix clauses have a referential
topic situation. Thus, switch-reference on sentential coordination should always
be situation-tracking. If it is ever subject-tracking, some structure must exist to
make the topic situation invisible. However, no such structure is known to ex-
ist, and there is no other evidence to propose one. As a result, we can conclude
that switch-reference with coordination is always situation-tracking, whether it
appears canonical or non-canonical. This conclusion leads us to the second hy-
pothesis of this chapter.
3.5 Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 proposes a link between the type of sentential connective switch-
reference is found on and the type of the pivot it tracks. It consists of two sub-
hypotheses, one for coordinating conjunctions and one for subordinating connec-
tives.
Hypothesis 2: The type of clause juncture where switch-reference is found
determines the type of switch-reference pivot tracked.
• Hypothesis 2a: Switch-reference on coordinating conjunctions only tracks
topic situations
• Hypothesis 2b: Switch-reference on subordinating connectives only tracks
subjects
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At the end of the previous subsection, I logicked my way to Hypothesis 2, but
empirical tests are required to demonstrate it with certainty.
3.5.1 Testing Hypothesis 2a
Hypothesis 2a claims that switch-reference with coordination tracks topic sit-
uations and not subjects. We know from the previous section that tracking topic
situations is possible, so to confirm this hypothesis we need to rule out subject-
tracking. We also saw that switch-reference does not track other semantic objects–
it tracks either topic situations or subjects.
The strongest way to confirm Hypothesis 2a is a reduction argument against
the possibility of subject-tracking. I will form a straw-man hypothesis and demon-
strate its impossibility. This hypothesis I will dub Hypothesis X:
Hypothesis X :
Switch-reference on coordinating conjunctions can track subjects.
What’s crucial about Hypothesis X is that if it is true, Hypothesis 2a must be
false, and if it is false, the second Hypothesis 2a must be true. If Hypothesis X
holds, we should find examples with co-referent subjects and different topic situ-
ations, where SS marking is obligatory and DS marking is infelicitous.
The thing is, we’ve already run this test — these are same conditions we used
to test Hypothesis 1a! There, we were testing for situation-tracking DS marking,
and we found it occurring every time. Here is another example, as a reminder.
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Context:
Your friend sees a group of young men at a fair, but doesn’t recognize
them. She asks you what they have been doing in the events.
(154) Kídêl
kh´ıdeˆl
yesterday
jóg`¯udàu
to´gu:-dO
young man-inv
ét
Pe´P−
[3i:rfl]
gúnhêl
g´˜un-heˆl
dance.pf-evid
nàu
nO˜
and.DS
´¯e
¯
h´¯audèkì
´˜e:hO:dekhi
today
ét
Pe´P−
[3i:rfl]
d´¯auvàidèhèl.
d´¯O+pĳaj-de-hel
sing+fight-pf-evid
‘ The young men danced yesterday, and they sang today.’ (f.n.)
(155) (with SS marking) #Kídêl jóg`¯udàu ét gún gàu ´¯e
¯
h´¯audèkì ét d´¯auvàidèhèl.
To test for subject-tracking DS marking, we need examples with disjoint sub-
jects and identical topic situations, where DS marking is obligatory and SS mark-
ing is infelicitous.
We have already run this test as well— these are the same conditions we used
to test Hypothesis 1b. There, we were testing for situation-tracking SS marking,
and we found it occurring every time. Here is another example, as a reminder.
Context:
Someone asks you Hágá chê
¯
gàu è tôyà?, “Where are the horses?", you
reply:
(156) a. F´¯a
pa´:
some
són
s´˜on
grass
gà
gjæ−
[3p:3s]
f´¯auyàu
pO´-jO
eat-impf
gàu
gO
and.SS
f´¯a
fa´:
some
t´¯o
tho´:
water
gà
gjæ−
[3p:3s]
tôm`¯au.
tˆ˜o:-mO˜:
drink-impf
‘Some are eating grass and some are drinking water.’
b. (with DS marking) #F´¯a són gà f´¯auyàu nàu f´¯a t´¯o gà tôm`¯au.
Neither prediction of Hypothesis X holds, and neither could possibly hold, be-
cause we saw that whenever situation-tracking could occur, it does. Hypothesis X
is falsified, confirming Hypothesis 2a.
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3.5.2 Testing Hypothesis 2b
Hypothesis 2b claims that switch-reference with subordinating connectives
tracks subjects, not topic situations. We saw in Chapter 2 that it can track sub-
jects, so to confirm this hypothesis we need to rule out situation-tracking. We also
saw that switch-reference can only track subjects, (technically, the highest nominal
argument), not any argument below them.
A simple attempt to test Hypothesis 2b is to look for non-canonical switch-
reference with subordination. Since, by Hypothesis 1, any example of non-canon-
ical SR is situation-tracking, finding it here would falsify Hypothesis 2b.
I found early on that non-canonical SR in subordination is unavailable in sim-
ple elicitation. Given a translation task, the speakers would invariably use canon-
ical SR (157a). For the follow-up judgment task, the speakers would swiftly and
strongly reject non-canonical SR (157b).
(157) ‘When Kathryn wrote a letter, Esther wrote one, too.’
a. Kathryn
K.
K.
gà
gjæ−
[3s:3p]
gút`¯e
¯
gu´P=e˜:
write.pf=when.DS
Estheràl
E.=al
E.=also
gà
gjæ−
[3s:3p]
gút
gu´P
write.pf
b. *Kathryn
K.
K.
gà
gjæ−
[3s:3p]
gútch`¯e
¯
gu´P=tse˜:
write.pf=when.SS
Estheràl
E.=al
E.=also
gà
gjæ−
[3s:3p]
gút
gu´P
write.pf
With coordination, speakers would generally accept the non-canonical follow-up
in these contextless environments, though sometimes with hesitation. What we’ve
seen suggests that context plays a role in SR with coordination, but not with sub-
ordination. Still, we want to test Hypothesis 2b, and the best way to be certain
is a reduction argument. The hypothesis used for this case I will dub Hypothe-
sis Y. Crucially, if Hypothesis Y is true, Hypothesis 2b is false, and if it is false,
Hypothesis 2b is true.
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Hypothesis Y :
Switch-reference on subordinating connectives can track topic situa-
tions.
The test conditions for situation-tracking SS are clauses with disjoint subjects
and coreferent topic situations, where SS marking is obligatory and DS marking
is infelicitous. These conditions are not quite possible, however, because the topic
situations in a when-clause must differ from that of its matrix clause. Yet, although
the topic situations must differ they are still related, at least by matching (Roth-
stein 1995). Thus, we can create contexts where the link between the situations is
tight, perhaps tight enough to lead to an SS marking.
In (158), the context describes a scenario where two actions are tightly linked,
and the subjects differ.24 As predicted, DS marking is obligatory.
Context:
A group of men were seated in a circle. One at a time, the men would
stand up and tell a story or a joke. Imagine there is a rule where if two
men stand up, one has to sit down. A friend has asked you about this
rule, and you are explaining it to her.
(158) Y´¯ıdè
j´ı:-de
two-nom
én
Pe´n−
[3d:rfl]
kàul´¯ehâj`¯au`¯e
¯
,
khO:le´+haˆ:-tO:=e˜:
together+get up.pf-mod=when.DS
hágá
ha´gjæ´
time\indef
èm
Pe˜m−
[3s:rfl]
âuis`¯auj`¯au.
Oˆj:+sO:-tO:
again+sit down.pf-mod
‘If two men stand up, one has to sit back down.’25
(159) #Y´¯ıdè én kàul´¯ehâj`¯auch`¯e
¯
, hágá èm âuis`¯auj`¯au.
‘If two men stand up (SS), one has to sit back down.’
24One subject referent includes the other; in Kiowa inclusion is canonically DS marked.
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The test conditions for situation-tracking DS are clauses with coreferent sub-
jects and disjoint topic situations, where DS marking is obligatory and SS mark-
ing is infelicitous. As noted before, the topic situations of the when-clause must
differ, though they are still related. Nevertheless, SS marking is required, as the
production-then-judgment task in (160) shows.
(160) a. Travis
T.
T.
Carnegiecà
C.-kjæ
C-in
∅−
[3s]
th´¯auch`¯e
¯
,
tĳO´:=tse˜:
stay=when.SS
hàun
h´˜On
not
Énéd´¯aukòcà
e´ne´dO:ko-kjæ
A.-in
∅−
[3s]
d´¯aumâu.
dO´:-mˆ˜O:
be-neg
‘When Travis stays in Carnegie, he isn’t in Anadarko.’
b. Travis Carnegiecà th´¯au`¯e
¯
, hàun Énéd´¯aukòcà d´¯aumâu.
‘When Travis stays in Carnegie (DS), he isn’t in Anadarko.’
Neither prediction of Hypothesis Y holds; it is therefore falsified, confirming
Hypothesis 2b. Since we have confirmed Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b, we
have confirmed Hypothesis 2.
3.5.3 Summary of findings
To summarize the findings of this chapter: The phenomenon described as ‘non-
canonical switch-reference’ is explained by the ordinary tracking of the reference
of the topic situations of the joined clauses, rather than their subjects. Situation-
tracking is not limited to obviously non-canonical examples, but instead occurs
whenever switch-reference appears with coordinating conjunctions. On the other
hand, subject-tracking remains for subordinating switch-reference. That is, con-
figuration type determines pivot type.
I am confident that Hypothesis 1 and 2a apply cross-linguistically, but Hypoth-
esis 2b requires further investigation. The apparent lack of any clear cases of sub-
25The target contains ‘if’, but as in English, the use of ‘when’ (=ch`¯e
¯
/`¯e
¯
) with a conditional sense is
common in Kiowa, and the sessions where I elicited these examples revolved around =ch`¯e
¯
/`¯e
¯
.
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ordinating switch-reference tracking situations suggests that Hypothesis 2b might
apply well beyond Kiowa. However, subordinating switch-reference in Kiowa
occurs only with intensional adverbial clauses; other clause types lack switch-
reference. In other languages, these other types would have to be tested in the
course of future investigations.
3.6 Apparent subject-tracking
The confirmation of Hypothesis 2 has an important consequence: Canonical
switch-reference is not always subject-tracking. Any apparent subject-tracking
may be coincidental. However, apparent subject-tracking is so common that we
should not leave it unexplained. We must understand why coordinating switch-
reference seems to track subjects so often if it always tracks topic situations.
The answer to this question lies in the observation that topic situations are
often tied to subjects through domain restriction. Apparent subject-tracking in
switch-reference arises when two factors converge. First, the subject’s resource
situation is tied to the clause’s topic situation, and second, the subject’s resource
situation is co-extensive with the DP.
3.6.1 Co-extensive domain restriction
Subjects, like any DP, contain a resource situation pronoun that restricts the
interpretation of its determiner or quantifier. This pronoun can be anaphoric to
a situation, or tied via binding to the clauses’ topic situation.26 For instance, in
(161), B’s reply is made about the party (here, situation s1), and its topic situation
is s1. The subject’s resource situation is also the s1, giving ‘everyone at the party
had a good time at the party.’
26Schwarz (2009) proposes a mechanism to effect this tying by an operator (Σ), based on an idea
by Büring (2004), that binds the resource situation and calls for the topic situation. The exact
mechanism need not concern us here.
173
(161) A: How was the party?
B: (s1) [Everyone (s1) had a good time.]
Sometimes, a domain restricting situation co-extends to the individual or set
of indivduals being picked out by the quantifier or determiner. For instance, let’s
think back to this party. At the party, A gives B a list of people to introduce them-
self to: C,D,E,F, and G. An hour later, A checks in on how B is doing with the
list.
(162) B: I managed to meet everyone.
Depending on the resource situation, (162) can mean many things. But here, it
is the group of people on the list. Let us call this group the situation s2. Since s2 is
C,D,E,F, and G, and ’everyone in s2’ is C, D, E, F, and G, the situation and the DP
are co-extensive.
Co-extension works with referential DPs as well. Elbourne (2005) demonstrates
that even proper names are equivalent to definite descriptions. That is, the name
Travismeans ‘the Travis’. Definite descriptions come with domain restricting situ-
ations, and this can be co-extensive with the individual. That is, Travis can often
mean something like ‘the guy named Travis in the Travis situation’.
(163) !Travis " = ιx. Travis(x)(s2), where s2 = Travis
This notion might seem counter-intuitive at first, but it is quite reasonable. For
one thing, individuals are in the set of situations Kratzer (1989), so the notion of a
Travis situation should not be far-fetched.27 For another, a co-extensive situation
27Granted, the difficulty in envisaging just what something like a ‘Travis situation’ is has led
many to consider the notion of individual situations far-fetched. But if a situation is a part of a
possible world, and any individual is part of a possible world, any individual must be a situation.
It might not be absolutely possible to say with certainty what parts of an individual count and what
don’t, but the same can be said about entities, locations, events, times, or any other semantic object.
That is to say, a little blurriness is a feature of natural language, not a bug, as frustrating as it is for
those who try to formalize it.
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is the most informative domain restriction possible, and it ensures a unique refer-
ent with the property described. Also, the use of a co-extensive resource situation
requires the listener to be familiar with that situation, reinforcing the presupposi-
tion of a definite determiner.
3.6.2 Co-extension and apparent subject-tracking
Switch-reference can appear canonical when it is tracking a topic situation tied
to (i.e., corefers with) the subject’s resource situation, and that situation is co-
extensive with the subject. In (164), the subjects differ in reference, so the canoni-
cal DS marking seems to be subject-tracking. However, according to Hypothesis 2,
this is situation tracking.
(164) John came in and-DS Bill sat down.
What I propose is that switch-reference is tracking a topic situation that co-
refers to a co-extensive subject domain restrictor. The paraphrase of the name
John in (164) is ‘the unique individual in s1 whose name is John’ The paraphrase
of the name Bill in (164) is ‘the unique individual in s2 whose name is Bill. Since
the ‘John situation’ (s1) is disjoint from the ‘Bill situation’ (s2) DS marking appears.
The fact that these descriptions end up referring to different people is coincidental.
(165) s1 [ [ John (s1) ] came in ] and-DS s2 [ [ Bill (s2) ] sat down.]
Under this account, what appears to be subject-tracking with coordination is in
fact tracking of a co-extensive resource situation. Canonical switch-reference ap-
pears to be subject-tracking so often because we generally refer to people we know
by name by using their co-extensive resource situation, which is the most infor-
mative. Exceptions occur when some other situation is more salient, and the indi-
vidual’s role in that situation is a more pertinent or reliable identification method
than simply using a co-extensive situation.
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3.6.3 Co-extensive resource situations in narration
In narratives, switch-reference usually seems to indicate a change in subject
within a single episode. This effect is most marked in long stretches of sentences
with pro-drop subjects, where only switch-reference lets the listener understand
who’s doing what without relying on context.
The following example illustrates this, though it isn’t so long. It is an excerpt
from a narrative describing the aftermath of the Kiowa raid on a wagon train,
where federal marshals were rounding up Kiowa leaders, including Big Tree. Each
clause has a different subject, and DS marking appears with each switch-reference
marker.
(166) Nègáu
and.DS:then
áuph`¯au
toward(the store) [3s?]
h´¯aféhèl
charge:pf.evid
nàu
and:DS
èm
[3s:refl]
càuétkùlhèl
fear:flee:pf.evid
— ´¯Adàuiét—
-Big Tree-
nègáui28
and.DS:then:[3i:3s]
àlhèl
chase.pf:evid
áuph`¯au
that way
´¯adò
¯
m
woods:under
‘And then they charged at it and he fled in fear, Big Tree. And then they
chased him that way into the woods’
If topic situations corresponded solely to episodes (Lungstrum 1995), we would
expect SS marking within long strings like (166) no matter what the subject. We
can drop that notion, of course. But even if topic situations do not correspond to
the episodes of the narrative (not exclusively, at least), they can still correspond to
situations co-extensive to the subjects of the clauses.
This correspondence suggests that speakers use topic situations differently in
narration than in conversation. This suggestion is not altogether surprising; in
28Nègáui is a fluent-speech contraction of nàu hègáu è=, ‘and.DS then [3i:3s]’.
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conversation, topic situations have a relationship to the question under discus-
sion, but in narration, there is rarely such a question. Thus, when it is clear that
the episode is being maintained, co-extensive topic situations can be used to em-
phasize the change in ‘camera angle’ from one story participant to the next.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed and proposed an explanation for the phe-
nomenon known as non-canonical switch-reference. Switch-reference in these
cases is tracking the joined clauses’ topic situations, rather than their subjects.
Otherwise it seems to behave normally. Furthermore, the testing used to verify
this proposal leads to another: All switch-reference on coordinating conjunctions
tracks topic situations rather than subjects.
This account provides an account for the phenomenon, where effects related to
coherence are derived from the object of reference-tracking. It rests upon a seman-
tic object whose existence has been thoroughly and independently demonstrated
in the semantics literature.
A welcome consequence of this proposal is that it informs us about topic situ-
ations as well. It provides the first clear evidence of morphology reflecting topic
situation reference, and offers a reliable way of testing for topic situations, at least
in languages with switch-reference.
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CHAPTER 4
A THEORY OF SWITCH-REFERENCE
The previous two chapters expanded our understanding of switch-reference,
as well as ruled out the two major theories previously proposed to account for it.
This chapter will propose a new theory. Section 4.1 will outline the facts and lay
the theoretical groundwork for the proposal.
4.1 Preliminaries
This section will summarize the facts that need to be accounted for, the com-
ponents of a theory of switch-reference, and the theoretical assumptions that form
the foundation of the proposal.
4.1.1 Generalizations
Any theory of switch-reference must account for the generalizations that I have
compiled over the previous two chapters.
1. SR morphemes are introduced by a specific functional head in the extended
verbal projection.
2. SR morphology is found at clause junctures, always in the clause with the
connective, and only once per clause.
3. SR morphemes are not cross-linguistically restricted by type of clause con-
nective.
4. Switch-reference tracks topic situations with coordinating conjunctions.
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5. Switch-reference tracks subjects with subordinating connectives.
The theory presented in this chapter will account for the first pair of facts by
the placement of switch-reference in the syntactic structure. It will account for
facts four and five through the interaction of the SR-introducing head with the
semantics of clauses. The third fact is derived lexically.
4.1.2 Desiderata
Any theory of switch-reference has four basic components or desiderata. In this
subsection, I will summarize their major questions they raise and how I propose to
account for them. I present them here one by one, but in this chapter they will be
discussed out of order, since the exposition will follow the derivational structure.
4.1.2.1 The nature of the SR morpheme
What kind of object is the SR morpheme? What syntactic category is it in?
What is its semantics? How do these predict its distribution? This question has
already been addressed to some extent, though not completely.
I propose that the SR morpheme is a pronominal, introduced by a functional
head (SR◦) in the extended verbal projection. It sits above inflectional heads and
below (other) complementizer heads, and introduces a relation of identity or dis-
jointness between two arguments, its pronominal one, which it introduces, and
another one, which it calls for.
4.1.2.2 Pivot selection
How does the SR morpheme select its pivot? How can we derive the pivot type
(situation or subject) and the configurational effect?
The SR◦ head selects its pivot indirectly. It bears an unvalued index feature that
is valued by the highest index beneath it. This results in a λ-abstraction such that
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SR◦ binds that index variable and results in a property. The pivot can be defined
as the object that saturates the property created by binding at SR◦.
4.1.2.3 Anti-pivot selection
How does the SR morpheme select its anti-pivot?
SR bears an index feature which gets interpreted as a pronoun in the SR rela-
tion. The C◦ head has an unvalued SR feature that gets valued by the SR feature
on SR◦. This valuation requires co-indexation, so the C◦ binds the pronoun at SR◦.
This creates a property that adjoins to the dominant clause. The anti-pivot can be
defined as the object that saturates the property created by binding at C◦.
4.1.2.4 Anaphoric relation
What kind of relation links the pivot and anti-pivot? How can we derive a
reading of co-reference or disjointness?
My proposal is that the relation is encoded in the meaning of SR. This avoids
the problems of relying on the Binding Theory to do the work, and allows for an
account of some purported cases of cross-linguistic variation in switch-reference
systems.
4.1.3 Theoretical Foundations
I assume a common syntactic theory following the Minimalist Program (Chom-
sky 1995, 2001), and a possibilistic situations semantics along the lines of (Kratzer
1989, 2007), which I discuss in section 3.3.3. Any relevant details, changes, or
developments will be discussed when they are necessary.
The theory of switch-reference I will propose depends on three major com-
ponents of the grammar, from whose interactions the effects of switch-reference
emerge. Feature valuation, binding, and A-semantics I will discuss each of these
in turn, and they will lead to the theory presented in the two subsequent sections.
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4.1.3.1 Features in syntax and semantics
Syntactic features and their interpretation play a major role in this proposal, so
it is important to lay out the syntactic and semantic properties of features that will
underpin this proposal.
I adopt Pesetsky & Torrego (2007)’s conclusion that the interpretability of syn-
tactic features is independent of their valuation, contra Chomsky (1995, 2001).
Unvalued features, once valued, can be interpretable. I also adopt their use of fea-
ture sharing as the result of an Agree operation.1 When a goal feature values a
probe feature on another head, both heads end up with the goal feature.
Agree (feature sharing version) Pesetsky & Torrego (2007)
(i) An unvalued feature F (a probe) on a head H at syntactic location α
(Fα) scans its c-command domain for another instance of F (a goal)
at location β (Fβ) with which to agree.
(ii) Replace Fα with Fβ so that the same feature is present in both lo-
cations.
The final assumption that I make concerning features is that indices are rep-
resented in the syntax by index features, rather than by some independent index-
assigning mechanism. The use of feature indices has proven directly or indirectly
useful in several accounts (Kratzer 2004, 2009; Adger & Ramchand 2005). No-
tably, it allows for constraints on co-reference and binding to be recast in terms
of already well-established locality constraints on Agree. Also, it further cements
the link between the syntax and the semantics, because these index features are
interpreted with the same mechanism as other features.
1Kratzer (2009), whose binding model I employ here, employs a feature unification model,
which is somewhat stronger. It seems to work just as well for switch-reference as feature sharing
does, but since feature sharing is more widely accepted, I will employ that to minimize potentially
contentious assumptions.
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In the semantics, these index features are interpreted like indices already are.
Heim & Kratzer (1998) demonstrate that indices are interpreted either as variables
or as variable binders. As variables, they can be semantically bound, or unbound.
If unbound, their interpretation depends on the assignment function, as shown by
the Pronouns and Traces Rule (167). As binders, they denote λ-operators that bind
variables. Since we will focus on entities and situations, I provide the interpreta-
tion rule for each.
(167) Pronouns and Traces Rule (Heim & Kratzer 1998), adapted for situations.
For any assignment g and index feature [n]. . .
! x[n] "g = g(n) : e! s[n] "g = g(n) : s
4.1.3.2 The binding mechanism
The account I propose here relies on binding, but not the Binding Theory it-
self. Instead, it relies on a mechanism for binding that links syntactic binding
with semantic binding. Syntactic binding occurs when two constituents are co-
indexed, and one c-commands the other. In that case, the dominant constituent is
the antecedent of the lower one (168a). Semantic binding occurs when an index
is bound by an operator adjoined to the sister of the antecedent, and interpreted
with respect to it rather than the assignment function (168b). Crucially, the two
are related. Heim & Kratzer (1998) show that every instance of semantic binding
corresponds to an instance of syntactic binding, and vice versa.
(168) Correspondence between syntactic and semantic binding (for any index n).
a.
XPn . . .
Yn . . .
b.
XP
λn . . .
n . . .
182
Another important aspect of the bindingmechanism is the source of the binder.
Recently, it has been shown that the binders are not (necessarily) the antecedents
themselves, but the functional heads that call for them (Adger & Ramchand 2005;
Kratzer 2009). Semantic binders correspond to functional heads, and since seman-
tic binding corresponds to syntactic binding, the true source of syntactic binding
is the functional head.
The binding mechanism proposed by Kratzer (2009) derives binding rather
simply. In a sentence like I blame myself, the reflexive object is bound not by the
subject John, but by v◦. The object is a minimal pronoun, which comes with no
φ-features of its own, only an index feature. The v◦ head is co-indexed with it.
This creates a binding structure (169a), so the head is interpreted as a λ-operator.
This operator is adjoined to the complement of v◦ at LF (169b).
(169) a.
v◦[n] VP
V◦
blame
DP
∅[n]
b.
v◦
λ[n] VP
V◦
blame
[n]
This has an effect on the semantics of the VP. The result is a relation between
entities and event situations (171).2 This relation combines with the relation in-
troduced by v◦ via Predicate Conjunction. Thus, the agent will also be the object
when it is merged in [Spec, vP] (172a), and composed by Functional Application
(172b).
(170) ! v◦ " = λxλs. agent(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
2I use the term event situation to describe situations that are used as Davidsonian arguments
to verbal predicates.
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(171) λxλs. blame(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λn λs. blame(g(n))(s) : 〈s, t〉
blame : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λxλs. blame(x)(s)
g(n)
(172) a. vP
DP
I v◦
λ[n] VP
blame [n]
b. vP : 〈s, t〉
λs. agent(I)(s) & blame(I)(s)
I : e λxλs. agent(x)(s) & blame(x)(s)
: 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
v◦ : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λxλs. agent(x)(s)
(171) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λxλs. blame(x)(s)
The minimal pronoun would then receive its φ-features from its binder via
feature transmission. This is how it gets interpreted as referring to the speaker,
even though it is bound. Kratzer proposes a couple of mechanisms to derive this
feature transmission, but they are tangential to this discussion, which relies only
on the functional head-based binding mechanism. This binding mechanism will
serve us throughout the analysis.
Another binding head is C◦. The C◦ head is indexed, and binds a pronoun
to create a property. This process, or ones like it, have been proposed for many
sorts of complementizer heads. I will discuss these heads and the relevance of this
process for switch-reference in section 4.1.3.3. It is not immediately clear exactly
which functional heads can bind and which cannot. Kratzer shows that at least
v◦ and C◦ can, and suggests (tentatively) that no others can. I will propose that
184
SR◦ is a binder, and that B◦, the coordinator, can bind as well, since they are in the
CP-layer. Pivot selection and anti-pivot selection will involve binding structures.
4.1.3.3 Semantics of A-pronouns
At first glance, this proposal of anti-pivot selection seems to resemble that pro-
posed by Finer (1984), in that there is a pronoun in the A-level that is interpreted
based on binding. However, the current proposal is actually very different, in three
ways: The pronoun refers to the anti-pivot, not the pivot; the A-semantics resem-
bles that found with other embeddings; and the binding is indirect.
These differences are crucial— recall in Chapter 2 that I pointed out the syn-
tactic and empirical problems with the Binding Approach, while alluding to its
semantic problems. Now that we have a sense of the semantic facts needing an
account, we can see these problems. The Binding Approach has been borrowed
and adapted in a number of later accounts of switch-reference, but all of these
are based on the syntax alone: the question of their interpretation does not come
up. Yet it is crucial. If we examine the semantics of Finer’s account, we see that
it has three problems ensuring that it does not and cannot work as an analysis of
switch-reference.
For one thing, it is not clear what a discontinuous T◦/C◦ constituent would
mean. We can perhaps get around that problem by assuming that C◦ and T◦ are
distinct constituents in some kind of agreement relation with each other that re-
quires co-indexation. If that assumption is true, the co-indexation would create a
binding structure, where the index on C◦ is interpreted as a λ-operator binding the
index on T◦. This interpretation is problematic because it closes off the indexed C◦
from being bound by the dominant C◦, or by anything at all.
The second problem relates to the semantics of A-pronouns. An A-pronoun
is a pronoun in a non-argument position (in the CP-layer) that is in a dependency
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relationship with a variable below it. This relationship comes about throughmove-
ment or base-generation, but these are interpreted identically: A λ-binder binds
the variable, creating a property through Predicate Abstraction. The A-pronoun
then saturates the property. The source of the binder index is not settled in the
literature, but the theory of binding assumed here provides a clear one: C◦ is a
binder.
Finer’s theory is incompatible with this standard view of A-semantics in three
ways. First, if there is an A-pronoun, it isn’t at C◦, but at [Spec, CP]. This minor
fault is easily repaired. The second incompatibility is more serious: In the seman-
tics, there is no semantic distinction between A-binding and A-binding, so this
pronoun will be bound by any co-indexed binder above it.To put this in terms of
the binding theory assumed here: Nothing prevents v◦ from binding this pronoun,
rather than the dominant C◦ as Finer predicts.
The third problem is the most serious: Simply put, it’s the wrong pronoun. If
there is an A-pronoun involved in switch-reference, it must co-refer (directly or
indirectly) to the anti-pivot, not the pivot. We can see this clearly by looking at a
later theory of switch-reference that avoids the first two problems.
Mürvet Enç (1989) proposes a theory of switch-reference as part of a broader
theory on binding and pronouns. Her investigation begins with the phenomenon
of disjoint anaphors in Dogrib (Saxon 1984). The disjoint anaphor ye requires an
antecedent, but cannot co-refer with it (173). Lacking an antecedent (174), the use
of ye is ungrammatical.
(173) John
John1
ye-hk’è
DA-3:shoot
ha
fut
‘John1 is going to shoot him*1/2.’
(174) *eekhani
this way
ye-enda
DA-3:survive
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‘He lives this way’
Enç’s proposes that this pronoun is related to two indices, one of which binds
it while the other licenses it. The binder is an A-operator (Opn), and the licenser
is an A-argument that must be its antecedent. In (173), ye is licensed by John, but
bound by Op1.
(175) Op1 [ John2 [ ye1 shoot ] ]
The need for an A-binder and a licenser are specified by features, [+BA] and
[+L], respectively. Importantly, there is a third feature on the pronoun, [±ID],
which specifies whether the binder and licenser co-refer. For the disjoint anaphor,
this feature is [−ID]. Since the pronoun is bound by the operator, it will always
co-refer to it. However, the operator is disjoint from the licenser, so the pronoun
is disjoint from its antecedent. This derives the disjoint anaphor morphology in
(173):
(176) Op1 [ John2 [ ye[+BA,+L,−ID] shoot ] ]
This analysis is easily extended to switch-reference. Enç assumes that SR is
a pronoun on T◦, which gets its index from its specifier, the subject. T◦ bears a
[+BA] feature, so it is locally A-bound, by Op1 in [Spec, CP]. It also bears a [+L]
feature, so it needs an A-licenser. This licenser must be specified as non-local, thus
avoiding the problem of needing an A-antecedent in the dominant clause. If the
ID feature is [+ID], SS marking appears. If it is [−ID], DS marking appears. Here
is an example of this with DS marking.
(177) nya-isvar-m
when-sing-DS
i:ma-k
dance-tns
‘When he1 sang, he2 danced (Mojave, Langdon & Munro (1979))
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(178) TP
he2
XP
CP
Op1
C◦
When
TP
he1
T◦1
[+L,+BA,−ID]
AspP
sang
XP
danced
T◦2
Enç’s theory of SR takes into account the presence of an A-operator at the CP
level, rather than a simple pronoun. In doing so, she provides some valuable in-
sight about the semantics of switch-reference. The involvement of A-binding re-
quires the SR-pronoun to be below C◦, as the current account proposes, rather than
at C◦ as Finer proposes. It thus obviates the problem of a discontinuous T◦/C◦ con-
stituent. Also, the SR-pronoun has two arguments (its binder and its licenser), and
it links them by a relation of identity or disjointness.
However, this theory does not get around the third problem with the semantics
of Finer’s account.3 For Enç, the operator in CP is a pronoun. However, current
3There are also many reasons why Enç’s broader theory of binding and pronouns is ultimately
untenable. To wit: The full account of pronouns requires the implausible assumption must pro-
pose that every pronoun is bound. Even ‘free’ pronominals are bound by an Opn at the root of their
clause. Also, if we convert the binding operators to λ-binders, they lose the ability to be bound
further. In addition, the licenser of the SR-marked T◦ requires some condition to make its own
specifier invisible to it, to ensure non-local licensing. Finally, it has the same empirical shortcom-
ings as Finer’s account, since it was meant as a theoretical improvement upon it. These problems I
will just mention here.
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understanding of A-phenomena is that the operator is a binder, and an A-pronoun
saturates the property that results from the binding. Thus, the structure of (178)
should have the following LF: C◦ is co-indexed with T◦, creating a binding struc-
ture. The index is interpreted as a λ-operator that binds the variable index on T◦.
Assuming, as before, that A-binding is simply binding from C◦, we get the struc-
ture in (179). This binding structure is interpreted as an abstraction, resulting in
a property (λx. . . . x . . . ).
(179)
C◦1 . . .
T◦1 . . .
→
λ1 . . .
1 . . .
We cannot insert a pivot pronoun to saturate this property. It would trigger
binding problems, since there is no semantic distinction between A-binding and
A-binding. The subject in [Spec, TP] intervenes between C◦ and T◦. If the subject
is pronominal, we should get condition B effects, and if it is a full DP, we should
get condition C effects. Also, we still have no semantics for the relationship of
the licenser of T◦. If that relationship involves binding, we run afoul of locality
constraints. We can conclude that there is not a pronoun inserted at [Spec, CP].
The CP must be interpreted as a property.
A property-expressing CP is actually very welcome, because evidence from
many phenomena converges on the observation that embedded clauses express
properties. Propositions in general have been shown to be properties of possible
worlds (Lewis 1979) or of situations (Kratzer 1989, 2002). Attitude clauses of dif-
ferent sorts have been shown to be properties of attitude holders (Lewis 1979) in de
se attitudes, a general res argument in de re attitudes (of which de se is a special case,
see Chierchia (1989); Kratzer (2006)), a property of relative head nouns (Kratzer
2009), or properties of content nouns (Moulton 2009). Conditional clauses are
(quantified over) properties of worlds. Relative clauses are properties of their head
nouns if externally headed (Heim & Kratzer 1998; Kratzer 2009), or properties of
189
situations if internally headed (Kim 2004). Adverbial clauses express properties
of times, or events (Johnston (1994); Rothstein (1995)). In a situations semantics,
we can say that adverbial clauses are properties of situations. In short, all sorts of
types of embedded clauses express properties, so it should come as no surprise if
SR-marked clauses do, as well.4
The propertization of the CPs emerges either out of an unsaturated argument
or binding fromC◦. The problem for Enç (and Finer) is that all of these phenomena
are interpreted in the same way: The property is ascribed to an argument in the
dominant clause. If SR involves A-binding, it involves binding from C◦ of an SR-
pronoun, which creates a property that will be ascribed to an argument in the
dominant clause. By definition, such an argument is an anti-pivot, not a pivot
(section 2.1.3). Therefore, any pronoun introduced by switch-reference and bound
by C◦ must be the anti-pivot argument of the switch-reference relation, not the
pivot argument. Finer, Enç, and the others all have the wrong pronoun.
4.2 The SR Head and Pivot Selection
I showed in section 2.2.1.4 that switch-reference is introduced by a specific
functional head in the extended verbal projection. Since this head’s sole purpose
is to introduce SR, I will propose that it is of the syntactic category SR◦, which
projects the SRP phrase. This projection sits above the inflectional layer, at the
base of the complementizer layer. I discuss this structure in more detail in section
4.2.1.
SR◦ is a pronominal head that bears an index introducing an argument. SR◦
also gets a second index from the pivot it selects, via feature valuation and bind-
4Many embedded clauses actually express relations, for instance from entities to worlds or
times. However, relations can be Schönfinkeled into a ‘chain’ of properties, and in any event, these
relations come about by λ-abstraction.
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ing. It also bears a switch-reference feature that introduces an SS or DS relation
between the two arguments. Importantly, SR does not directly co-refer with either
of its arguments. Instead, it relies on semantic binding to create properties that
it composes with. In the following discussion I will explain how this mechanism
works, then walk through a derivation.
4.2.1 Binding and pivot selection
Let me briefly summarize pivot selection before discussing particular exam-
ples. The SR◦ head bears an index that co-refers with an argument below it (for
exposition, let’s call this the ‘pivot index’). It thus binds that pronoun (an empty
category) and creates a property that is saturated by the pivot in [Spec, SRP]. A
basic syntactic structure for subject pivots is in (180a). At LF, the structure is in
(180b).
(180) a. SRP
DP
pivot SR◦[n] TP
e[n] . . .
b.
DP
SR◦
λ[n] [n] . . .
While SR◦ can bind, it differs from v◦ and C◦ in two respects. First, it is obli-
gatorily indexed. If it isn’t indexed, it cannot be interpreted properly. Second, it
cannot be inserted into the structure with a pivot index. Instead, it must acquire
it. The reason for this is that it cannot select its pivot freely. Other binders can
bind any item they c-command that happens to be co-indexed, but SR◦ can only
bind the argument below it that is highest in the structure.
I assume that this height requirement is reduced to relativized minimality
(Rizzi 1990, 2001). This requirement is derivable through feature checking and
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valuation, which are independently subject to the same requirement. I propose
that SR◦ bears an unvalued interpretable feature, [uI: ]. This feature is valued
by an index feature, and through standard feature probing mechanisms, it will be
valued by the highest index feature below it (181a). Once the SR◦ head is valued
with an index, it acquires that index via feature sharing (181b). At that point, this
index can be interpreted at SR◦ as a binder like any other index.
(181) a. SRP
DP
pivot SR◦
[uI : __ ]
TP
e[n] . . .
x[m] . . .
b. SRP
DP
pivot SR◦[n] TP
e[n] . . .
x[m] . . .
4.2.2 Selection of entity pivots
To demonstrate how the syntax and semantics interact in pivot selection, it’s
best to use an example. Here is an earlier DS-marked clause from Kiowa. It has a
when-clause, so it involves entity-tracking.
(182) Nén
n´˜en−
[1s:3d:3s]
máuny`¯aigàu
m´˜On+jaj:-gO
hand+wave−pf
é
¯
´˜e−
[3s:1s]
b´¯o
¯
`¯e
¯
bo´:=e˜:
see.pf=when.DS
‘I waved when she1 saw me2’ (Kiowa, f.n.)
Let’s focus on the when-clause in (182). Note that in Kiowa the subject and
object are both pro; the latter is represented as such in the structure, but the former
is a null pronoun, for reasons that will be evident. An abbreviated structure of the
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TP in this clause is in (183a), and the corresponding semantics (translated into
English for clarity) in (183b). The subject pronoun is interpreted as just an index.5
(183) a. TP
DP
x[1] T
◦ VP
V
b´¯o
¯
DP
pro[2]
b. λs: saw(me2)(1)(s) : 〈s, t〉
1: e
λxλs.saw(me2)(x)(s) :
〈e,〈s, t〉〉
Here are the steps of pivot selection.
1. SR◦ takes this TP as its complement. Its unvalued index feature is valued by
the first index it finds, that of the subject DP.
SR◦
[uI : __ ]
TP
x[n] . . .
2. Through the Agree relation, SR◦ takes on the index of the subject, creating a
syntactic binding structure.
SR◦[n] TP
x[n] . . .
3. This binding structure corresponds to semantic binding; the higher index is
parsed as a λ-operator over the TP.
5The subject DP in (183a) will have originated in [Spec, vP]. The semantics also ignores vP,
which I will assume distinguishes external arguments from internal arguments in such way that
only internal arguments are arguments of the predicate itself.
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SR◦
λn TP
[n] . . .
At this point, we should jump directly into the semantics so that the contri-
bution of SR◦ can be made clear. In the semantics, the syntactic mechanism in
steps 1-3 will be interpreted as Predicate Abstraction over the TP.6 The relation
that results will be the input to SR◦.
λxλs. saw(me2)(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λ1 TP: 〈s, t〉
λs. saw(me2)(1)(s)
1 λxλs. saw(me2)(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
The semantics of the SR◦ head depends on the three features it bears. I’ve dis-
cussed its unvalued index feature and the switch-reference feature, but there is
also a simple index feature. This index feature is interpreted as a pronoun argu-
ment of the switch-reference condition. As I pointed out in section 4.1.3.3, this
index will be associated with the anti-pivot, not the pivot. I will call this index the
‘anti-pivot index’ for clarity. We can write the denotation of the SR◦ head in this
structure as follows:
(184) ! SR◦[DS],[m] " = λPλxλs. x ! g(m) & P(x)(s) : 〈〈e,〈s, t〉〉,〈e,〈s, t〉〉〉
SR◦ denotes a function from a relation between entities and situations
to another relation between entities and situations. It adds a condition
to the entity argument (the pivot), such that it is co-referent from or
disjoint to the pronoun g(m).
6In the semantic composition, I will add category labels as guideposts to help the reader; they
are not actually interpreted.
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4. The SR◦ head takes the TP as its first semantic argument. Since it exhibits
DS marking, it has a [DS] feature. For an anti-pivot index, I will arbitrarily assign
the number 8. As an index feature, it is represented as [8].
λxλs. x ! g(8) & saw(me2)(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
SR◦[DS],[8] : 〈〈e,〈s, t〉〉,〈e,〈s, t〉〉〉
λPλxλs. x ! g(8) & P(x)(s)
λxλs. saw(me2)(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λ1 TP: 〈s, t〉
λs. saw(me2)(1)(s)
5. Coming back to the syntax, we can progress to complete the SR projection.
The pivot is inserted at [Spec, PivP]. In the semantics, this is interpreted as the
pivot saturating the entity argument, leaving a proposition.
SRP
DP
pro1 SR◦
[DS],[8],[uI:1]
TP
x1 . . .
λs. g(1) ! g(8) & saw(me2)(g(1))(s) : 〈s, t〉
DP : e
x1
λxλs. x ! g(8) & saw(me2)(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
SR◦[DS],[8]
: 〈〈e,〈s, t〉〉,〈e,〈s, t〉〉〉
λPλxλs. x ! g(8) & P(x)(s)
λxλs. saw(me2)(x)(s) :
〈e,〈s, t〉〉
This structure derives the selection of entity pivots, and accounts for the gen-
eralization that switch-reference tracks subjects, but no lower argument. How-
ever, the consequences of this proposal need to be addressed, notably the base-
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generation of pivots at [Spec, SRP], especially when the pivot is a full DP. Before
doing that, though, we need to account for situation pivots.
4.2.3 Selection of situation pivots
The SR◦ head selects situation pivots using the samemechanism it uses to select
entity pivots. Accounting for situation pivots will require only a small amendment
to the semantics of the SR◦ head. Since the basic mechanism has been explained, I
will start with an example of situation-tracking SR. This case is from earlier (100),
and it exhibits non-canonical DS marking.
(185) a. Óp
o´p
there
á
a´*−
[3p:3s]
`¯a
¯
l`¯e
¯
Pa:l−e:
chase−pf
‘They1 chased it over there’
b. nègáu
negO´
and:DS.then
óp
Po´p
there
jáuchò
tO´=tso
like this=instead
á
Pa´*-
[3p:3s]
`¯a
¯
l`¯e
¯
Pa:l-e:
chase−pf
‘And then they1 chased it this way’ (Palmer, Jr. 2003)
Let’s focus on the SR-marked conjunct in (185b). The nominal arguments in
the clause are all pro. In addition, there is a silent topic situation pronoun located
above the subject’s position at [Spec, TP]. Thus, the TP is of type t.
(186) Nàu hègáu7 s1 pro óp jáuchò á `¯al`¯e.
1. The SR◦ head’s unvalued index feature is valued by the highest index feature in
its complement; in this case it is that of the topic situation.
7I will ignore this adverbial in the tree structures.
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SR◦
[uI : __ ]
TP
s[1] DP[2] . . .
2. Through this process it adopts the pivot index. This creates a syntactic binding
structure, which corresponds to a semantic binding structure, where the index is
parsed as a λ-operator adjoining to TP. The situation is parsed as a variable index,
bound by the higher index.
SR◦
[1]
TP
s[1] DP[2] . . .
SR◦
λ1 TP
1
DP2 . . .
Since this structure involves Predicate Abstraction over a sentence of type t,
the result is a proposition (of type 〈s, t〉). In (187) is the semantic composition of
the steps so far. For clarity, I will abbreviate the semantic structure by translating
the expression chased it this way as ‘chased’, and ignoring the vP, aspect, and tense.
(187) λs. chased(g(2))(s) : 〈s, t〉
λ1 TP: t
chased(g(2))(g(1))
g(1) : s λs. chased(g(2))(s) : 〈s, t〉
DP : e
g(2)
λxλs. chased(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
Now we can revisit the semantics of the SR◦ head. The denotation proposed
in (184) cannot work here. In (184), SR◦ takes an expression of type 〈e,〈s, t〉〉, and
returns an expression of type 〈e,〈s, t〉〉, such that its pivot argument is an entity.
However, with situation pivots, its first argument would be of type 〈s, t〉, and SR◦
would return an expression of type 〈s, t〉. Because of this type mismatch, we have
to amend our semantics of SR◦.
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I propose that there are two lexical items of category SR◦. We can call the first
one Ent (for entity), and the second one Sit (for situation). Ent with a [DS] feature
and an anti-pivot index feature [n] has the same denotation as the SR◦ head in
(184). I repeat it in (188a). Sit with [DS] and [n] has the denotation in (188b).
(188) a. !Ent[DS],[n] " = λPλxλs. x ! g(n) & P(x)(s) : 〈〈e,〈s, t〉〉,〈e,〈s, t〉〉〉
b. ! Sit[DS],[n] " = λpλs. s ! g(n) & p(s) : 〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉
With this revised semantics for the SR◦ head, we can return to the example.
3. Sit takes the result of the abstraction as its first semantic argument, returning a
proposition. The [DS] feature derives its DS marking. I arbitrarily assign the index
8 to the anti-pivot pronoun.
λs. s ! g(8) & chased(g(2))(s) : 〈s, t〉
Sit[DS],[8] : 〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉
λpλs. s ! g(8) & p(s)
λs. chased(g(2))(s) : 〈s, t〉
λ1 TP: t
chased(g(2))(g(1))
g(1) : s λs. chased(g(2))(s) : 〈s, t〉
4. Coming back to the syntax, we can progress to complete the SR projection.
The pivot is inserted at [Spec, SRP]. In the semantics, the pivot saturates the first
argument of the proposition, and the result is that the SRP is of type t.
SRP
s1
SR◦
Sit
[DS],[8],[uI:1]
TP
s1 . . .
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SRP : t
g(1) ! g(8) & chased(g(2))(g(1))
s1 : s λs. s ! g(8) & chased(g(2))(s) : 〈s, t〉
Sit[DS],[8] : 〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉
λpλs. s ! g(8) & p(s)
λs. chased(g(2))(s) : 〈s, t〉
4.2.4 Pivot selection with SS marking
SS marking, like DS marking, reflects a feature on the SR◦ head. The [DS]
feature introduces a relation of non-identity between the pivot and the anti-pivot.
SS marking occurs when SR◦ bears an [SS] feature, which introduces a relation of
identity between the pivot and the anti-pivot. This feature is interpreted along
with the other features on SR◦. The denotations of the two SR-selecting heads, Ent
and Sit, with SS marking, are as follows; they are identical to (188a) and (188b),
except for the identity relation.
(189) Given an index n. . .
a. !Ent[SS],[n] " = λPλxλs. x = g(n) & P(x)(s) : 〈〈e,〈s, t〉〉,〈e,〈s, t〉〉〉
b. ! Sit[SS],[n] " = λpλs. s = g(n) & p(s) : 〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉
The syntax and semantics proceeds as it did with DS marking. Thus, I will
simply present an example of situation-tracking SS (190) and entity-tracking SS
(191), along with the structures and semantics of the pivot clause of each. In both
cases, I arbitrarily assign the index feature [8] to introduce the anti-pivot index.
This might seem odd at first, since it gives the result g(1) = g(8), but once the
anti-pivot selection takes place, it will turn out not to matter.
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(190)
∅
s1
Kathryn
K.
K.
gà
gjæ−
[3s:3p]−
gút
gu´P
write.pf
gàu
[gO
and.SS
∅
s1
Estheràl
E.-al
E.-also
gà
gjæ−
[3s:3p]−
gút
gu´P]
write.pf
‘s1 Kathryn wrote a letter and s1 Esther wrote one too’ (f.n.)
SRP
s1
SR◦
Sit
[SS],[8],[uI:1]
TP
s1 DP
Esther
. . .
SRP : t
g(1) = g(8) & wrote(Esther)(g(1))
s1 : s λs. s = g(8) & wrote(Esther)(s) : 〈s, t〉
Sit[SS],[8] : 〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉
λpλs. s = g(n) & p(s)
λs. wrote(Esther)(s) : 〈s, t〉
(191)
[∅−
[3s]−
H´¯ebàch`¯e
¯
he´:ba`=tse˜:]
enter.pf=when.SS
èm
e˜m−
[3s:rfl]−
s´¯au.
sO´:
sit down.pf
‘[When she1 came in], she1 sat down.’ (f.n.)
SRP
DP
pro1 SR
◦
[SS],[8],[uI:1]
TP
x1 . . .
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λs. g(1) = g(8) & sat down(g(1))(s) : 〈s, t〉
DP : e
x1
λxλs. x = g(8) & sat down(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
SR◦[SS],[8]
: 〈〈e,〈s, t〉〉,〈e,〈s, t〉〉〉
λPλxλs. x = g(8) & P(x)(s)
λxλs. sat down(x)(s) :
〈e,〈s, t〉〉
4.2.5 Summary
This concludes the discussion of the current proposal about the nature of the
switch-reference morpheme, and the mechanism of pivot selection. To summarize
the nature of the SR morpheme:
1. SR morphology is introduced by a head on a particular category, SR◦.
2. Two different lexical items are of category SR◦: Sit is used for situation-
tracking, while Ent is used for entity-tracking.
3. SR◦ bears an index feature that introduces an anti-pivot variable.
4. SR◦ bears a feature indicating identity or non-identity of its arguments.
To summarize pivot selection:
1. The SR◦ head merges above the inflectional layer.
2. It bears an unvalued index feature that is valued by the first index below it,
selecting its pivot.
3. Through valuation, SR◦ acquires the index of its target.
4. The co-indexation creates a binding structure that feeds the interpretation of
the SR◦ head.
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5. The actual pivot itself merges at [Spec, SRP].
The interaction of the SR◦ head with binding and feature valuation accounts for
the selection of situation and entity pivots, corresponding to the types of clauses
each is found in. This proposal thus derives several of the generalizations about
the switch-reference head and pivots.
Besides its empirical adequacy, this proposal relies on mechanisms that have
independent motivation. Pivot selection employs grammatical mechanisms used
in many other parts of the structure. This efficiency is not only advantageous
in terms of theoretical elegance, it is compatible with notions of economy in the
grammar natural language.
Finally, this account of pivot selection and the SR◦ head gains considerable
support from fruitful predictions. It derives the configuration effect for free, it
predicts certain observations about switch-reference pivots, and it is compatible
with possible variation among SR systems.
4.3 Predictions of the pivot selection mechanism
4.3.1 Deriving the configuration effect
The previous chapter demonstrated a link between pivot type and clause junc-
ture type. With coordinating conjunctions, switch-reference tracks topic situa-
tions, while with subordinating connectives, it tracks subjects. This is a robust
effect in Kiowa, and it appears to be cross-linguistic. However, despite being a
configuration effect, it has no obvious source in the syntax. It is well-established
that coordination is a type of subordination, so there is no major difference in
clause type from a structural point of view. Furthermore, switch-reference is not
introduced by the connective, so it is not at first obvious why the type of connective
should even matter.
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We must turn to the semantics. An investigation will show that the key source
of the effect is not the connective itself. The semantics of the pivot clause and the
theory of feature valuation interact in a way that allows us to derive the configu-
ration effect.
When we examine the semantics of the Kiowa pivot clauses, we see that their
semantic type varies in such a way that it correlates strongly with the type of pivot.
Matrix clauses with situation pivots are of type t, and adverbial clauses with entity
pivots are of type 〈s, t〉. This difference stems from the fact that matrix clauses
contain a topic situation pronoun (over which they are asserted), while adverbial
clauses are intensional: their topic situation argument remains unsaturated, and
ends up bound by some operator.
(192) TPmatrix : t
stopic
DPsubject T◦ . . .
TPembedded : 〈s, t〉
DPsubject T◦ . . .
Informally speaking, situation-tracking SR is only possible when there is a sit-
uation to track. In formal terms, the insertion of Sit at SR◦ is restricted to config-
urations where its complement clause has a topic situation pronoun. The syntax
and semantics both work to ensure this restriction.
Intensional clauses lack a topic situation pronoun, so there is no way for SR◦ to
select a situation pivot. We saw this in example (183). Note that it does not matter
that the proposition has a situation argument. The rules of semantic composition
require a condition to restrict an argument before its saturation, but the syntax
of feature valuation does not allow it; the unvalued index feature is restricted to
targets with an index feature. Since the lexical semantics of Sit or Ent derive from
this valuation, the SR condition can also only be applied to an argument in the
syntactic structure below it.
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The semantics allows us to drive the point home with a reduction argument
based on type-theory. Suppose that Sit could be used with subordination (182).
We’ll call this head Sit′. The first argument of Sit′ has to be a proposition. The
embedded TP on its own is of the right type. However, it only remains of the right
type if we ignore the binding resulting from the index feature valuation. Let’s sup-
pose that Sit′ does not have the unvalued index feature, and try to compose (193).
The TP of type 〈s, t〉 is the first argument to Sit. The result is another proposition,
but if the pivot is the topic situation, we end up with a SRP of type t, and that
cannot be embedded under an intensional operator.8
(193) SRP : t
s1 ! g(8) & p(s1)
s1 λs. s ! g(8) & p(s) : 〈s, t〉
Sit′ [DS],[8] :
〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉
TP : 〈s, t〉
λs. p(s)
In intensional clauses, the syntax and semantics both prevent switch-reference
from tracking a situation pivot. The highest argument will be the subject. In
matrix clauses, it will be the topic situation. Thus, this account derives the config-
urational difference, independent of the connective itself, with no additional ma-
chinery. This derivation is thus a major point of support for the theory proposed
in this chapter.
Another important prediction this theory makes is that embedded SR-marked
clauses that are not intensional should employ situation-tracking. This is the case
for coordinating conjunctions, as we have seen. Before discussing further, though,
let me clarify what I mean when I describe a clause as intensional. I am using
‘intensional’ here to describe a clause whose situation argument is bound by an
operator, rather than saturated by a topic situation pronoun. This differs from a
8Reminder: The unvalued index feature is how we derive subject-tracking.
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broader sense of intensionality in the literature. This broad sense can apply to any
proposition, as it would to any predicate of situations, times, or worlds.9 As we
will see when we discuss anti-pivot selection, coordinated clauses are properties
of situations as well. Nevertheless, that situation argument is bound or saturated
outside the pivot clause. Below the coordinating conjunction, the pivot clause
contains a topic situation pronoun.
It is very probably the case that clause-chains are not intensional in the sense
I describe. I pointed out in section 2.2.2.3 that clause-chains behave like coordi-
nation when it comes to switch-reference, except that the pivot clause precedes
the anti-pivot clause. Non-canonical switch-reference is found in clause-chains as
well. The switch-reference facts indicate that clause-chained pivot clauses contain
a topic situation pronoun. This matches with the widespread observations that
they seem to be semantically independent of the other clauses, despite being syn-
tactically dependent. The semantic independence of a clause can be derived from
the presence of its own situation pronoun. I can only conjecture about clause-
chains at this point— to my knowledge, no one has thoroughly investigated their
formal semantics. Undoubtedly, the logistical difficulty of conducting the research
with far-flung or outlying languages constitutes a major hurdle. However, I do
believe that it would be worth the effort and expense, and that this account of
switch-reference provides a useful stepping stone for future inquiry.
What about other types of embedded clauses? This account predicts that SR-
marked clauses where a situation pronoun can be established below the connec-
tive will have situation-tracking SR, while those without one will have subject-
tracking. As a result, the appearance of non-canonical switch-reference ought to
9Situations include times (a time interval across all spaces in a world) and worlds (which are
maximal situations).
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be relatively predictable. Conversely, the presence of non-canonical SR in a clause
should indicate that a clause is non intensional.
Kiowa has no other SR-bearing connectives to test for, so fieldwork in other
languages will be required to test this prediction. One possibly fruitful case is
Choctaw, which has SR-marking on because-clauses, which may contain a topic
situation pronoun. I am not aware of any research on the situation semantics of
because clauses, but their syntax (Sawada & Larson 2004) and their scope effects
(notably with negation) offer strong potential at enlightening us about switch-
reference.
4.3.2 Base-generation of pivots
Another feature of this proposal that warrants discussion is that overt pivots
are base-generated in [Spec, SRP], while their argument positions are filled by a
null pronoun. This is a consequential proposal, notably for subject pivots. Subject
movement from [Spec, vP] or [Spec, TP] is a priori more plausible, since it has
a lot of independent motivation. However, we will see that the consequences of
base-generation are positive.
Proposing that topic situation pivots are base-generated is essentially trivial,
since there are no predicted effects on the morphology, syntax, or semantics be-
yond what is required for switch-reference. Situation pronouns are already null,
leaving no morphosyntactic evidence for either base-generation or movement.
There are no scope-bearing positions between the insertion site of the topic situa-
tion and the SR◦ head10, so no semantic effects should arise. Thus, we can assume
that the base-generation account is perfectly suitable for situation pivots.
10This may not be the case for evidentials, but the semantics of evidentials (whence their scope
facts) is a matter of debate (Faller 2002; Aikhenvald 2004: i.a). Until a clearer picture emerges, and
is demonstrated for Kiowa, I will abstract away from them.
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For DP pivots, however, the picture is more complicated. Proposing the base-
generation of subjects in [Spec, SRP], outside the inflectional layer, is quite a de-
parture from what we know about subjects. So it ought to be clear that they are in
fact base-generated there. Notably, we should find signs of high placement with
no movement effects. This is what we find, both in the syntax and the semantics.
A base-generation account has some advantages: It explains pivot height effects
in placement and interpretation, and it permits quantified pivots. On the other
hand, it is difficult to precisely pinpoint overt DPs in Kiowa, and some of the
movement effects that one could test for are not possible to test.
One clear sign of pivot height is that pivots are never found very low. To test
for height, we cannot rely on functional heads, since Kiowa is generally head-
final. However, we can look at the position of pivots relative to various adverbials.
Watkins (1984) observed that many Kiowa adverbials select for aspect, negation,
or modality. For instance, the habitual morpheme àn only appears when the verb
is marked for imperfective aspect. The adverbial béth`¯au, meaning ‘I didn’t know,
to my surprise’ only applies when the verb is marked for indirect evidentiality.
Harbour (2007) derives this selection through Spec-head agreement. The ad-
verbial sits in the specifier position of the particular inflectional head, and restricts
its value.11 Two key pieces of evidence are relative ordering and recurrent mirror-
ing effects.12 For instance, EvidP sits above AspP, so its specifier ought to precede
that of AspP. Thus, béth`¯au should always precede àn, and it does.13 Moreover, since
Kiowa is right-headed, we should see the inflectional morphemes on the verb in
11I suspect that an explanation based on semantic composition restrictions might be more plau-
sible in the long run, since adverbials typically are not specifiers, and since discourse configuration
can displace some of them, as (Adger & Harbour 2007a: p. 17) note.
12I described these briefly in Chapter 1.
13In my fieldwork I unexpectedly elicited a translation with clause-final béth`¯au; other evidence
is suggestive that these adverbials’ positions are not always fixed.
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the reverse order: aspect before evidential. We do. Both of these are demonstrated
in (194), from Adger et al.’s (2009) book that builds on this observation.
(194) Béth`¯au
unbeknown
àn
hab
áu−
[∅:3s:3i]
bô+hàunx`¯o-y`¯ı-th`¯au-d`¯e
always+come late-impf-mod-evid
‘Unbeknown (i.e., I didn’t realize) he was going to keep on coming late’
(Adger et al. 2009)
The present proposal predicts that subject pivots are higher than the inflec-
tional layer, so we should find them above all of these selecting adverbials. This is
clearly the case for lower ones, like negative hàun (NegP). In (195), we see that the
pivot cannot be found lower than negation, even though in matrix clauses, it can.
(195) a. Nén
n´˜en−
[1s:3d:3s]
máuny`¯aigàu
m´˜On+jaj:-gO
hand+wave−pf
[Bill
B
B.
háun
h´˜On
not
é
¯
´˜e−
[3s:1s]
b´¯o
¯
mâu`¯e
¯
]
b´˜o-mOˆ=e˜:
see-neg=when.DS
‘I waved when Bill didn’t see me.’ (f.n.)
b. *Nén máuny`¯aigàu [háun Bill é
¯
b´¯o
¯
mâu`¯e
¯
]
Notably, when the embedded clause does not have switch-reference, the sub-
ject can be located lower than negation. For instance, relative clauses permit low
subjects.
(196) Háun
h´˜On
not
Bill
B
Bill
mátàun
ma´tO˜n
girl
∅−
[3s:3s]
qáujédè
kĳO´te´=de
meet.pf=nml
kídêl
kh´ideˆl
yesterday
gà
gjæ−
[1s:3s]
qáujé.
kĳO´te´
meet.pf
‘I met [the girl that Bill didn’t meet] yesterday.’ (f.n.)
One difficulty in establishing height with these adverbials is that some of the
higher ones, like béth`¯au (EvidP), or hayatjo, ‘perhaps’ (ModalP), do not seem to be
available inside adverbial clauses. My consultants did not allow the adverbials to
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be placed there, and I found no examples in texts. They are readily available in
matrix clauses, but those have situation pivots. I should note that both evidential
and modal inflection are available inside an adverbial clause, so the restriction
isn’t syntactic.
Other adverbials can give us evidence of high pivots. Besides these fixed-
position adverbials, temporal adverbials are associated with the TP level. Pivots
are located above these as well. In (197), the adverbial is clearly below the pivot.
In (198), it seems to be above the pivot, but it may actually be in the matrix clause.
(197) Bill
B.
Bill
k´¯ıdêl
kh´ı:deˆl
today
∅−
[3s]=
chánth`¯aunàu,
tsa´n-tĳO:=nO˜
arrive.pf-mod=DS
bá
ba´*−
[1pi:3s]
b`¯o
¯
j`¯au.
bo˜:-tO:
see.pf-mod
‘If Bill comes today, we’ll see him. . . . ’
(198) K´¯ıdêl [Bill chánth`¯aunàu], bá b`¯o
¯
j`¯au.
To be certain that the adverbial is in the embedded clause, we can postpose it,
but speakers rejected it. It’s not clear, however, whether this is due to a binding
effect or the placement of the pivot.
(199) *Bá b`¯o
¯
j`¯au [k´¯ıdêl Bill chánth`¯aunàu],
‘We’ll see him1, if Bill1 comes today’
To summarize, there is syntactic evidence that strongly suggests that pivots
must be high, as predicted by this account. A lot of the things that might show
movement, however, are difficult to test for because of the ‘free’ nature of Kiowa
word order.
Besides the syntactic evidence, semantic evidence supports high pivots. Lack-
ing any reconstruction targets, any scope-bearing pivot must be interpreted high.
This is the case for indefinite DP pivots, which must be specific. In (200), consul-
tants rejected existential interpretations of indefinite pivots.
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(200) Hájél
ha´te´l
someone
∅
[3s]
chán`¯e
¯
ts´˜an=e˜:
arrive.pf=when.DS
j´¯e
te´:
all
ém
Pe˜m−
[3p:rfl]
kúnhâ.
khu´n+haˆ:
dance+arise.pf
‘When someone showed up, everyone got up to dance.’
Consultant: “You’re waiting for a particular person to show up."
Finally, another advantage of base-generation is that it provides a simple ex-
planation for the use of quantificational pivots. Quantificational pivots are not
referential, since they are not interpreted with respect to the assignment function.
Instead, a quantified DP is interpreted as binding its copy, which is interpreted
as a variable (201). They do not have an index feature of their own. Thus, the
unvalued index feature on SR◦ should not be able to select them.
(201)
DP
Everyone λ1
everyone1
likes cheese
→
∀x
λ1
1
likes cheese
However, as we saw in (200), quantificational entity pivots are allowed. The
proposed structure of switch-reference, combined with base-generation, predicts
that they should be. A quantifier needs to bind a variable in order to be inter-
preted. If a quantified pivot is generated at [Spec, SRP], there is no place for QR,
so there is no trace to bind. However, the structure already provides a variable to
bind, the subject, and a binder: SR◦. The binding at SR◦ creates a relation that
serves as the input to a quantifier.
Below, we see the SRP embedded in (198). I assume the denotation in (202)
for someone, which is a simplified version of Schwarz’s (2009) denotation of the
determiner every.14
14Domain restriction is effected by a part relation (≤). I abstract away from exemplification
(Kratzer 2007) and a matching function in the nuclear scope.
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(202) ! someone " = λQλs. ∃x∃s′[ s′ ≤ s & person(x)(s′) ] &
∃s′′[ s′ ≤ ′′ ≤ s & Q(x)(s′′) ] : 〈〈e,〈s, t〉〉,〈s, t〉〉
SRP : 〈s, t〉
λs. ∃x∃s′[ s′ ≤ s & x ! g(8)
person(x)(s′) & arrived(x)(s′) ]
DP : 〈〈e,〈s, t〉〉,〈s, t〉〉
λQλs. ∃x∃s′[ s′ ≤ s &
person(x)(s′) & Q(x)(s′) ]
λxλs. x ! g(8)
& arrived(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
Ent[DS],[8]
〈〈e,〈s, t〉〉,〈e,〈s, t〉〉〉
λPλxλs. x ! g(8) & P(x)(s)
λxλs. arrived(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λ1 TP : 〈s, t〉
λs. arrived(g(1))(s)
1 λxλs. arrived(x)(s) :
〈e,〈s, t〉〉
4.3.3 The meaning of the anaphoric relation
The fourth desideratum of a theory of switch-reference is the relation between
the pivot and anti-pivot. In the present proposal, that relation is one of identity or
non-identity. The relation’s value is introduced by a feature on the SR◦ head. [SS]
introduces an identity relation and is marked by SS marking. [DS] introduces a
non-identity relation and is marked by DSmarking. The use of an identity relation
adequately accounts for the reference-tracking effects of switch-reference without
any unwieldy or ad hocmechanism.
However, the [DS] and [SS] features are privative. We might wonder whether
there is some more basic binary feature that gives us identity (à la Enç). For now,
though, we should persist with privative switch-reference features. Not only is it
unclear that binary features are necessary, but the use of privative features obtains
two clear typological advantages. One is that we can rely on the lexicon to explain
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why some languages only mark DS or only mark SS, and not both. The second is
that we do not rule out the possibility that switch-reference in some languages can
involve relations besides identity.
It’s wise to keep that possibility open because of two types of unexpected
switch-reference that have been noted in the literature: inclusive (or overlapping)
reference, and open-reference. Inclusive reference is discussed in Chapter 2 (sec-
tion 2.4.2) as a problem for Finer’s (1984) reliance on the Binding Theory. Essen-
tially, in some languages, SS marking must or can appear if the pivot is a subset of
the anti-pivot, a superset of the anti-pivot, or intersects with the antipivot. Binding
ignores partial identity, so it is unsuitable for explaining these observations. But
an anaphoric relation can well include a subset, superset, or intersective relation
in addition to an identity relation. Stirling (1993) proposes that SR does exactly
that, and it may be the case that it does. If so, we would not want to be limited by
a binary feature.
The idea that SR relations include these set-related notions is not far-fetched;
they form a regular part of many semantic analyses, so if the data supports their
presence, we can rest assured that the formal logic already does. However, this dis-
sertation has shown conclusively that the source of unexpected SR marking often
has nothing to do with the subject identity, but is instead derived by situation-
tracking. This is especially the case for SR-morphemes with clause-chains or coor-
dination. Until the source of the unexpected marking can be pinpointed, I reserve
judgment.
The second area of variation with the fourth desideratum is what is called open-
reference. It was first proposed by Nichols (1983) in discussing Chechen, but has
also been proposed in Inuktituk (Pittman 2005). Essentially, open-reference un-
derspecifies for identity. For Inuktituk, Pittman claims that -llu is an SS marker,
since it is only available when the subjects co-refer.
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(203) Alana-up
A.-erg
ujagak
rock:abs
atja-tlu-gu
carry-llu-3sO
ani-vuk
go out-intr.indic.3s
‘While Alana1 was carrying the rock, she1/*2 went out’
The string ti-llu- indicates open-reference; it allows either subject co-reference
or disjointness.
(204) a. pisuk-ti-llu-Na
walk-ti-llu-1s
iNNi-lauq-tuq
sing-DistPt-3s
‘While I was walking, he was singing’
b. pisuk-ti-llu-Na
walk-ti-llu-1s
iNNi-lauq-tuNa
sing-DistPt-1s
‘While I was walking, he was singing’
If Pittman’s claim of open-referencemarking is correct, it can be explained with
an underspecified anaphoric relation on SR◦. We might imagine something like in
(205). The pivot and anti-pivot still have to be of the same type, so perhaps there
would be a feature [SR] that ensures they do, with the relation in (205a).
(205) a. For any two arguments α and β,
λαλβ. T (α)(β) = 1 iff α and β are of the same semantic type.
b. Imagined underspecified entity-tracking switch-reference marker,
given some index n:
!Ent[SR],[n] " = λPλxλs. T (x)(g(n)) & P(x)(s)
A underspecified switch-reference relation would not be completely out of
place, considering that underspecification has been shown to be useful in under-
standing other heads on the extended verbal projection. A non-exhaustive list in-
cludes tense (Matthewson 2006; Lin 2006; Abusch 1997; von Stechow 2003), aspect
(Böhnemeyer & Swift 2004), modality (Deal 2010), and evidentiality (Aikhenvald
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2004). The particular formal implementation of underspecification in (205) might
not be ideal, but it’s just a suggestion. The idea of an underspecifed SR marking is
very plausible, if the evidence supports it.
However, like with inclusive or overlapping reference, I believe a closer look at
the evidence is required before including open-reference into a theory of switch-
reference. For the former, it was not clear that subject-reference was at issue. For
the latter, it is not clear that we are even dealing with switch-reference.15
Looking at Pittman’s examples closely, we see that there are three signs that
this phenomenon is not switch-reference. The first is that the purported open-
reference marker (-ti-llu) includes the SS marker (-llu). This suggests that -ti-llu
marks both SS and open-reference. For purposes of semantic composition, double-
marking is extremely odd. When two features combine like this (e.g. among φ-
features), their meanings interact, but do not cancel out. Also, other heads in
the extended verbal projection do not allow multiple-marking, so SR◦ should not
allow it, either.
The second sign is that the verb morphology is lacking. We saw in Chapter 2
that SR morphemes can condition tense and agreement morphology. SR can even
trigger defective marking. However, in Inuktituk, the presence of these markers
simply precludes tense and aspect marking, as well as agent agreement. Only
absolutive agreement is possible on either -llu or -ti-llu; in fact the latter does
not even permit transitive predicates. These clauses’ restrictions, along with their
temporally dependent nature, allows us to suggest that they are smaller than full
TPs. What is going here may simply be an instance of so-called VP-coordination,
15This uncertainty prevented me from including open-reference in the survey of switch-
reference in Chapter 2.
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which, as in English and other languages, only works with the same subject.16
This is purely a conjecture, of course, but it seems more plausible than proposing
switch-reference. Perhaps -llu indicates a close relation between events, while -ti-
marks simultaneity.17
The third sign is that Pittman herself proposes that -ti and -llu are not SRmark-
ers per se, but temporal markers. -llu introduces a time variable inserted at T◦,
while -ti- is a binder over times at C◦. This proposal is actually plausible, as well
as quite interesting, although it is perhaps more likely that -llu introduces a rela-
tion over the time variable rather than referring to it directly.18
All in all, the case for switch-reference in Inuktituk, much less the case for
open-reference, is far from convincing. Similar statements can be made about
Chechen or the Bantu languages (Wiesemann 1982), languages with purported
open-reference or inclusive reference. More semantic-based fieldwork is required
to understand what is going on, and until we have a clearer picture, it’s best not
to deal with open-reference or inclusive reference. For the anaphoric relation,
identity and non-identity suffice.
4.3.4 Situation indeterminacy
One of the issues that concern the use of situations in semantics is indetermi-
nacy. How can we actually tell where one situation begins and another ends? This
problem seems important for the theory of switch-reference presented here, be-
16I say ‘so-called’ because the VP-conjunct actually contains an extended verbal projection, as it
does in English; the second conjunct in John fell abruptly and is nursing his sore back is at least an
AspP.
17The examples Pittman provides with -ti- are all intransitive statives. I do not know whether
their stativity is a coincidence.
18Pittman derives switch-reference by adopting Finer’s mechanism of index transmission via
Spec-head agreement— the T head acquires the subject’s variable via index transmission. We saw
the syntactic problems with this mechanism in section 2.4.2, and its semantic impossibility in
4.1.3.3. These are problems for any theory of switch-reference reliant on T◦.
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cause it depends in large part on situation identity. However, the problem is not
by any means restricted to situations. In fact, indeterminacy is such a part of natu-
ral language that it ought to have effects in the theory, rather than being explained
away.
In chapter 3 I showed that locations, times, and events do not suffice as pivots.
Even if they did, indeterminacy would be a problem with them, too. Take, for
instance, a location. Some locations are neatly defined, like political entities with
delineated borders, or rooms in a building. However, some are not defined well at
all. Take for instance, the Grand Canyon. If you say I’ve been to the Grand Canyon,
it is true if you were hiking at its base, strolling along its rim, climbing a bluff next
to it, flying over it in a tour, looking at it from the next mountain over, driving
through the national park around it, etc. What counts as the Grand Canyon? Is
there an exact limit?
The problem is even more acute with location-sensitive grammatical expres-
sions, like deictics, that are purely context-sensitive. How close to the speaker can
here refer to? Is it the distance that’s vague, or the location of the speaker? If I
say come here, it means ‘move to a spot near me’, but what does near mean? This
vagueness is a problem for temporal expressions, too, as well as events.
Even individual reference suffers from indeterminacy. If I say I touched Josie on
the shoulder, we generally accept that as true even if her shoulders were covered.
Does Josie include her clothes, then? If I talk about the Super Bowl, is that just
the game itself, or what’s going on on the sidelines? In the stands? On the TV
broadcast? The halftime show? This particular kind of indeterminacy is an issue
for situations as well Zweig (2007), but it is not more of an issue for them than it
is for individuals.
It applies to properties, as well. The truth-conditions of many properties are
rather ineffable, and that causes no impediment to the use of language. It might
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pose a problem in philosophy or law, where clear-cut conditions are usually re-
quired.19 However, indeterminacy and vagueness are pervasive features of natural
language. Any attempt to understand natural language will eventually hit a point
of granularity where we cannot be completely certain about the boundaries be-
tween two objects. It seems that indeterminacy is an ordinary by-product of a
natural cognitive system, but it does not prevent us from a better understanding
the nature of that system.
4.3.5 Summary
To summarize, the proposal for pivot selection and the anaphoric relation
makes several predictions that evidence confirms or supports. It predicts the
configuration effect on pivot type, it predicts height-related properties of pivots,
and it predicts the observed values of switch-reference. At the same time, this
proposal leaves some room for purported variations in switch-reference systems.
Once those variations can be tested and determined with certainty, this proposal
can be tweaked to account for them without reducing its explanatory adequacy.
4.4 Anti-pivot selection
Now that we have established the nature of the SR◦ morpheme, how pivots are
selected, and how they are related to anti-pivots, we will turn to the selection of
anti-pivots. Like pivot selection, anti-pivot selection is indirect— the anti-pivot
19A classic example of ineffability in natural language came in the Supreme Court case Jacobellis
v. Ohio, which overturned a ruling that a film that was obscene. Justice Stewart Potter famously
wrote about the limits of knowing the truth-conditions of a property, in this case, the definition of
‘pornography’:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description [of pornography], and perhaps I could
never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion
picture involved in this case is not that.
(Potter 1964)
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argument is not directly referential, but is bound by an operator, creating a prop-
erty that will be saturated by the eventual anti-pivot. Thus, anti-pivot selection
relies on the binding mechanism and adjunction.
To summarize, anti-pivot selection has five basic steps, the first of which we
saw in the previous section.
1. The SR◦ bears an index feature that introduces a variable into the switch-
reference relation.
2. The C◦ head is co-indexed with this variable, creating a binding structure.
3. This creates a semantic property.
4. The property adjoins to the anti-pivot clause
5. Whatever saturates this property is the anti-pivot.
This mechanism works for both coordinating and subordinating configura-
tions. There is a slight variation between configurations due to the adjunction
sites, so I will describe the mechanism first for coordination and situation anti-
pivots, then for subordination and entity anti-pivots.
What I propose with this anti-pivot selection mechanism will involve the sec-
ond way: SR◦ introduces a pronoun, which is bound by C◦ in the case of embedded
clauses, and B◦, the coordinating head, in the case of coordination.
The rest of this section will discuss this proposal, with a discussion about why
I do not propose the first way. I will begin with situation anti-pivots, then entity
anti-pivots.
4.4.1 Selecting situation anti-pivots
Switch-reference in Kiowa tracks situations when it is found with sentential co-
ordination. This discussion will be based on the example in (206). The DSmarking
signals different topic situations, to which I arbitrarily assign the indices 1 and 2.
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(206)
s1
John
J.
J.
∅−
[3s]
h´¯ebà
he´:ba
enter:pf
nàu
nO˜
and.DS s2
Sam
S.
[3s:rfl]
èm
Pe˜m−
leave:pf
k´¯ı
¯
f`¯au.
kh´˜ı:pO:
‘s1 John entered and DS s2 Sam left.’
We start with the construction of the pivot clause. The SR◦ head in the pivot
clause bears an index feature; let’s use [8]. It acquires the index of the situation
variable ([2]) via feature valuation of its unvalued index feature [uI: ]. After the
topic situation pivot is merged at [Spec, SRP], we have the pivot clause in (207).20
(207) SRP
s2
SR◦
Sit[8]
[DS],[uI: 2]
λ2 TP
s[2] Sam . . .
SRP : t
s2 ! g(8) & left(Sam)(s2)
s2 : s λs. s ! g(8) & left(Sam)(s) : 〈s, t〉
SitDS,8 : 〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉
λpλs. s ! g(8) & p(s)
λs. left(Sam)(s) : 〈s, t〉
λ2 TP : t
left(Sam)(s2)
Now we can proceed to the process of anti-pivot selection.
1. This SRP is then the input to the sentential coordinator nàu. After Munn (1993),
I will consider this coordinator to be of category B◦. It takes the second conjunct
as its complement, and the BP adjoins within the first conjunct. Semantically, a
conjunction conjoins two items of the same semantic type. Sentential coordination
20Again, I use a simplified vP for the pivot clause.
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conjoins two propositions, which in a situation semantics are of type 〈s, t〉. Thus,
the version of and that is relevant to us has the denotation in (208).
(208) ! and " = λpλqλs. p(s) & q(s) : 〈〈s, t〉,〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉〉
2. If and takes a proposition as its first argument, something needs to happen so
that the SRP is of the right type. Since the second conjunct needs to become a
property of the topic situation in the first conjunct, binding of a situation variable
needs to take place. Thus, we re-employ the binding mechanism used earlier. The
B◦ head is coindexed with the pronoun introduced by SR◦.
BP
B◦[8] SRP
s2 SR◦[8] . . .
3. This co-indexation, combined with c-command, creates a binding structure.
The higher index is interpreted as a λ-operator that binds the lower index, which
is interpreted as a variable. The operator is parsed as adjoining to SRP.
B◦
λ[8] s2 [8] . . .
4. This binding corresponds to Predicate Abstraction, which creates a proposition,
a property of situations. Informally speaking, it creates a property of anti-pivots.
This proposition then composes as the first argument of the conjunction.
BP : 〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉
λqλs. q(s) & s ! s2 & left(Sam)(s2)
and
〈〈s, t〉,〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉〉
λpλqλs. p(s) & q(s)
λs. s2 ! s & left(Sam)(s2) : 〈s, t〉
λ8 SRP : t
s2 ! g(8) & left(Sam)(s2)
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5. The BP then adjoins to the matrix TP, below the insertion site of the first con-
junct’s topic situation.
DP
John T
◦ AspP
entered
BP
B◦
and
SRP
s2 DS Sam left
λs. entered(John)(s) & s ! s2
& left(Sam)(s2) : 〈s, t〉
λs. entered(John)(s) : 〈s, t〉
John : e λxλs. entered(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
BP : 〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉
λqλs. q(s) & s ! s2 & left(Sam)(s2)
6. Finally, the topic situation of the first conjunct is inserted, completing the com-
position.
TP
s1
TP
John entered
BP
and s2 DS Sam left
TP: t
entered(John)(s1) & s1 ! s2
& left(Sam)(s2)
s1 λs. entered(John)(s) & s ! s2
& left(Sam)(s2) : 〈s, t〉
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A curious consequence of this account is that it derives the selection of anti-
pivots in a way that doesn’t involve any selection mechanism. What it does is
provide a semantic definition of the anti-pivot: The anti-pivot is the object that
saturates the argument resulting from the binding of the variable introduced by
SR◦. However, the argument does not itself force any particular object to saturate
it. Thus, this account raises an important question: How can we be certain that the
anti-pivot works out to be the topic situation?
We can derive restrictions on anti-pivots quite simply, through the nature of
the clause juncture. Sentential coordination conjoins two propositions, so it must
take two arguments of the same semantic type. The input to B◦ is a proposition,
so the BP can only adjoin at some point in the structure of type 〈s, t〉. This could be
any maximal projection above Asp◦. If the adjunction takes place at any of these
sites, the anti-pivot will be the topic situation, since no other situation argument
will enter the clause.
To ensure that the topic situation is the anti-pivot, we have to rule out adjunc-
tions that might select other situations. For instance, if the BP adjoins to a VP of
type 〈s, t〉, the situation argument introduced by SR◦ would be bound by the exis-
tential operator introduced by Asp◦. This does not happen, though; the semantics
prevents low adjunction of a SR-marked BP. The second conjunct is not within the
scope of that aspectual head, nor the other inflectional heads above it (notably
negation). The syntax also prevents low adjunction. While a strong coordinate
structure constraint (Ross 1967) is no longer tenable, it is clear that coordination
brings together like elements that are interpreted with respect to similar types of
objects (Munn 1993; Johannessen 1998; Kehler 2002; Haspelmath 2004; Dalrym-
ple & Nikolaeva 2006; Zhang 2010). Essentially, if the second conjunct contains a
complete inflectional layer, the first conjunct should as well, to the extent allowed
by the semantic composition. Thus, the second conjunct must adjoin as high as
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possible to get the right interpretation. As a result, the argument introduced by
binding the variable introduced by SR◦ will always be saturated by the topic sit-
uation. That is, the anti-pivot of a coordinate structure will always be the topic
situation.
4.4.2 Selecting entity anti-pivots
Entity pivots are selected any time switch-reference is found in intensional
clauses, which lack an indexed topic situation pronoun for SR◦ to select. Entity
anti-pivots are selected in the same indirect manner as situation anti-pivots. The
SR relation on Ent introduces an anti-pivot variable. The complementizer is co-
indexed with this variable. This creates a binding structure, which results in a
property that is adjoined to the dominant clause. The location of this adjunction
determines the anti-pivot, since the first item that saturates the property will be
the anti-pivot.
This discussion will be based on the example in (209). The DS marking signals
different subjects, to which I arbitrarily assign the indices 1 and 2. I assign the
index 3 to the matrix topic situation, though it will not play a significant role in
this example.
(209)
s3
Sam
S
S.
èm
Pe˜m−
[3s:rfl]
k´¯ı
¯
f`¯au
kh´˜ı:pO:
leave:pf
[John
J.
J.
∅−
[3s]
h´¯ebà`¯e
¯
]
he´:ba=e˜:
enter:pf=when.DS
‘Sam1 left when John2 entered.’ (f.n.)
We start with the construction of the pivot clause. The SR◦ head in the pivot
clause, Ent, bears an index feature (let’s use [8]). It acquires the index of the subject
variable ([2]) via feature valuation of its unvalued index feature [uI: ]. After the
subject pivot is merged at [Spec, SRP], we have the pivot clause in (210).
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(210) SRP
DP2
John SR◦
Ent[8]
[DS],[uI: 2]
λ2 TP
x[2] . . .
SRP : 〈s, t〉
λs. John ! g(8) & entered(John)(s)
John : e λxλs. x ! g(8) & entered(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
Ent[DS],[8] :
〈〈e,〈s, t〉〉,〈e,〈s, t〉〉〉
λPλxλs. x ! g(8) &
P(x)(s)
λxλs. entered(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λ2 TP : 〈s, t〉
λs. entered(g(2))(s)
g(2) :
e
λxλs. entered(x)(s) :
〈e,〈s, t〉〉
Now we can proceed to the process of anti-pivot selection. As before, the anti-
pivot is not truly selected. Instead, the ‘selection’ depends on the adjunction site
of the SR-marked clause. Here are the steps for anti-pivot selection.
1. The SRP is the input to the connective `¯e
¯
, translated as when. I assume that `¯e
¯
is
of category C◦, and takes the SRP as its complement.21
The semantics of =ch`¯e
¯
/`¯e
¯
is essentially that of ‘when’; it links two situations by
a relation of temporal proximity (WHEN(s′)(s)). This relation explains the tempo-
ral closeness of the two situations, and derives matching effects (Rothstein 1995;
Vikner 2004; Hinterwimmer 2010) in the sameway that at derives matching effects
through spatial proximity.
21This assumption contradicts the claim made in section 1.5.3 that C◦ is left-headed in Kiowa.
This claim is based on the observation that yes/no question particles are sentence-initial. However,
Kiowa has many projections with operators to the left and corresponding heads to the right, and
perhaps CP is one of them. Perhaps, then, the yes/no question particles are in [Spec, CP], and the
complementizer is at the right edge: [CP Q [ TP C◦ ] ]
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When takes a proposition, and returns a property of situations that are tempo-
rally proximal to the unique situation (in some domain) that describes the propo-
sition. I use the ι operator to express uniqueness, and D to describe a function
getting us from the situation to the domain (cf. von Fintel (1994)).22
(211) !when " = λpλs. WHEN(ιs′. D(s′) & p(s′))(s) : 〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉
2. Kiowa when bears an unvalued SR feature [uSR: ], which is valued by the [DS]
feature on SR◦. Through the Agree mechanism, C◦ acquires the DS feature, which
is spelled out as DS marking. As we saw with coordination, the Agree mechanism
only works if the heads are co-indexed. As a result, C◦ also bears the index feature
[8].
SRP
John2 SR◦
[DS],[8]
TP
C◦
when
[uSR: ],[8]
3. This co-indexation, coupled with c-command, creates a syntactic binding struc-
ture that corresponds to a semantic binding structure. The higher index is inter-
preted as a λ-binder of the lower index.
4. However, this λ-binder is not interpreted as adjoined to the SRP. Instead, it is
parsed above the complementizer.
22The denotation in (211) is grossly simplified. The domain restriction function is contextually
supplied but not further specified. Also, I make no mention of exemplification (Kratzer 2007),
which ensures that the situation bound by the ι-operator is truly unique. These issues are crucial
to a full analysis of when-clauses, but they are not crucial to this discussion, so I abstract away from
them.
225
λ[8]
SRP
John2 [8] TP
when
Why does the binder get parsed above the binding head in this case, but not in
the others we have seen? Essentially, because it cannot get interpreted otherwise.
This is not an ad hoc claim, though. I propose that indices are subject to a con-
straint of ‘earliest interpretation’. In the case of the index on the coordinator s B◦,
interpreting it as a binder over the argument of B◦ is possible, since it creates a
proposition, and B◦’s first argument is a proposition. In the case of the (anti-pivot)
index introduced with SR◦, it cannot be interpreted as a binder over the TP, since
the result of the wrong type. However, it can be interpreted with the head as a
variable, so it is.
The index on C◦, however, cannot be interpreted as a binder adjoining beneath
the head. If it were interpreted as adjoining to SRP, it would create a relation,
which would be of the wrong type as an input to when. It cannot be interpreted as
a variable at C◦, since there is no argument for it in the meaning of when. Thus,
it must be interpreted as a binder above C◦, after the composition of when. The
semantics of the when-clause in (209) would be as follows (translated into English
for clarity)
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CP : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λxλs. WHEN(ιs′. D(s′) & John ! x
& entered(John)(s′)
λ8 λs. WHEN(ιs′. D(s′) &
John ! g(8) & entered(John)(s′) : 〈s, t〉
SRP : 〈s, t〉
λs. John ! g(8) & entered(John)(s)
when
〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉
λpλs. WHEN(ιs′. D(s′) & p(s′))(s)
5. The SR-marked when-clause adjoins to the matrix vP, below the insertion site of
the matrix subject. Both branches are of the same type, so they compose semanti-
cally by Predicate Conjunction.
v◦ VP
left
CP
SRP
John
SR◦[DS],[8]
λ[1] TP
1 . . .
C◦
when.DS
[uSR:DS],[8]
I assume that v◦ selects for an external argument, and in this case is agentive,
introducing an agent relation (Kratzer 1996). It combines with the VP (of type
〈s, t〉) by Event Identification (212b) .23
(212) a. ! v◦ " = λxλs. agent(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
23I have replaced events with situations.
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b. ! v◦ PVP " = λxλs. agent(x)(s) & P(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λxλs. agent(x)(s) & left(x)(s) &
WHEN(ιs′. D(s′) & John ! x
& entered(John)(s′))(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λxλs. agent(x)(s) & left(x)(s)
〈e,〈s, t〉〉
CP : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λxλs. WHEN(ιs′. D(s′) & John ! x
& entered(John)(s′))(s)
6. As before, the anti-pivot is the object that saturates the property created by
binding the anti-pivot index.
This structure derives the fact that the anti-pivot of switch-reference on an
adverbial clause is always the subject. Switch-reference has made the CP a relation
rather than a simple proposition, and this restricts its adjunction sites. It is of
type 〈e,〈s, t〉〉. For Predicate Modification to apply, it can only adjoin to a node
of type 〈e,〈s, t〉〉. If the verb is intransitive, the only adjunction site is at vP. If
the verb is transitive, it is of type 〈e,〈s, t〉〉. However, the syntax does not permit
adjunction between a verb and its complement object, which would saturate the
entity argument. Any adjunction site higher than vP would not be possible for the
semantics of the adverbial clause to have the interpretations it is observed to have.
Thus, the anti-pivot of awhen-clause will always be whatever fills the [Spec, vP]
position of the clause dominating it. All subjects are either base-generated here
or pass through here (as passive or unaccusative subjects). Thus, the anti-pivot
will always be the subject. Through a combination of semantic composition rules
and syntactic constraints, this structure derives subject-tracking without literal
subject-tracking.
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To summarize anti-pivot selection:
1. The SR◦ head introduces a variable.
2. This variable is bound by the connective (∼ A-binding).
3. The binding creates a property that combines with the meaning of the head.
4. This property adjoins to the dominant clause.
5. The argument that saturates this clause is the anti-pivot.
4.4.3 Anti-pivot selection with SS marking
The mechanism for anti-pivot selection is not affected by the presence of SS
marking, as the following examples show. (190) involves situation-tracking. The
SRP is from earlier.
(190)
∅
s1
Kathryn
K.
K.
gà
gjæ−
[3s:3p]−
gút
gu´P
write.pf
gàu
[gO
and.SS
∅
s1
Estheràl
E.-al
E.-also
gà
gjæ−
[3s:3p]−
gút
gu´P]
write.pf
‘s1 Kathryn wrote a letter and s1 Esther wrote one too’ (f.n.)
TP
s1
DP
Kathryn
TP
wrote a letter
BP
B◦
and[8]
[uSR: SS]
SRP
s1
SR◦
[SS], [8]
TP
Esther wrote one, too
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TP : t
λs. wrote(Kathryn)(s) &
s = s1 & wrote(Esther)(s1)
〈s, t〉 :
λs. wrote(Kathryn)(s)
BP : 〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉
λqλs. q(s) & s1 = s
& wrote(Esther)(s1)
and : 〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉
λpλqλs. q(s) & p(s)
〈s, t〉 :
λs. s1 = s & wrote(Esther)(s1)
λ[8] SRP : t
s1 = g(8) &
wrote(Esther)(s1)
Example (213) involves entity-tracking and SSmarking. This is nearly the same
clause as in (191); the details of the SRP can be found there.
(213) Èm
e˜m−
[3s:rfl]−
s´¯au
sO´:
sit down.pf
[∅−
[3s]−
h´¯ebàch`¯e
¯
he´:ba`=tse˜:]
enter.pf=when.SS
‘She1 sat down when she1 came in.’ (f.n.)
vP
pro[1]
v◦ VP
sat down
CP
SRP
pro[1]
SR◦
[8],[DS]
TP
came in
C◦
when
[uSR: DS],[8]
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Here is the semantic composition of the CP:
CP : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λxλs. WHEN(ιs′. D(s′) &
x1 = x & came in(x1)(s′))(s)
λ8 λs. WHEN(ιs′. D(s′) &
x1 = g(8) & came in(x1)(s′))(s) : 〈s, t〉
SRP : 〈s, t〉
λs. x1 = g(8) & came in(x1)(s)
when : 〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉
λpλs. WHEN(ιs′. D(s′) & p(s′))(s)
The CP then adjoins to vP, and the subject merges as the anti-pivot:
λs. agent(x1)(s) & sat down(x1)(s) & WHEN(ιs′. D(s′) &
x1 = x1 & came in(x1)(s′))(s)
DP : e
x1
λxλs. agent(x)(s) & sat down(x)(s)
& WHEN(ιs′. D(s′) &
x1 = x & came in(x1)(s′))(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λxλs. agent(x)(s) &
sat down(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
CP : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λxλs. WHEN(ιs′. D(s′) &
x1 = x & came in(x1)(s′))(s)
4.4.4 Recursion
An important property of switch-reference is that it is recursive. Narratives
often contain long sequences of SR-marked clauses, and Finer (1984) showed that
an embedded clause’s anti-pivot is its immediately dominating clause. Thus, any
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theory of switch-reference ought to work recursively. In this subsection I will show
that the mechanisms proposed for pivot and anti-pivot selection work recursively.
As a demonstration I will provide a Kiowa example with situation-tracking. I
could not elicit recursively-embedded adverbial clauses, but these are recursive as
well.
The following example demonstrates the recursivity of switch-reference with
coordinating conjunctions. The sequence (214) is slightly adapted from a story
about the Cutthroat Massacre of 1833.
(214) Jógúl
young man
f´¯a
one
cául
buffalo
é
[3d:3s]
hòlhèl
kill.pf-evid
nàu
and.DS
Gùsâuzèbàut
Osage+arrow
é
[3s]
â
¯
d`¯od`¯e
bear.impf.evid
nàu
and.DS
hégáu
then
fénhè
¯
butcher+without
cául
buffalo
é
[3d:3s]
t`¯odèhèl
abandon.pf-evid
gàu
and.SS
t´¯auchò
this way
j`¯of´¯egù
homeward
én
[3d]
qòmv`¯adààihèl.
take flight.pf-evid
‘The two young men killed a buffalo and it had an Osage arrow in it, and
they left the buffalo there without butchering it, and fled back home.’ (Cut-
throat Massacre, ms.)
Let’s focus on the first three clauses, which demonstrate the recursion. Since we
have DS marking, each clause has a different topic situation from the next. Thus,
I assign them situations s1, s2, and s3. The third clause may have the same topic
situation as the first, so s3 may be s1, but I will stick with s3 for this discussion.
conj SR top. sit. clause
s1 two young men killed a buffalo
and DS s2 it bore an Osage arrow
and DS s3 they abandoned the buffalo without butchering (it)
Table 4.1. Schema of a string of SR clauses
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For the purposes of clarity, I will abbreviate the clauses. Since the only relevant
argument is the topic situation, the clauses will become as follows:
conj SR top. sit. clause
s1 killed
and DS s2 bore
and DS s3 abandoned
The second and third clauses conjoin as we saw in sections 4.2.3 and 4.4.1. The
result is in (215):
(215) a. [TP s2 bore [BP and DS s3 abandoned ] ]
b. !TP " = bore(s2) & s2 ! s3 & abandoned(s3) : t
This clause then undergoes switch-reference, leading to an SRP that is con-
nected by another BP.
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TP : t
killed(s1) & s1 ! s2 & bore(s2)
& s2 ! s3 & abandoned(s3)
s1 λs. killed(s) & s ! s2 & bore(s2)
& s2 ! s3 & abandoned(s3) : 〈s, t〉
λs. killed(s) : 〈s, t〉 λqλs. q(s) & s ! s2 & bore(s2)
& s2 ! s3 & abandoned(s3) : 〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉
B◦[uSR:DS],[8] :
〈〈s, t〉,〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉〉
λqλpλs. q(s) & p(s)
λ8 SRP : t
s2 ! g(8) & bore(s2)
& s2 ! s3 & abandoned(s3)
s2 : s
SR◦[DS],[8], [uI: 2]
λpλs. s ! g(8) & p(s) :
〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉
λ2 TP
This process can keep repeating, as predicted. It also works for entity pivots as
well, though in the interests of time I will not explicitly spell that process out.
4.5 Consequences from anti-pivot selection
The mechanism for anti-pivot selection accounts for the distribution of anti-
pivots and the effect of clause types on that distribution. However, it raises a few
issues that need to be addressed. The first concerns the interpretation of when-
clauses that are located outside the vP. The second concerns the fact that not all
anti-pivots are pivots. The third addresses the issue of anaphoric anti-pivot selec-
tion.
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4.5.1 Dislocated when-clauses
Under the present account, when-clauses must adjoin to vP. However, they are
often found (and interpreted) much higher in the structure. In (216), for instance,
we need to adjoin the CP to something of type 〈e, st〉, but the subject argument is
already saturated. There has to be a representation of the anti-pivot somewhere
below v◦ for the SR to be interpreted properly.
(216) [CP When DS John entered], Bill v◦ left
To account for this, we can turn to a solution offered by Moulton (2009) for a
similar problem with complement clauses (217). Moulton shows that these clauses
do not move, so they cannot reconstruct. However, they still need to be interpreted
low for binding purposes.
(217) [CP That he1’ll end up looking like his father ] doesn’t seem to any young
man1 to be very likely . (p. 91)
His solution relies on the semantics of de re ascription. The attitude predicate
takes among is arguments a res argument (Chierchia 1989; Percus & Sauerland
2003). The res of any attitude is the object to which the attitude ascribes a descrip-
tion. In (218), the res is John. The belief can be said to be about him; indeed the res
can be expressed overtly.
(218) Mary said (x1) that he1 likes fish.
(219) Mary said about John1 that he1 likes fish.
For this ascription to work, the CP must express a property, rather than a
proposition. Thus, the C◦ head bears an index, which binds a variable inside the
CP (an A-binding structure).
(220) [CP λ1 [ λs. he1 likes fish (s) ] ] = λxλs. x likes fish (s)
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This property CP is an argument of the attitude predicate, which applies it to
the res.
(221) λs.say(λxλs. x likes fish(s))(x1)(s)
λxλs. say(λxλs. x likes fish(s))(x)(s)
λPλxλs.say(P)(x)(s) CP : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λxλs. x likes fish(s)
DP : e
x1
res
That is how CPs work at their base site. To account for left-dislocated CPs,
Moulton proposes that the property argument is replaced by a variable (P) of type
〈e,〈s, t〉〉. Below the CP’s high insertion site, a λ-operator binds this variable. The
fronted CP is inserted afterwards, and is thus applied ‘low’, despite being high (p.
109).
(222) [CP That he1 might be too old to WORK for Mrs. Brown2 ], I don’t think
she2 would want any man1 to accept.
λs. ∀y man(y)(s)→ believe([λxλs. too-old-for-Mrs.B(x)(s)])(y)(s)
Fronted CP
λxλs. too-old-for-Mrs.B(x)(s)
λP main clause
λs. ∀y man(y)(s)→ believe(P)(y)(s)
This solution applies to when-clauses just as easily. The switch-reference clause
is already a property of the anti-pivot. We can replace the entire CP with a vari-
able. Let’s call this variable A (for adjunct). It is of type 〈e,〈s, t〉〉. Thus, it combines
by Predicate Modification. This tree then composes normally. When the subject is
merged, it saturates the entity argument for A.
(216) [CP When DS John entered], Bill left.
236
vP : 〈s, t〉
λs. agent(John)(s) & sat(s) & A(John)(s)
DP : e
Bill
vP : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λxλs. agent(x)(s) & sat(s) & A(x)(s)
vP : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λxλs. agent(x)(s) & left(s)
A : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
At the point where the CP is inserted, a λ-operator binds A.
(223)
〈s, t〉 :
λs. agent(John)(s) & sat(s)
& [λxλs. WHEN(ιs′. D(s′) & x ! Bill & left(Bill)(s′))(s)](John)(s)
CP : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λxλs. D(s′) & WHEN(ιs′. x ! Bill
& left(Bill)(s′))(s)
λAλs. agent(John)(s) & sat(s) &
A(John)(s) : 〈〈e,〈s, t〉〉,〈s, t〉〉
λA λs. agent(John)(s) & sat(s) &
A(John)(s)
. . .
vP A
If we convert the root clause, the expression comes to mean (224), the desired
result.
(224) ! (223) " = λs. agent(John)(s) & sat(s) & WHEN(ιs′. D(s′) & John ! Bill &
left(Bill)(s′))(s) : 〈s, t〉
4.5.2 Pivots aren’t always anti-pivots
One important observation that Jacobsen (1967) made about switch-reference
is that the pivot of one SR morpheme serves as the anti-pivot of an SR morpheme
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embedded under it, and that the anti-pivot of an embedded SR morpheme serves
as the pivot of an SRmorpheme in its own clause. This effect is visible when several
clauses are linked by SR morphemes. In (225), the subject24 of the third clause is
pro, but DS marking indicates a change from the subject before it. It may co-refer
with the first sentence’s subject, or it might refer to another person altogether. In
(225), the second clause is the pivot clause of the first SR marker, as well as the
anti-pivot clause of the second.
(225) Yísàum
j´i:sO˜m
Y.
∅−
[3s]
h´¯ebàhèl
he´:b-a-hel
enter-pf-evid
nàu
nO˜
and.DS
∅−
[3s:3s]
dónhêl
d´˜on-heˆl
look at.pf-evid
nàu
nO˜
and.DS
∅−
[3s:3s]
j´¯onê. . .
t´˜o:-nˆ˜e:
say.impf.evid
‘Yisaum1 came in and he*1/2 looked at him and he1/*2/3 said. . . ’
This property of pivots appears so evident that it might seem barely worth
mention. However, it does not follow from the configurational hypothesis that I
successfully tested in Chapter 3. In fact, from that hypothesis, it follows that in
certain configurations, the anti-pivot cannot be the pivot of its own clause.
In particular, if a conjoined clause contains awhen-clause, like in (226) the anti-
pivot of the SR morpheme in the when-clause is the conjoined clause’s subject, but
the pivot of the SR morpheme of the conjoined clause is the topic situation.
24As I point out in my other sample, SR on coordination can look to be subject-tracking if the
topic situations co-extend with the subjects, and suggested that this was common in narratives
where no question is under discussion.
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(226) À
a−
[1s]
ch´¯o
¯
chàn,
ts´˜o+tsa˜n,
crawl+arrive.pf
gìgáu
gigO´
and:SS:then
dè
de−
[1s:rfl]
k´¯ı
¯
fáu
kh´ı:p-’O
jump up-pf
gàt
gja`P−
[1s:3pa]
b´¯o
¯
ch`¯e
¯
.
b´˜o:=tse˜:
see.pf=when.DS
‘I snuck in, and then I ran off when I saw them.
This conclusion is not predicted by any other account of switch-reference, but
it follows naturally from the account presented here. The anti-pivot of the SR
morpheme ch`¯e
¯
will be the subject, but the pivot of that clause will be the topic
situation. This is a welcome, though surprising, result.
4.5.3 Other non-referential subjects
This account predicts that switch-reference can handle quantificational piv-
ots. This subsection will show that it can handle other types of non-referential
targets— bound variable pivots and anti-pivots, and wh-pivots.
4.5.3.1 Bound variable subjects
If switch-reference requires some kind of reference, we might wonder how it
works when its pivot is interpreted as a bound variable. As it turns out, switch-
reference operates normally. The sentence in (227) has a bound variable interpre-
tation, and SS marking appears. In (228), the DS marking is used, and the bound
variable interpretation is not allowed.
(227) Háun
h´˜On
neg
hájél
ha´te´l
person/indef
[èm
Pe˜m−
[3s:rfl]
gúnm´¯auch`¯e
¯
]
gu´n-mO˜:=tse˜:
dance-impf=when.SS
èm
Pe˜m
[3s:rfl]
d´¯auj`¯aug`¯u
dO´:+tO:-gu:
sing+act-neg
‘Nobody sang1 while they1 danced.’ (f.n.)
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(228) Háun
h´˜On
neg
hájél
ha´te´l
person/indef
[èm
Pe˜m−
[3s:rfl]
gúnm´¯au`¯e
¯
]
gu´n-mO˜:=Pe˜:
dance-impf=when.DS
èm
Pe˜m
[3s:rfl]
d´¯auj`¯aug`¯u
dO´:+tO:-gu:
sing+act-neg
‘Nobody sang1 while he/she2 danced.’ (f.n.)
This result is predicted by the theory proposed in Chapter 4, even though nei-
ther the pivot nor the anti-pivot are referential. The bound variable is inserted as
the pivot. It bears an index, so it can be bound by the higher quantified subject.
Since the two subjects co-refer, SS marking is found.
(227′) [ [ ¬∃x person(x) ] λ1 [vP x1 [ [.CP when x1 SS danced ] [ v◦ VP ] ] ] ]
When the pivot is not bound, it is interpreted with respect to the assignment
function (i.e., it is anaphoric). DS marking is found.
(228′) [ [ ¬∃x person(x) ] λ1 [vP x1 [ [.CP when x2 DS danced ] [ v◦ VP ] ] ] ]
We can see how these results follow from the theory proposed in Chapter 4, by
looking at the following derivation. Here is the LF of the CP, with its denotation in
(229), slightly simplified:
CP
λ8
SRP
x1
SR◦[8],[SS] . . .
C◦
when
(229) !CP " = λxλs. AT(ιs′. x = x1 & dance(x1)(s′))(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
This CP is adjoined to the vP. The subject that saturates the anti-pivot property
is the lower copy of the quantifier, which is interpreted as a variable, as shown by
the corresponding semantic structure.
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vP
x1
CP
when x1 SS danced
v◦ VP
sang
vP : 〈s, t〉
λs. agent(x1) & sang(x1)(s) &
AT(ιs′. x1 = x1 & dance(x1)(s′))(s)
x1 λxλs. agent(x) & sang(x)(s) &
AT(ιs′. x = x1 & dance(x1)(s′))(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λxλs. agent(x)(s)
& sang(x)(s) : 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
CP: 〈e,〈s, t〉〉
λxλs. AT(ιs′. x = x1
& dance(x1)(s′))(s)
The derivation proceeds normally, then the raised quantifier merges. Since it
has moved, a λ-operator adjoins to the sister of the DP. This operator binds the
variable copy, and since the pivot has the same index, the operator binds it, too.
The resulting projection (which I label XP below) is then the input to the quantifier.
DP
nobody
XP
λ1 vP
x1
CP
when x1 SS danced
. . .
(230) !XP " = λxλs. agent(x) & sang(x)(s) & AT(ιs′. x = x & dance(x)(s′))(s) :
〈e,〈s, t〉〉
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In the example that lacks a bound variable interpretation, the pivot’s index
does not match that of the quantifier (technically, that of its binder). Thus, it is
ignored, and cannot co-refer to it.
DP
nobody
XP
λ1 vP
x1
CP
when x2 DS danced
. . .
(231) !XP " = λxλs. agent(x) & sang(x)(s) & AT(ιs′. x ! x2 & dance(x2)(s′))(s) :
〈e,〈s, t〉〉
As we saw in the previous chapter, switch-reference has no problemwith quan-
tified pivots. This discussion shows that it has no problem with quantified anti-
pivots, or with bound variable pivots.
4.5.3.2 Wh-subjects
Another kind of non-referential subject is the wh-subject. Switch-reference
behaves as the present theory predicts it should. With coordination, SS or DS
marking is available when the conjoined clauses have wh-subjects (or any wh-
expressions, for that matter). As we saw in Chapter 3, the context determines
whether SS or DS marking appears, since what is being tracked is the topic situa-
tion, rather than the subject. The wh-movement takes the wh-word to [Spec, CP],
past the SRP projection. Thus, the wh-movement does not affect switch-reference.
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(232) Hâjêl
haˆ:teˆl
person\wh
chói
tso´i
coffee
∅−
[3s:3s]
b´¯au
bO´:
bring.pf
gàu
gO
and.SS
hâjêl
haˆ:teˆl
person\wh
chóigùl
tso´i+gul
liquid+red
∅−
[3s:3s]
b´¯au?
bO´:
bring.pf
‘Who brought coffee, and who brought tea?
(233) Háundè
h´˜Onde
thing/wh
bé
be´−
[2s:3i]
b´¯au,
bO´:
bring.pf,
gàu
gO
and.SS
hágà
ha´gjæ
where:at
bé
be´−
[2s:3i]
sép?
se´p
put/sg.pf
‘What did you bring, and where did you put it? (f.n.)
With embedded clauses, switch-reference tracks subjects, even if one is a wh-
expression. Wh-anti-pivots are no more a problem for this theory than any other
quantificational anti-pivot; the anti-pivot is the variable copy in the [Spec, vP]
position (234). Wh-pivots do not appear in adverbial clauses in Kiowa (235), so
switch-reference is untestable with them.
(234) Hâjêl
haˆ:teˆl
person/wh
[èm
Pe˜m−
[3s:rfl]
gúnm´¯auch`¯e
¯
]
gu´n-mO˜:=tse˜:
dance-impf=when.SS
èm
Pe˜m
[3s:rfl]
d´¯auj`¯aug`¯u
dO´:+tO:-gu:
sing+act-neg
‘Who1 sang while they1 danced?’ (f.n.)
(235) *Ém
Pe´m−
[2s:rfl]
k´¯ıf`¯au
kh´ı:pO:
exit.pf
[hâjêl
haˆ:teˆl
person/wh
∅−
[3s]
chán`¯e
¯
]?
ts´˜an=e˜:
arrive.pf=when.DS
You left when who arrived? (f.n.)
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4.6 Summary
This chapter has offered a new theory of switch-reference. It employs a com-
bination of syntactic and semantic structures to derive the observations that have
been made in this dissertation. In doing so, this analysis highlights the ways that
the two modules of the grammar seem to work together to derive surface phenom-
ena. The derivations also made interesting and correct predictions about other
facets of switch-reference phenomena.
The theory proposed in this chapter was crafted to capture the generalizations
about Kiowa, but is intended to apply cross-linguistically. In the final chapter,
we will discuss some of the issues concerning other languages. We will also dis-
cuss briefly a few open questions about Kiowa switch-reference that seem to be
promising.
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CHAPTER 5
ISSUES OF FURTHER PURSUIT
The previous chapter introduced a theory of switch-reference that accounts for
the generalizations presented earlier in this dissertation. In this final chapter will
examine some additional phenomena that this theory accounts for, as well as a
couple that I have not been able to completely test for so far. In section 5.1 we will
look at a few unresolved issues concerning switch-reference in Kiowa. Section 5.2
will discuss issues concerning the extension of this account to what is known about
other switch-reference languages. It does not offer any solid answers, in large part
because what we know about these languages is limited. Finally, section 5.3 closes
the dissertation with some remarks on what I hope this work has accomplished.
5.1 Further issues in Kiowa
In the previous chapter, we saw that the theory of switch-reference proposed
here had many welcome consequences and verified predictions. In this section,
we will look at three issues where the evidence has not revealed a certain result.
These are the use of switch-reference with expletives, the restriction of anti-pivots
to subjects despite high applicatives that might provide a valid adjunction site, and
the mechanism that forces the SR pronoun to be bound, rather than anaphoric.
5.1.1 Expletive subjects
Another non-referential pivot to explore is the expletive. Expletives are per-
haps the quintessential non-referential subject, since syntactic theory proposes
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that they are meaningless constituents used solely to satisfy syntactic constraints.
Since expletives by definition do not refer, we might predict that switch-reference
should only treat them in one of two ways:
a) Switch-reference cannot appear, due to the identity relation requiring refer-
ence of both its arguments.
(that is, without reference there can be no switch-reference)
b) It always appears with DS marking, since the identity relation will never be
one of identity.
(that is, without reference there can be no identity)
This prediction is wrong: Neither seem to be the case. In fact, the switch-
reference facts suggest that expletives are referential. Granted, very little research
has been done on the matter. Langdon & Munro (1979) provides the only study of
expletives, where they find a stark preference for SS marking in Yuman languages
(of California)
(236) nya-ipily-k
when-be hot-SS
hupak-mot-m
snow-neg-tns
‘When it’s hot, it doesn’t snow.’
(237) nya-hupak-m
when-snow-DS
hačur-k
be cold-tns
‘When it snows, it’s cold. (Mojave; Langdon & Munro 1979)
Evidence from Kiowa also suggests that expletives are referential. Expletives
can trigger default 3rd-person plural agreement (238), or they can trigger 3rd-
person singular agreement (239).
(238) Kídêl
kh´ıdeˆl
yesterday
gà
gjæ−
[3p]
sál.
sa´l
be hot
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‘Yesterday it was hot.’
(239) Mîn
mˆ˜ın
about to
[ ]
∅−
[3s]
sôyà
soˆ:-ya
descend/sg-impf
‘It’s about to rain’1
What about switch-reference? The evidence suggests that weather expletives
are referential. With coordination, I found a preference for SS marking in simple
elicitation (240). With subordination, the preference is for DS marking, both in
elicitation (241) and in texts.
(240) Gà
gja−
[3p]
hôjèàumgà
hoˆ:te+PO˜m-gja
dark+make-Detr.pf2
gàu
gO
and.SS
gà
gja−
[3p]
th´¯oàumgà.
t’o´:+PO˜m-gja
cold+make-Detr.pf
‘It got dark and it got cold.’ (f.n.)
(241) Gà
gjæ−
[3p]
c`¯odóth`¯oàumdèp
ko:do´+tĳo:+PO˜m-dep
very much+cold+make-Detr.impf
´¯e
¯
h`¯au`¯e
¯
´˜e:hO´:=Pe˜:
this:here=when.DS
àn
a˜n
hab
∅−
[3s]
thóls´¯oyà.
tĳo´l+so:-ya
snow+descend/sg-impf
‘When it gets very cold here, it snows a lot.’ (f.n.)
When an adverbial clause is adjoined to a matrix clause with a DP subject, DS
marking is required (242).3
1This Kiowa example can also refer to the past (i.e., ‘it was about to rain’), in a different context.
2Kiowa uses the detransitive form of the verb ´¯a
¯
um´¯e, ‘make, do’, to express changes of state (it
generally translates ‘become’).
3I did not use contexts to test for the possibility of SS marking with adverbial clauses joining
two clauses with expletive subjects.
247
(242) a.
∅−
[3s]
Sépd´¯au`¯e
¯
se´p+dO:=e˜:
descend+be=when.Diff
háun
h´˜On
not
gûi
guˆ-j
outside-to
bàt
bak−
[1pi]
kîy`¯au.
khˆı:-yO:
exit-impf
‘When it rains we don’t go outside.’ (f.n.)
b. * Sépd´¯auch`¯e
¯
háun gûi bàt kîy´¯au.
If switch-reference with coordinating conjunctions tracks topic situations, we
should see effects derived from the semantics of topic situations, and we do. For
instance, in (243), the preferred SS marking is elicited in a context about a single
day.4
Context:
I ask you how the weather was today.
(243) G´¯ı
¯
gàu
g´˜ı:gO
morning
∅-
[3s]
c`¯odó+sèp+d`¯au
ko:wdo´+se´p+dO:
much+rain+be
gàu
nO˜
and.SS
hègáu
hegO´
already
k´¯ısàujàu
kh´ı:sOtO
afternoon
gà
gja-
[3p]
ás`¯auldèd`¯au.
a´sO:lde+dO:
drizzle+be
‘This morning it rained a lot, and this afternoon it drizzled’ (f.n.)
However, DS marking is easily obtained if the context is right. The adverbials
in (244) refer to the recent past, in the actual world, and the future, which is not
in the actual world. In a situation semantics, these different worlds are simply
different (maximal) situations, and the topic situations the adverbials describe are
part of these ‘worlds’. Thus, the two topic situations cannot be identical, so we get
DS marking.
4The contrast on the adverbials suggest that the two clauses describe different parts of the same
day.
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Context:
I ask you when a good time will be weather-wise to go for a walk. You
suggest right now, with the following reason:
(244) ´¯E
¯
hàudèkì
¯
´˜e:hO-de`+kh˜ı
today
∅−
[3s]
sépd`¯au
se´p+dO:
descend+be
nàu
nO˜
and.DS
k`¯a
¯
hìgàu
khjæ˜:higO
tomorrow
gà
gjæ-
[3p]
ás`¯auldèd`¯auth`¯au.
a´sO:lde+dO-tĳO:
drizzle+be-mod
‘It was raining this morning and it will drizzle tomorrow’ (f.n.)
The following examples support the notion that situations are involved, rather
than spatiotemporal locations. (245) shows that a contrast in spatial location is
not sufficient for switch-reference, while (246) shows that temporal location is not
sufficient.
(245) ´¯E
¯
hàu
´˜e:hO
here
∅−
[3s]
sépd`¯au
se´p+dO:
descend/sg+be
gàu
gO
and.SS
´¯auhàu
PO´:-hO
there
∅−
[3s]
gómcòt.
go´m+koP
wind+be strong
‘It is raining here and it’s windy over there.’ (f.n.)
(246) K´¯ıdêl
kh´ı:deˆl
yesterday
∅−
[3s]
sépd`¯au
se´p+dO:
descend/sg+be
gàu
gO
and.SS
´¯e
¯
h`¯audek`¯ı
´˜ehO:dekhi:
today
∅−
[3s]
gómcòt.
go´m+koP
wind+be strong
‘It was raining yesterday and it was windy today.’ (f.n.)
The notion that some expletives are referential is actually in line with a lot of
recent research. For instance, several have argued for expletives referring to events
or spatiotemporal locations in a variety of languages (Erteschik-Shir 1997; Felser &
Rupp 2001; Jäger 2001; Carminati 2002; Kiss 1995; Devine & Stephens 2006: inter
alia). The notion is not even new; even Chomsky (1981) suggests that weather
expletives might refer.
The facts I describe above for Kiowa strongly suggest that weather expletive
clauses involve a situation that restricts interpretation. However, before claiming
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this with certainty, we need an understanding of how expletives work with sit-
uation semantics. Saying that the expletive involves a situation does not tell us
enough, because there are multiple situations in the clause, any of which could
provide the requisite spatiotemporal restriction, even if they are not referential.
If the situation in question is the topic situation, it is inserted independently
of the expletive subject, which would be null (247a).5 If there is no topic situ-
ation (say, in an intensional embedded clause), the existentially quantified-over
event situation could provide enough meaning, without recourse to an expletive
situation (247b). Or, there could be an ‘expletive’ pronoun referring to a situation
(247c), inserted as an argument of the verb.
(247) It rained.
a. ! s1 it rained " = PAST(s1) & ∃s′[ s′ ≤ s1 & rain(s′) ] : t
b. ! λs. it rained (s) " = λs. ∃s′[ s′ ≤ s & rain(s′) ] : 〈s, t〉
c. ! s1 it2 rained " = PAST(s1) & ∃s′[ s′ ≤ s1 & rain(s2)(s′) ] : t
In addition, if the expletive refers, the predicate has to be different as well. It
would either have to have a V◦ head of type 〈s,〈s, t〉〉 or a v◦ head that resulted in
an expression of type 〈s,〈s, t〉〉. More investigation is warranted, since the result
would make a difference for how we understand switch-reference with expletives.
Perhaps, then, the switch-reference facts can help us better understand how ex-
pletives work. For instance, if expletives rely on the topic situation, they should
not work with switch-reference in intensional clauses. If, however, expletive situa-
tions are arguments to the verb, they ought to work with any clause, but we would
have to include a new SR head, that takes propositions but still tracks a situation.
Further investigation ought to be quite informative.
5These denotations are partially simplified, to remove irrelevant details.
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What about other types of expletive subjects? It isn’t clear that Kiowa has
any. In Kiowa, attitude complement clauses trigger plural object agreement on
the verb (Watkins 1984). If we assume that attitude clauses are adjuncts that de-
scribe a pronominal argument (Koster 1978; Kiss 2002; Moulton 2009: inter alia),
this agreement is predicted. However, objects never serve as pivots, so we would
need to look at sentential subjects (which are also adjuncts), which should trig-
ger plural subject agreement. However, Kiowa does not allow sentential subjects.
Kiowa psych verbs also do not provide evidence in this regard. These have dative-
marked attitude holders, which would be the highest argument in the clause, and
thus the pivot.
All told, expletives are an interesting phenomenon for switch-reference, and
may shed some light on the nature of expletives themselves. Unfortunately, it
seems that we run into practical limits trying to understand this issue by looking
solely at Kiowa. Perhaps we could learn more from a switch-reference language
with a wider variety of expletive constructions.
5.1.2 Other possible adjunction sites
In the previous chapter, I argued that adverbial clause CPs are restricted by the
meaning added by SR to join at only one position, below [Spec, vP]. This restric-
tion, which emerges from the syntax and the semantics, derives the observation
that the dominant clause subject is the anti-pivot of the embedded SR marker.
However, in the examples we’ve seen so far, there is only one place of the right se-
mantic type inside the vP: right below the subject insertion site at [Spec, vP]. What
happens, then with applicatives? The merge of Appl◦ to VP results in a node of
type 〈e,〈s, t〉〉, right below the insertion site of the applicative argument. Thus, the
semantics should not prevent the CP from adjoining to ApplP. This means that the
presence of an applicative might have an effect on SR marking.
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Adger & Harbour (2007b) and Adger et al. (2009) argue for a high applicative
projection in Kiowa, which hosts datives, benefactives, and other ‘indirect objects’.
This projection is situated between VP and vP.
(248) Hét
hort
[n`¯au
I
gàu
and
ám]
you
chégùn
dog
t´¯o
¯
sè
bones
bédê
[1di:3d:3s]
`¯a
¯
u.
give.pf.imper
‘Let’s you and I give two bones to the dog. (Adger et al. 2009)
vP
DP
n′au gàu ám v◦ ApplP
DP
chégùn Appl◦ VP
t´¯o
¯
sè bédê `¯a
¯
u
Watkins (1993) provides an example that seems to involve a dative anti-pivot.
The dative-marked possessor (an applicative DP) is tracked instead of the nomi-
native internal argument possessum (249). However, this example has SR marking
with coordination, so the switch-reference is tracking the topic situation, rather
than any of the nominal arguments.
(249) Góm+j´¯a
¯
gá
wind+grease
á−
[∅:3s:3s]
d´¯a
¯
u-mê
be-evid
gàu
and.SS
∅−
[3s:3s]
báuláu+f`¯aul`¯e
butter+eat:impf.evid
‘He had mentholatum (Mentholatum was to him) and he was eating it like
butter.’ (Watkins 1993)
In addition, (249) has an intransitive dative, so the applicative DP would be
highest anyways. What we need is an example with a ditransitive, something like
the Kiowa sentence (250). If the anti-pivot can be the applicative (his daughter),
we should see that SS marking is possible.
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(250) Bill gave his daughter a dog when she visited.
I suspect that DS marking is the only one allowed, but I have not tested it with
contexts. If this suspicion is correct, the proposed theory has to provide some
explanation. I would suspect a syntactic restriction; a category restriction on ad-
junction of CPs. Essentially, CPs cannot be adjoined to an ApplP.
5.1.3 Anaphoric anti-pivots
One final issue arises from the nature of the SR◦ head. This head introduces a
variable that gets bound by the connective. But what makes it get bound? Seman-
tically, there is no way to force it to be bound, which predicts that there should SR
should be able to appear in at least some languages in matrix clauses, without a
connective. However, this is never the case.6 There must be some syntactic reason
for this obligation to be bound.
As an obligatorily bound variable, the SR-pronoun is like other embedded pro-
nouns that are bound at C◦, like PRO, logophors, long-distance anaphors, etc.
These too must be bound. There is no clear consensus on how to ensure so, and
I admit that I have not found a solution for switch-reference. So this remains an
open question.
5.2 Issues with cross-linguistic extension
The theory I proposed in Chapter 4 focused on explaining the facts of switch-
reference in Kiowa, where the most study had been conducted. However, the the-
ory is meant to apply cross-linguistically, since the generalizations that fed the
6Watkins (1993) discusses a couple of cases in Kiowa where a coordinated clause is used in
relation to a salient situation, rather than the topic situation of the previous utterance (if there was
one). This is intriguing, since it allows for the anti-pivot situation to be, say the local situation to
the speaker. But this phenomenon is not quite what I am describing, since in the Kiowa case a
conjunction is still required. Sentential coordination is often used this way in natural language.
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desiderata of the theory are cross-linguistic. Unfortunately, the bulk of the descrip-
tive work done on switch-reference languages is not suitable for this task, since
it includes little description of syntactic structure and even less on clause-level
semantics. More theory-driven elicitation with semantic fieldwork techniques is
required for us to make the most applicable generalizations. However, we can get
a sense of the questions that elicitation might start by asking, and this section will
discuss some of those questions.
5.2.1 Recapitulative verbs
Switch-reference is found in many languages on reduced-form anaphoric pro-
verbs, called recapitulative verbs. These verbs are often fixed forms of verbs like
‘do’ or ’be’, and are frequently found in narration. The first clause in (251b) is an
example from Creek (Muskogean, Oklahoma) of a recapitulative verb, mo:mi- ‘it’s
like’, whose form is fixed.7 This verb bears SR-marking that relates to the previous
matrix clause.
(251) a. ma
that
ísti
person
a:ìati:s
went.about
‘That person went about’
b. mo:mi-n
be like-DS
ahakakáca
law.breaker
ìokáfa
to.be.whipped
anati
they
momi:hocikon
didn’t do it
ismonkatit
still
ômis
it is
‘Being like that, they have still not done it to the lawbreaker who was
to be whipped.’ (Creek, Martin (1998: 11))
7It is not certain whether this verb has no agreement or null 3rd-person agreement (i.e., default
agreement).
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The use of switch-reference recapitulative verbs has been widely attested in the
Muskogean languages, in the languages of New Guinea, and elsewhere. Notably,
it is found in clause-chaining environments, and it is not difficult to surmise why.
Clause-chains behave like coordinated clauses, at least as far as switch-reference
is concerned. Let’s assume that clause-chaining is coordination, but one where the
internal conjunct precedes the external one. This difference becomes important
in narration. When your language has sentential coordination, you can simply
connect clauses together by putting one at the left-edge of the second conjunct.
If there is switch-reference, you can even connect to other speakers’ clauses ((38),
pg. 59). However, clause-chains have their connective at the right edge, thus the
connectives cannot be used at the left-edge by themselves. Without a coordinating
conjunction at the left-edge the only way to connect two distinct chains is to repeat
the previous clause as a medial verb in a chain. This a very standard environment
for using a pro-verb, as the Amele example in (252) shows. The recapitulative verb
in (252b) refers to the entire clause in (252a).
(252) a. Sain
time
leih
some
dana
man
age
3p
jo
house
eundec
that kind
ben
big
ca
with
cehe-gi-na.
build-3p-pres
‘Sometimes the men make one of those houses bigger.’
b. Od-i-me-ig
do-Pred-SS-3p
cuamu
room
ijed
three
o
or
wal
four
oso
Indef
eu
that
odi
like
qahe-gi-na.
break-3p-pres
‘They divide it into three or four rooms.’ ((Stirling 1993; Roberts 1987))
Recapitulative verbs raise an interesting question about ellipsis that could be
very informative of the semantics and syntax of switch-reference. Essentially, how
does the SR morpheme access the elided pivot? I am not sure what the answer
might be, although theories of ellipsis should provide an excellent basis for in-
vestigation. The first step in addressing this question will be to figure out exactly
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what structure the pro-verb is replacing, and that will require some fieldwork on
these languages.
5.2.2 Complement clauses
Some languages have switch-reference in complement clauses. Choctaw is one
that is relatively well-studied, although no detailed semantic work has been done
on Choctaw complement clauses. Yet, they do not seem terribly out of the ordinary,
so we can get a decent preliminary sense of how the theory presented here can be
applied to its complement clauses, especially in attitude reports.
Broadwell (2006) observes that SR-marked complement clauses involve subject
tracking, as the following examples demonstrate.8
(253) Pisachokma-ka-t
handsome-comp-SS
ikhána-h
know-tns
‘He1 knows that he1 is handsome.’
(254) Pisachokma-ka
handsome-comp/DS
ikhána-h
know-tns
‘He1 knows that he2 is handsome.’ (Broadwell 2007: 264)
The subject-tracking is expected, since complement clauses of attitude pred-
icates are intensional. However, the semantics of complement clauses raises an
interesting question about the role of binding from C◦ in switch-reference.
Complement clauses in attitude reports are interpreted as properties, ascribed
to some argument in the matrix clause, called the res. The distinction is shown in
the English examples in (255), where an overt res is added. We can thus derive the
8Choctaw can form complement clauses in two ways. One is to use a complementizer, ka; this
clause has SR marking, where -t marks SS, and suprasegmental nasalization marks DS. The other
ways is to use a determiner, ma; this is case-marked, not SR-marked.
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distinction between de se readings of attitude clauses, which are about the attitude
holder, and de re readings, which are about something else.
(255) a. de se: x1 thinks (about x1) [ that λx. x is handsome ]
b. de re: x1 thinks (about x2) [ that λx. x is handsome ]
What is intriguing is the source of the CP property— it’s binding from C◦,
which is co-indexed with the res. This is interpreted as a binding structure, where
the index on C◦ is interpreted as a λ-operator binding a variable in the embedded
clause.
(256) a. de se: x1 thinks (about x1) [ C◦1 x1 is handsome ]
b. de re: x1 thinks (about x2) [ C◦2 x2 is handsome ]
Recall that under the theory proposed here, C◦ binds the SR variable, creating
a property of anti-pivots. It thus predicts that the anti-pivot, which is the attitude
holder (i.e. the matrix subject), will always be the res. However, this is not the case.
In 257, the matrix subject is not represented in the embedded clause.
(257) . . . am-ikhá
¯
na-akili-ttook
1sIII-know-indeed-DistPt
[naahollo’
white people
anopa’
language
anopoli-li-ahii-kiiyo-ka]
speak-1sI-irr-neg-comp/ds
‘. . . they knew that I didn’t speak English’ (Broadwell 2006)
Or is it? The semantics of switch-reference presented here claims that the anti-
pivot is represented in the pivot clause, though indirectly, by the SR pronoun.
However, the SR pronoun is bound by C◦, which independently binds a variable in
the clause as well. We might suspect, then, that SR-marked complement clauses,
whether SS or DS marked, are always de se: They describe the property of being
identical to or disjoint from the embedded subject.
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This suspicion does not seem correct. For one thing, it is implausible— the res
would always be bound by the anti-pivot. The verb agreement in (257) shows why.
The attitude predicate is marked for 1st person singular agreement, even though
the speaker is not the attitude holder. Third person agent marking is null, while
the am- prefix signals 1st person singular marking of class III. Class III markers
are used on verbs generally for indirect objects or possessors, and Broadwell argues
that they are actually the Class II markers with an applicative suffix.9 Abstracting
away from the technical details, it seems clear that the res argument is triggering
agreement of some kind. Thus, the res does not necessarily co-refer to the attitude
holder, and the complement clauses are not necessarily de re.10
If SR-marked complement clauses are not all de se, we have two other possi-
ble options to explore. First is that the complementizer can bind multiple objects.
That is, it has more than one index. For type reasons, these indices cannot both
be parsed as merging at the same projection; one could feed the C◦ or be the in-
terpretation of the head, while the other is interpreted above the head (259). This
‘double binding’ from C◦ would have the result that SR-marked attitude verbs
have one argument more than their non-SR counterparts do. This might have un-
welcome effects on the composition of complement clauses, or they might fit well;
more investigation is required.
(258) x1 [ v◦ [ thinks (of x2) [CP λ1 C◦1,2 λ2 [SRP x2 [ SR◦1 [ λx. x is handsome ]]]]]]
9To rule out the possibility of agent marking with know, note that 1st person singular agents are
marked by the class I marker -li, a suffix that is found in the embedded clause in this example.
10In a Choctaw de se environment, the attitude verb can be reflexivized.
(1) John-at
John-nom
[ pisachokma-ka-t
be:good looking-C-SS
] il-anokfillih
refl-think
‘John1 thinks that he1 is good looking’ (Broadwell 1997: 15)
Broadwell analyzes (1) as reflexive raising, since the elicitation can also lead to a sentence with
the embedded verb reflexived. Yet, we predict this reflexive if the res is represented in the agree-
ment, and is bound (since the clause is interpreted de se).
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A second option is for the SR pronoun to be bound by v◦, rather than C◦. Per-
haps it is not possible for an attitude complementizer C◦ to bear more than one
index, but the SR pronoun has to be bound. Rather than crashing, it is simply
bound by the next available binding functional head: v◦.
(259) x1 [ v◦1 [ λ1 [ thinks (of x2) [CP C◦2 λ2 [SRP x2 [ SR◦1 [ λx. x is handsome ]]]]]]]
Binding from v◦ would link the anti-pivot to the attitude holder with certainty,
and avoid problems with the semantic type of the CP. It is also very intriguing,
since it could well be extended to adverbial clauses. However, before settling
on this approach, there are drawbacks: It might encounter difficulties with lo-
cality, it removes the parallel to other CP types, which involve binding from C◦,
and it undermines the application of Moulton’s solution to CP dislocation (sec-
tion 4.5.1), which relies on the variable being saturated within the abstracted-over
constituent.
These different approaches to understanding switch-reference with comple-
ment clauses are each interesting, but at this point, none are developed past the
stage of suggestion. Detailed semantic investigation is required. Perhaps the
Choctaw language, where the descriptive groundwork has already been laid, is
the language best suited to this investigation.
5.2.3 Relative clauses
In a small number of languages, switch-reference is found on relative clauses.
The examples I am aware of are all in North America (Jacobsen 1983).11 If the
relative clause is externally-headed, the theory presented here faces the same issue
it did with complement clauses. Relative clauses are created byA-binding fromC◦,
11Austin (1981) in his typology of switch-reference in Australia uses the term ‘relative clause’
to describe adverbial clauses that are interpreted as temporally preceding or simultaneous to the
dominant clause, in contrast to ‘implicative clauses’ which are future-interpreted.
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whose index is interpreted as a λ-operator. Thus, the relative clause is a property
that will be ascribed to the head noun. If switch-reference involves binding from
C◦, we would expect the head noun to always be the anti-pivot. However, this is
not the case— the anti-pivot is the dominant clause subject. This is clear in the
following examples from Washo:
(260) k’ák’aP
heron
dá:
there
∅−gé:gel−i−š−ge
3-sit-impf-DS-Det.Acc
∅−yá:m−aP
3-speak to-aor
‘She spoke to a heron who was sitting there.’
(261) gitNaPmímiN
children
∅−bó:Niy-i-∅−ge
3-call-impf-SS-Det.Acc
∅−wehigí:githay-aP
3-tell what to do-aor
‘She called her children, whom she told what to do.’
(262) daPmóPmoP
woman
da
there
P−éP-∅-gi
3-be-impf-SS-Det.Nom
∅−p’ímewaP-aš
3-go out-aor
‘A woman who was there went outside’ (Peachey 2006)
Subject-tracking is a problem for externally-headed relative clauses. However,
Washo and the other switch-reference languages with SR marked relative clauses
have internally-headed relative clauses (IHRC’s). For instance, in Washo, the head
remains in the clause, if it is overt at all, while the clause final morpheme -ge/gi in-
dicates the case of the head noun. In this respect and a few others, Washo IHRC’s
resemble those found in Korean or Japanese. Min-Joo Kim (2004) effectively ar-
gued that IHRC’s involve a proposition (of type 〈s, t〉) embedded under a quan-
tificational relativizing head (Rel◦), which is in turn embedded inside a DP, from
which its projection QR’s. I suspect that switch-reference would work normally
with EHRC’s if they QR to the edge of VP, rather than to some higher projection,
but a lot of tweaking of Kim’s EHRC architecture might be required, and without
semantic fieldwork, it is not clear at this stage what tweaks would be indepen-
dently motivated.
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To summarize, to ensure that the theory of switch-reference proposed in Chap-
ter 4 has cross-linguistic import, we must examine how it behaves with other types
of embedded clauses. Unfortunately, any strong claims on these matters currently
elude us, since the previous investigation of these languages has not provided us
with the required data.
5.3 Closing remarks
This dissertation closes with what I hope to have accomplished by conduct-
ing this study. First and foremost, this dissertation offers a new theory of switch-
reference, based on the first critical look at switch-reference with both the syntax
and semantics in mind. This theory leads to an understanding of the syntax and
semantics of SRmorphemes themselves, it offers testable predictions for other lan-
guages that still have room for variation, and it can help understand the nature of
clause-chains.
The theory provides interesting results for our understanding of linguistic the-
ory. It ties switch-reference to other anaphoric embedding phenomena. It shows
that coherence effects— the scene-tracking— can emerge from reference-tracking.
It provides the first clear demonstration of morphology sensitive to situations, and
in doing so it provides a useful diagnostic for following topic situations.
This dissertation also offers two key benefits in a broader domain than the na-
ture of switch-reference. First, it demonstrates the value and necessity of theory-
driven elicitation in the field. Without a clear understanding of the meaning of
the expressions where switch-reference is found, we must hesitate to make strong
generalizations about its usage and distribution. Secondly, it is my profound hope
that the contents of this dissertation will, with the proper distillation, be able to in-
form teachers and learners of languages with switch-reference. Many of these lan-
guages, especially those in the Americas, are in grave danger of extinction. Only
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a concerted effort can preserve, maintain, or revitalize them. These efforts require
the most complete conscious understanding of the language possible, in order to
produce completely fluent speakers. Two genres that are only mastered by com-
pletely fluent speakers are extended dialogues and narratives. Switch-reference
plays an important role in both. Thus, any progress in our comprehension of
switch-reference should help us with our efforts to ensure these languages’ sur-
vival. Óbàhàu.
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APPENDIX A
GLOSSING ABBREVIATIONS
Agreement Prefixes
[α] intransitive
[α : β] transitive ( subject : direct object )
[∅ : α : β] intransitive dative ( null : nominative : dative subject)
[α : β : γ] ditransitive ( agent : direct object : indirect object )
[1s] 1st person singular
[1di] 1st person dual inclusive
[1dx] 1st person dual exclusive
[1pi] 1st person plural inclusive
[1px] 1st person plural exclusive
[2s] 2nd person singular
[2d] 2nd person dual
[2p] 2nd person plural
[3s] 3rd person singular
[3d] 3rd person dual
[3i] 3rd person inverse number
[3pa] 3rd person plural animate
[3pn] 3rd person plural inanimate
[rfl] reflexive
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Morpheme categories
abs Absolutive case
acc Accusative case
adv Adverbial clause connective
aor Aorist tense
aux auxiliary verb
bas basic number
decl declarative mood
def definite
detr detransitive
DistPt distant past tense
DS different subject/situation marking
erg ergative case
evid indirect evidentiality
hab habitual/generic aspect
hort hortative
icpt inceptive aspect
imper imperative mood
impf imperfective aspect
inch inchoative
indef indefinite
intj interjection
inv inverse number
irr irrealis mood
merge *the meaning of this gloss was not provided
mod modal
mv middle voice
neg negation verb-marking
nml nominalizing morpheme
nom nominative case
NonFut non-future relative tense
npst non-past tense
obl oblique argument
pf perfective aspect
pres present tense
prog progressive aspect
pt past tense
rcp reciprocal
RemPt remote past
sg singular verb stem
SS same subject/situation marking
tns unspecified tense
wh wh-form
X unknown gloss
y y-grade aspect
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APPENDIX B
INDEX OF LANGUAGES EXEMPLIFIED
Language Family Location Page(s)
Amele Gum Papua New Guinea 64, 87, 88, 104, 109,
111, 121-122, 127,
255
Apalı Emuan Papua New Guinea 64
Chickasaw Muskogean Oklahoma 63, 67, 69
Choctaw Muskogean Oklahoma/Miss. 57, 67-68, 70, 128-
129, 256-258
Creek Muskogean Oklahoma 67,254
Crow Siouan Montana 73, 86, 110, 113, 150
Diyari Pama-Nyungan Australia 81, 96, 129
Dogrib Athabaskan Canada 187
English Germanic UK/ex-colonies 53, 61, 140-147, 161,
174
French Romance France, etc. 62, 128
GtaP Munda India 85
Icelandic Germanic Iceland 101
Inuktituk Eskimo-Aleut Greenland 213
Kiowa Kiowa-Tanoan Oklahoma 9, 34-38, 40, 46, 50-
52, 56, 59, 60, 76, 81,
82, 96, 110, 114, 116-
118, 130-131, 152-
158, 160-163, 166,
169-172, 176, 192,
196, 208-209, 219,
229, 230, 232, 240,
243, 247-249, 252
Koasati Muskogean Louisiana 67
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Language Family Location Page(s)
Lakhota Siouan No./So. Dakota 107, 112, 113, 149
Latin Italic extinct 83
Mandan Siouan No. Dakota 63, 109
Maxakalí Jê Brazil 65
Mojave Yuman California 47, 113, 187, 246
Mpwarnte
Arrernte
Pama-Nyungan Australia 73
Nêlêmwa Austronesian New Caledonia 110
Pitjantjatjara Western Desert Australia 83, 111
Russian Slavic Russia 74
Seri isolate Mexico 57, 99, 100
Tauya Rai Coast P. New Guinea 85
Turkish Turkic Turkey 62
Washo Hokan California 58, 260
Yiddish Germanic E. Europe 74
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APPENDIX C
INDEX OF LANGUAGES MENTIONED
Algonquian language family, 53
Alyawana, 70
Arabana-Wangganguru, 70
Arawak language family, 53
Athapaskan language family, 53
Australian languages, 72
Bantu languages, 53,215
Caucasian languages, 53
Chechen, 212, 215
Dogrib, 186
Garwa-Wanyi, 70
Gugada, 70
Inuktituk, 212, 215
Jamul Tipaay, 70
Kiowa, 53
Kiowa-Tanoan language family, 78
Lenakel, 63
Muskogean language family, 53, 72
Numic language family, 53
Old Yiddish, 74
Omotic language family, 53
Piman language family, 53
Pitjantjatjara, 70, 115
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Pomoan languages, 53
Proto-Muskogean, 69
Seri, 92
Siouan language family, 53
Wagaya, 70
Yiddish, 73
Yuman language family, 246
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